List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

The Supreme Court overturned the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors that had quashed a sexual assault case against a teacher accused of rubbing a student's breast, based on a compromise between the victim's father and the teacher. The Court observed that such offenses, particularly under the POCSO Act the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, cannot be treated as private matters for compromise due to their serious societal impact.  

• Court ruled that sexual assault cases must proceed in the interest of justice, affirming that such crimes against children are heinous and cannot be settled privately. 

What was the Background of Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. Versus State of Rajasthan & Ors case? 

• On 6th January 2022, a teacher (the accused) allegedly sexually assaulted a Class XI student in a Higher Secondary School in Rajasthan when she was alone in the classroom. 
• The specific allegations were that the teacher:  
  • Checked through the window to ensure no one was nearby 
  • Approached the student from behind 
  • Patted her cheeks 
  • accused of rubbing the victim's breast 
  • When she ran away, he followed her and hurled casteist abuses including terms like 'dedh Chamar' 
• When the student sought help from other teachers:  
  • They asked her to remain silent about the incident 
  • The Principal made her sign a blank paper 
  • A teacher went to the victim's house and brought her mother to school claiming the girl was unwell 
• The victim was in a terrified state at school and couldn't speak to her mother. However:  
  • After reaching home, she disclosed the incident to her mother 
  • The mother informed the father, who was away in another village 
  • When the father returned the next day, the victim narrated the entire incident to him 
• On 8th January, 2022, the victim's father filed an FIR against the teacher under:  
  • Sections 354A, 342, 509, and 504 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 
  • Sections 7 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act,2012 
  • Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(b) & 3(2)(vii) of the SC/ST Act,1989. 
• On 31^th January, 2022, the accused teacher reached a compromise with the victim's father. 
• Following this compromise, the teacher filed a petition in the Rajasthan High Court seeking to quash the FIR. 
• After the High Court quashed the FIR, some concerned citizens from the same tehsil and district challenged this decision, leading to the present case. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court held that rubbing a child's breast constitutes "sexual assault" under Section 7 of POCSO Act, punishable with imprisonment between three to five years, and such offenses must be viewed as heinous and serious crimes against society. 
• The Court unequivocally established that sexual assault cases, particularly those occurring within educational institutions by teachers, cannot be classified as purely private matters and inherently carry serious societal impact. 
• The High Court's decision to quash the FIR based on compromise was deemed erroneous as it failed to properly examine the nature and gravity of the offenses and misapplied the law laid down in Gian Singh's case. 
• The Court emphatically ruled that POCSO Act offenses cannot be permitted to be settled through compromise, and a victim's father lacks the authority to enter into such settlements with the accused. 
• On the question of locus standi, the Court held that given the grave nature and societal impact of sexual assault, third parties can maintain petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution as prosecuting such offenders serves society's interest. 
• The Court mandated that before quashing any FIR, courts must consider whether the crime is against society or an individual, the nature and seriousness of the offense, its statutory classification, stage of proceedings, and circumstances of compromise. 
• The Court observed that the existence of a compromise between parties, even if it might affect conviction prospects, cannot be grounds for abruptly terminating investigation in cases of this nature. 
• Noting the victim's age (16 years), the alleged pressure to prevent report filing, and the suspiciously quick compromise (within 23 days), the Court emphasized that such circumstances demanded deeper scrutiny before accepting any compromise. 

Section 7 and Section 8 of POSCO Act 

• Section 7 deals with Sexual Assault. 
  • It states that "Whoever, with sexual intent touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child or makes the child touch the vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person or any other person, or does any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration is said to commit sexual assault." 
• The core of Section 7 is the presence of sexual intent in the act. 
• Specific Body Parts: The act of sexual assault is specifically defined as touching a child's vagina, penis, anus, or breast. These are the body parts listed under the law, and any contact with these parts, regardless of the manner, constitutes sexual assault under this provision. 
• Making the Child Touch: It’s not just the touching of the child that constitutes the offense; the law also covers situations where the accused makes the child touch their own or another person’s private body parts (vagina, penis, anus, or breast). 
• Physical Contact Without Penetration: The key aspect of "sexual assault" under Section 7 is that it involves physical contact without the need for penetration. Penetration is required for a more severe offense like rape under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). However, in the case of sexual assault, the contact is non-penetrative. 
• Other Acts with Sexual Intent: This section also includes other acts of sexual nature involving physical contact with sexual intent that do not fall into the specific categories mentioned above. Essentially, any inappropriate physical interaction with sexual intent that involves touching any private body part of the child falls under sexual assault. 

