List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan held that the Appellate Court owes a duty to specify the time period within which balance sale consideration is to be paid. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through it’s Lr’s & Ors.(NCT of Delhi) (2025). 

What was the Background of Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through it’s Lr’s & Ors (NCT of Delhi) (2025) Case?   

• Case Origin 
  • The case is an appeal against the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision dated 30th August 2022, which allowed a Civil Revision Application filed by the defendants. 
  • This decision set aside the order of the Executing Court, which had directed the defendants to execute the sale deed in favor of the plaintiff upon deposit of the remaining sale amount of ₹5,00,000 within 15 days. 
• Background of the Dispute 
  • The plaintiff (appellant) filed a suit for specific performance of a sale agreement dated 16th November 2006 with the defendants (respondents) regarding agricultural land. 
  • The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff on 20th January 2012, directing the defendant to execute and register the sale deed within 3 months, provided the plaintiff deposited the balance sale consideration within 2 months. 
• First Appeal 
  • The defendants challenged the Trial Court’s decision in the District Court, but their appeal was dismissed on 21st April 2015. 
  • The defendants did not file a Second Appeal, making the decree final. 
• Execution Petition 
  • The plaintiff filed an execution petition in January 2017, requesting permission to deposit the balance sale consideration. 
  • The Executing Court allowed the petition on 06th May 2019, directing the plaintiff to deposit the amount within 15 days and the defendants to execute the sale deed before 06th July 2019. 
• Defendants’ Challenge in High Court 
  • The defendants filed a Civil Revision before the High Court, arguing that:  
    • The plaintiff delayed depositing the balance amount without any valid reason. 
    • The decree had become unexecutable due to this delay. 
  • The High Court agreed, holding that:  
    • The plaintiff should have deposited the amount immediately after dismissal of the First Appeal in 2015. 
    • Since no compelling reasons were given for the delay, the decree had become unexecutable. 
  • The High Court set aside the Executing Court’s order, effectively dismissing the plaintiff’s claim. 
• Current Appeal 
  • The plaintiff has now appealed against the High Court’s decision, seeking enforcement of the decree despite the delay. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court observed that the relevant provision in this case is Order XX Rule 12 A of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) which provides for decree for specific performance of contract for sale or lease of immovable property. 
• Rule 12A of Order XX makes it obligatory for the Court to specify in the decree for specific performance of contract for sale or lease of immovable property the date  by which the purchase money or other sum should be paid by the vendee or lessee. 
• The Court in this case invoked the doctrine of merger which is based on the rationale that at a given point there cannot be more than one operative decree. 
• Thus, once a judgment passed by the Trial Court came to be challenged in the Appellate Court the judgment passed by the Trial Court merges with that of the Appellate Court irrespective of the fact whether the appeal is allowed or disallowed. 
• The Court held that the decree of specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree and both the parties have reciprocal rights and obligations flowing out of the decree. 
• Further, Section 28 (1) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 (SRA) makes it clear that the Court does not become a functus officio after the grant of the decree of specific performance and it retains its power and jurisdiction to deal with the decree till the sale deed is executed. 
• The non-payment of the balance sale consideration within the time period fixed by the Trial Court does not amount to abandonment of the contract and consequent rescinding of the same. The real test must be to see if the conduct of the plaintiff will amount to a positive refusal to complete his part of the contract. 
• There must be an element of willful negligence on the part of the plaintiff before a Court proceeds to invoke Section 28 of SRA and rescind the contract. 
• The Court in this case held that the appellate Court must specify the time to deposit the balance sale consideration. 
• What is executable is the decree passed by the appellate court. The Appellate Court owes a duty to specify the time period.  
• If during the specified time period the decree holder is not in a position to deposit the balance sale consideration or, in other words, fails to deposit the balance sale consideration and later upon expiry of the specified time period seeks permission to deposit, then it would be within the discretion of the trial court to grant further time to deposit the balance sale consideration or decline. 
• This discretion has to be exercised judiciously keeping in mind various factors like bona fide of the decree holder, the cause for failure to deposit the balance sale consideration in time, the length of delay and also the equities that might have been created during the interregnum period in favour of the judgment debtor. 
• The Court finally held that if the appellate Court fails to specify the time the decree holder is expected to deposit the amount within reasonable time. 
• Thus, the Appeal succeeded in the facts of the present case.