Section 8  

• Section 8 deals with punishment for Sexual Assault 
  • It states that "Whoever, commits sexual assault, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine." 
• Punishment Duration: The punishment for committing sexual assault is imprisonment for a term not less than three years. The minimum term ensures that there is a baseline penalty for the offense, highlighting its seriousness. The sentence can be extended up to five years depending on the specifics of the case and the discretion of the court. 
• Imprisonment of Either Description: This refers to imprisonment in either a rigorous (hard labor) or simple (without hard labor) form. The law gives courts flexibility in sentencing, though for sexual assault, a longer sentence (usually rigorous) may be imposed based on the seriousness of the offense. 
• Liability to Fine: The convicted person is also liable to pay a fine. The amount of the fine is not specified in Section 8 but can be determined by the court based on the facts and circumstances of the case.

Source: Punjab and Haryana High Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Kirti Singh held that once first anticipatory bail application is denied on merits the second application for same relief cannot be entertained by introducing new circumstances, development or material.                     

• The Punjab and Haryana High Court held this in the case of Sikander Singh v. State of Punjab and Another. 

What was the Background of Sikander Singh v. State of Punjab and Another Case? 

• A First Information Report was registered on the following facts: 
  • Two people were shot: a complainant and his father 
    • The complainant was hit in the left side of his abdomen 
    • The father was hit twice: once above his right wrist and once in his abdomen 
  • The victims cried out for help ("mar ditta mar ditta") 
  • The attackers then: 
    • Fled from the scene 
    • Were shouting threats as they ran ("raising lalkars") 
  • After the shooting: 
    • The complainant's brother-in-law (Sukhjinder Singh) arranged transport 
    • He took both victims to the hospital 
    • Sadly, the father died before reaching the hospital 
  • Key witness: 
    • The complainant's brother-in-law witnessed the entire incident 
• The final report was filed under Section 173 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) against Pargat Singh and Nachhatar Singh (father and brother of petitioner). 
• An application under Section 319 of CrPC was filed and the petitioner was summoned to face trial by way of issuance of bailable warrants. 
• Now the proceedings under Section 82 of CrPC have been initiated against the petitioner. 
• Apprehending the arrest for offences under Section 302, 307 and Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 25/27 of Arms Act, 1959, the petitioner approached the High Court for grant of anticipatory bail which was dismissed. 
• Thereafter, the petitioner filed the second petition under Section 482 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). 
• This second petition is before the High Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations?  

• The issue before the Court was whether second bail petition can be entertained when the first petition on the same facts has been dismissed. 
• The Court analyzed several case laws on this matter and held that once the first anticipatory bail application is denied the second bail application for the same cannot be entertained by making new arguments or twists or by introducing new circumstances. 
• Thus, the Court held that second bail application without any change in fact situation cannot be entertained. 
• The Court further held in this case that where non-bailable warrants have been issued and proclamation proceedings under Section 82 of CrPC are underway the anticipatory bail should not be granted. 
• Hence, the Court held that in such cases the anticipatory bail would undermine the judicial authority and encourage non-compliance of legal summons and warrants. 
• Accordingly, the Court denied the relief under the second anticipatory bail petition.  

What is Section 482 of BNSS? 

• Section 482 of BNSS provides the direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest. 
• This Section provides for a provision of pre arrest bail.  
• This provision was earlier found under Section 438 of CrPC. More on this can be accessed here. 
• Anticipatory bail: Important conditions and Forum (Section 482(1))

• The conditions that can be imposed while granting anticipatory bail (Section 482 (2))

• Consequences of grant of Anticipatory Bail (Section 482 (3)) 
  • If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on such accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail;  
  • and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should be issued in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under sub-section (1). 
• Exception to the grant of Anticipatory Bail (Section 482 (4)) 
  • This Section shall not apply in cases where accusation is made under Section 65 (Punishment for rape in certain cases) and Section 70(2) (Gang Rape on a woman under 18 years of age) of BNSS.

What are the Principles for Filing the Second Petition for Anticipatory Bail ? 