What is Order XX Rule 12A of CPC?

• This provision was inserted in 1976 by way of an amendment. 
• This provision provides for a decree for specific performance of contract for sale or lease of immovable property. 
  • The provision provides for the following: 
  • If the decree of specific performance requires the buyer or lessee to pay an amount (purchase money or any other sum), it must mention this clearly. 
• The decree of specific performance must specify a deadline for making the payment. 
• Rule 12A makes it obligatory for the court to specify in the decree for specific performance of contract for sale or lease of immovable property the date by which purchase money or other sum should be paid by the vendee or lessee.

Source: High Court of Madras 

Why in News? 

Recently Justice Bharatha Chakravarthy has held that no caste can claim temple ownership, as temple administration is not a protected religious practice under Articles 25 and 26. 

• The High Court of Madras held this in the matter of C. Ganesan v. The Commissioner (2025).

What was the Background of C. Ganesan v. The Commissioner Case? 

• C. Ganesan filed a writ petition against the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Administration Department. 
• The petition concerned a group of temples administratively combined, including Arulmighu Mariamman, Angalamman, Perumal, and Ponkaliamman Temples. 
• The primary contention was the administrative structure of these temples, specifically focusing on the Arulmighu Ponkaliamman Temple. 
• The petitioner claimed that the Ponkaliamman Temple was exclusively maintained and administered by members of a specific caste. 
• In contrast, other temples in the group involved administrative participation from people of different castes. 
• Ganesan sought a judicial directive to separate the Ponkaliamman Temple from the administrative group. 
• The request was fundamentally based on caste-specific administrative segregation. 
• The petition aimed to establish a caste-exclusive administrative mechanism for the temple. 
• The legal application challenged the existing administrative framework of religious institutions. 
• The underlying motivation appeared to be maintaining caste-based administrative distinctions. 
• Constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination were directly challenged by the petition. 
• The proposed administrative separation violated fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The court strongly provides that caste cannot be considered a religious denomination under the Constitution of India. 
• Justice Bharatha Chakravarthy observed that temple administration based on caste identity is not a protected religious practice under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. 
• The court explicitly stated that a public temple must be accessible, manageable, and administrable by all devotees, regardless of caste. 
• The judicial observation states that attempt to disguise caste discrimination under the guise of religious practices are fundamentally unconstitutional. 
• The court referenced previous Supreme Court judgments, particularly the Kashi Vishwanath Temple case, to reinforce the principle that caste cannot be a basis for religious institutional management. 
• The observation critically noted that believers often try to perpetuate caste hatred by misusing religious denomination protections, viewing temples as breeding grounds for divisive social instincts. 
• The court emphatically declared that the constitutional goal is to create a casteless society, and any practice perpetuating caste divisions is inherently against the fundamental principles of the Indian Constitution. 

What are the Constitutional Provisions Relating to the Right of Religion? 