• Ganesh Raj v. State of Rajasthan (2005) 
  • The second or subsequent bail application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. can be filed if there is a change in the fact situation or in law which requires the earlier view being interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. 
  • Second or subsequent anticipatory bail application shall not be entertained on the ground of new circumstances, further developments, different considerations, some more details, new documents or illness of the accused. 
  • Under no circumstances the second or successive anticipatory bail application shall be entertained by the Section Judge/Additional Sessions Judge. 
• Maya Rani Guin and etc v. State of West Bengal (2003) 
  • The Full Bench of Calcutta High Court held that entertaining second anticipatory bail would amount to review or reconsideration of the earlier order passed by a Bench as the accusation remains unchanged. 
  • The Court answered the following question:  
    • Whether the applicant/accused can move second application for anticipatory bail in case his first application is rejected; if yes, in what contingencies before the same Court or to the superior court? 
  • The Court answered the above as follows: 
    • Under Section 438 CrPC a person can move to either High Court or Court of Session. 
      • In case a person chooses to move the Court of Session in the first instance and his application for grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 is rejected, he can again move the High Court for the same reason under Section 438 Cr. P.C. itself. 
    • where a person chooses to straightway move the High Court in the first instance and his application is rejected on the same set of facts and circumstances, he will not be entitled to move the Court of Session for the second time, but may invoke the extraordinary powers of the Supreme Court by seeking special leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. 
    • A person will be entitled to move the High Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, for the second time. 
      • He can do so only on the ground of substantial change in the facts and circumstances of the case due to subsequent events. 
      • However, he will not be entitled to move the second application on the ground that the Court on earlier occasion failed to consider any particular aspect or material on record or that any point then available to him was not agitated before the Court.

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh V. Asap Fluids Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. has held that arbitral tribunal has the authority to impose cost on the party who refrains the other party to participate in the arbitration proceedings by taking advantage of the minimum interference of the courts at referral stage. 

What was the Background of Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh V. Asap Fluids Pvt. Ltd. & Anr  Case? 

• In the present case, the petitioner is a Non-Indian Resident (NRI) and ASAP Fluids Pvt. Ltd (respondent No. 1) and  Gumpro Drilling Fluids Pvt. Ltd. (respondent No. 2) are Indian Private Ltd Companies. 
• The petitioner and respondents entered into Shareholder agreement where it was agreed that the petitioner was to hold 4,00,000 equity shares of respondent no. 1 and also participate in the management of respondent no.1 company. 
• The Managing Director of respondent no.2 informed the petitioner, that 2,00,010 equity shares of respondent no.1 which belong to the petitioner were being held by respondent no.2 in its name. 
• It was stated that the arrangement was made to provide comfort to the potential investors in the respondents and the shares shall not be pledged or sold at any time without the written consent of the petitioner.  
• At the time of sale of respondent no.1, it was confirmed that the value of these shares net of taxes would be paid to the petitioner or his nominee. 
• Subsequently the following agreements were executed by the respondent No. 1: 
  • A Service Agreement between Respondent No. 1, its Dubai subsidiary (ASAP Fluids DMCC), and the Petitioner 
  • A Commercial Expertise Agreement between the Petitioner and both Respondents 
• Under the Service Agreement:  
  • The Petitioner was appointed as Director of both Respondent No. 1 and its Dubai subsidiary 
  • He was responsible for the full operations of the Dubai subsidiary 
  • The appointment was for an initial period of 3 years. 
  • The agreement specified his remuneration and benefits 
• Under the Commercial Expertise Agreement:  
  • The Petitioner agreed to transfer his commercial expertise, knowledge, and experience to Respondent No. 1 
  • This included his expertise in government approvals, administrative, and legal aspects of the business 
  • In exchange, Respondent No. 1 agreed to issue 400,000 equity shares (₹10 each) to the Petitioner 
• Key Disputes:  
  • The Petitioner claims Respondent No. 2 failed to transfer 200,010 shares in Respondent No. 1 that belonged to him 
  • Respondent No. 1 allegedly failed to issue share certificates for the additional 200,010 shares 
  • Despite allegedly holding 400,000 equity shares per the Shareholders Agreement, the Petitioner never received the share certificates 
  • The Petitioner couldn't exercise his "Right of First Refusal" under Clause 6 of the Shareholders Agreement due to lack of share certificates. 
• Subsequently:  
  • The Petitioner made multiple requests for either the share certificates or equivalent monetary compensation 
  • He sent an Arbitration Notice to both Respondents. 
  • Due to no response from the respondents the petitioner filed two separate applications under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (A & C) for adjudication of disputes pertaining to the 4,00,000 equity shares and Arbitration clause was invoked. 
  • The Respondents replied after 10 months, denying all claims but appointing two arbitrators and called upon the petitioner to appoint the third arbitrator. 
  • The Respondents contested that the dispute over 200,010 shares couldn't be referred to arbitration 
  • The Petitioner eventually resigned as Director from both Respondent No. 1 and its Dubai subsidiary, which was accepted via Director's Resolution. 
• The Bombay High Court on the application held that the petitioner is a Non-Resident Indian who habitually resides and works in Dubai. The proceedings would constitute an “international commercial arbitration” and therefore, the Section 11 applications filed before it was not maintainable. 
• Aggrieved by the same the present petition has been filed by the petitioner before the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The observation of the Supreme Court are as follows: 
  • Limited Jurisdiction Recognition: 
    • The Court acknowledged concerns about parties being forced into arbitration due to the courts' limited jurisdiction under Section 11(6-A) of the A & C Act. 
    • Some parties might exploit this limited judicial interference to compel others into costly and time-consuming arbitration proceedings 
  • Scope of Court's Examination: 
    • At the referral stage, courts should only examine two aspects: 
      • The existence of a valid arbitration agreement between parties 
      • Whether the application for arbitrator appointment was filed within three years 
  • Powers of Arbitral Tribunal: 
    • The Arbitral Tribunal has authority to impose entire arbitration costs on parties who misuse the court's limited jurisdiction 
    • This acts as a safeguard against parties forcing others into unnecessary arbitration 
    • Courts should refer matters like time-barred claims and non-signatory inclusion to arbitration 
    • Detailed examination of such issues should be left to the Arbitral Tribunal 
  • Limitation Period Analysis: 
    • Courts should conduct only a prima facie examination of the limitation period 
    • Detailed evidentiary inquiry into time-barred claims should be avoided at the referral stage 
    • Such determinations are better left to the arbitrator's decision  
  • Trust in Arbitral Tribunal: 
    • The Court expressed confidence in arbitral tribunals' ability to identify frivolous litigation. 
    • Arbitrators are better equipped to conduct extensive examination of pleadings and evidence  
  • Precedential Support: 
    • The Court reaffirmed principles established in two previous cases: 
      • In Re: Interplay 
      • SBI General Insurance v Krish Spinning 
  • Judicial Restraint: 
    • Courts should avoid intricate evidentiary inquiries at the referral stage 
    • The focus should be on maintaining a balance between judicial oversight and arbitral autonomy 
• The Supreme Court, after making the above observations, held that the arbitral tribunal has the authority to impose cost on the party who refrains the other party to participate in the arbitration proceedings by taking advantage of the minimum interference of the courts at referral stage. 
• Therefore, the court allowed the present petition, and the appointment of sole arbitrator was allowed considering the appointment of the same for the resolution of dispute related to service agreement between the same parties. 