• Article 25 guarantees freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality, and health. 
• This fundamental right is available to both citizens and non-citizens, covering both religious beliefs and religious practices. 
• The article allows the State to make laws regulating economic, financial, political, or secular activities associated with religious practices. 
• Article 26 provides religious denominations the right to establish and maintain religious and charitable institutions, manage their religious affairs, and own and administer property. 
• To be recognized as a religious denomination, a group must have:  
  • A system of beliefs conducive to spiritual well-being. 
  • A common organization. 
  • A distinctive name. 
• Article 27 prohibits compelling any person to pay taxes specifically meant for promoting or maintaining a particular religion or religious denomination. 
• Article 28 regulates religious instruction in educational institutions, distinguishing between:  
  • State-maintained institutions (no religious instruction). 
  • State-administered institutions with specific religious trust requirements. 
  • Institutions recognizing voluntary religious instruction. 
• These constitutional provisions collectively ensure religious freedom while maintaining the secular fabric of the Indian state, balancing individual religious rights with broader social harmony and public interest. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justices Surya Kant, Dipankar Datta, and Ujjal Bhuyan have ruled that expert opinions on a child's disability should take precedence over inferred consent in custody matters. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of Sharmila Velamur v. Sanjay and Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of Sharmila Velamur v. Sanjay and Ors. Case? 

• The case involves Aadith Ramadorai, a 22-year-old US citizen with significant cognitive disabilities, specifically Ataxic Cerebral Palsy, whose parents - both US citizens - divorced in 2007 through an Idaho Court, initially establishing a joint custody arrangement that equally divided parental time and responsibilities for Aadith and his younger brother Arjun, who has Autism Spectrum Disorder. 
• The original Idaho Court divorce settlement explicitly prohibited either parent from relocating the children's residence without prior written consent, mandating a structured custody schedule where each parent would have the children from 8:00 am Friday to 8:00 am Monday alternately, and requiring equal division of holidays. 
• In June 2022, a significant shift occurred when the father brought one child (Arjun) back to the mother's home while Aadith remained with the father, prompting the mother to file a guardianship application in the Idaho Court seeking full legal guardianship over Aadith, which the father contested by arguing that Aadith was sufficiently capable of making independent decisions. 
• Medical evaluations became crucial in understanding Aadith's cognitive capabilities, with the Institute of Mental Health in Kilpauk assessing him as having a mild intellectual disability (50% disability), an IQ of 54, and capable of simple tasks but requiring family support for major life decisions. 
• In a critical turn of events, the father obtained Aadith's passport and left the United States in December 2023, arriving in Chennai, India, and residing with paternal grandparents, which occurred simultaneously with ongoing legal proceedings in the Idaho Court where the mother had been appointed as Aadith's temporary guardian. 
• The mother responded by filing multiple legal actions, including an online police complaint, a complaint with the NRI Cell in Chennai, and a habeas corpus petition in the Madras High Court, all aimed at retrieving custody of Aadith and challenging what she perceived as an illegal removal of her son from the United States. 
• A comprehensive psychological assessment by NIMHANS, Bengaluru revealed extensive details about Aadith's cognitive functioning, determining his social age to be approximately 7 years, diagnosing a moderate disability in social and adaptive functioning, and highlighting significant limitations in his ability to make complex, independent decisions. 
• The subsequent legal proceedings involved intricate deliberations about Aadith's capacity to provide informed consent, with medical experts from multiple institutions providing detailed evaluations that consistently indicated his cognitive abilities were significantly below those expected for his chronological age. 
• The case ultimately transformed into a complex international legal dispute centered on determining Aadith's decision-making capacity, identifying his best interests, and establishing an appropriate custodial arrangement that would provide him with necessary support, care, and protection given his cognitive limitations. 
• There are 2 issues: 
  • Whether Aadith is capable of making independent decisions?  
  • Whether Aadith’s best interests and welfare would be served by permitting him to continue residing with Respondent No. 4 in India? 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court critically examined Aadith's capacity to make independent decisions, fundamentally rejecting the High Court's earlier determination that he could consensually reside in India, based on a brief oral interaction. 
• The Court definitively established that Aadith, despite being chronologically 22 years old, possesses cognitive abilities equivalent to an 8-10 year old child, rendering him incapable of making complex, legally binding decisions about his residence and future. 
• Multiple expert assessments, particularly from NIMHANS, Bengaluru, conclusively demonstrated Aadith's significant cognitive limitations, including: 
• An intelligence quotient (IQ) of 53, placing him in the "very low range of cognitive ability". 
  • Substantial challenges in performing complex tasks. 
  • Inability to make informed decisions about long-term consequences. 
  • Requirement of constant guidance and supervision. 
• The Court stated that the paramount principle of "best interests of the child" doctrine, prioritizing Aadith's welfare over procedural technicalities or parental disputes. 
• The judgment provides that Aadith's established life in the United States - including specialized educational programs, familiar environment, and crucial sibling relationship - constitutes a more supportive ecosystem for his developmental needs. 
• The Court critically observed that the High Court's original judgment was procedurally flawed, having been rendered hastily without comprehensive evaluation of medical assessments and expert reports. 
• Legal precedents were systematically analysed, particularly regarding decision-making capacities of individuals with cognitive disabilities, reinforcing the Court's stance on protecting vulnerable individuals. 
• The Supreme Court unequivocally directed Aadith's return to the United States under his mother's guardianship, ensuring continued access to specialized educational and support services. 
• The judgment emphasized maintaining parental connectivity, directing both parents to share contact information and ensure the children's access to both parents, while prioritizing the children's welfare. 
• The Court's observed the nuanced approach required in legal proceedings involving individuals with developmental disabilities, stressing the necessity of expert medical assessments and comprehensive evaluations over superficial interactions. 

What are the Legal Principles Governing Child Custody and Guardianship? 

• Parens Patriae Doctrine 
  • A fundamental legal principle where the court acts as a guardian for individuals unable to protect their own interests. 
  • Specifically applied in cases involving children or individuals with cognitive limitations. 
  • Empowers the court to make decisions in the best interest of vulnerable individuals. 
• Doctrine of Best Interests 
  • A paramount legal consideration in custody and child welfare cases. 
  • Requires courts to evaluate:  
    • Stability and security 
    • Loving and understanding care 
    • Child's character and personality development 
    • Intellectual development 
    • Future prospects 
    • Moral and ethical considerations 
• Comity of Courts Principle 
  • Recognizes international legal jurisdictions. 
  • Allows courts to override foreign court orders when the welfare of the child is at stake. 
  • Emphasizes that child's welfare supersedes procedural jurisdictional constraints. 
• Guardianship Laws 
  • Provisions for appointing legal guardians for individuals with cognitive disabilities. 
  • Considers medical assessments and expert opinions in determining guardianship. 
  • Focuses on protecting the rights and welfare of individuals with limited decision-making capacities. 
• Medical Consent and Decision-Making Capacity 
  • Legal framework for determining an individual's capacity to provide informed consent. 
  • Relies on expert medical assessments. 
  • Protects individuals from making decisions that could harm their interests. 
• International Child Custody Considerations 
  • Legal mechanisms for resolving cross-border custody disputes. 
  • Prioritizes child's welfare over jurisdictional technicalities. 
  • Considers factors like established environment, educational continuity, and familial relationships.

What is the Principle of Welfare of Child?   

• Section 13 of Hindu Minorities and Guardianship Act, 1956 (HMGA):  
  • This Section provides that the in the appointment or declaration of any person as guardian of a Hindu minor by a court, the welfare of the minor shall be the paramount consideration.  
• Section 17 of Guardian and Wards Act, 1890:  
  • This Section provides matters to be considered while appointing a guardian.   
  • Section 17 (1) provides that in appointing or declaring the guardian of a minor, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be guided by what, consistently with the law to which the minor is subject, appears in the circumstances to be for the welfare of the minor.   
  • Section 17 (2) provides that In considering what will be for the welfare of the minor, the Court shall have regard to the age, sex and religion of the minor, the character and capacity of the proposed guardian and his nearness of kin to the minor, the wishes, if any, of a deceased parent, and any existing or previous relations of the proposed guardian with the minor or his property.   
  • Section 17 (3) provides that if the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference, the Court may consider that preference.   
  • Section 17 (5) provides that the Court shall not appoint or declare any person to be a guardian against his will.