What is Section 11 of the A & C Act?

• Nationality of Arbitrators:   
  • Any person of any nationality can be an arbitrator, unless the parties agree otherwise.  
  • Appointment procedure:   
  • Parties are free to agree on a procedure for appointing arbitrators, subject to subsection (6).  
  • In the absence of an agreement, for a three-arbitrator tribunal, each party appoints one arbitrator, and the two appointed arbitrators select the third (presiding) arbitrator.  
• Role of Arbitral Institutions:   
  • The Supreme Court and High Courts can designate graded arbitral institutions for appointing arbitrators.  (subsection 3A) 
  • In jurisdictions without graded institutions, the Chief Justice of the High Court may maintain a panel of arbitrators.  
  • These arbitrators are deemed to be arbitral institutions and are entitled to fees as specified in the Fourth Schedule.  
• Appointment in Case of Failure: (subsection 4) 
  • If a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within 30 days of receiving a request, or if the two appointed arbitrators fail to agree on the third within 30 days, the appointment is made by the designated arbitral institution.  
  • For international commercial arbitration, the Supreme Court designates the institution; for other arbitrations, the High Court does so.  
• Sole Arbitrator Appointment:   
  • If parties fail to agree on a sole arbitrator within 30 days, the appointment is made as per subsection (4).  
• Failure to Act under Agreed Procedure: (subsection 6) 
  • If a party, the appointed arbitrators, or a designated person/institution fails to perform under the agreed procedure, the court-designated arbitral institution makes the appointment.  
• Disclosure Requirements:   
  • Before appointing an arbitrator, the arbitral institution must seek a written disclosure from the prospective arbitrator as per Section 12(1).  
  • The institution must consider any qualifications required by the parties' agreement and the contents of the disclosure.  
• International commercial arbitration:  (Subsection 6-A) 
  • For sole or third arbitrator appointments in international commercial arbitrations, the designated institution may appoint an arbitrator of a nationality different from the parties.  
• Multiple appointment requests:   
  • If multiple requests are made to different institutions, the one receiving the first request is competent to appoint.  
• Time frame for appointment:   
  • The arbitral institution must dispose of an application for appointment within 30 days of serving notice on the opposite party.  
• Fees determination:   
  • The arbitral institution determines the arbitral tribunal's fees and payment manner, subject to rates in the Fourth Schedule.  
  • This doesn't apply to international commercial arbitrations or where parties have agreed on fee determination as per arbitral institution rules.  
• Non-delegation of judicial power:   
  • The designation of a person or institution by the Supreme Court or High Court is not considered a delegation of judicial power.