List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice PB Varale held Section 18 of Limitation Act shall apply in case of demand under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of New Mangalore Port Trust & Anr v. Clifford D Souza Etc. (2025). 

What was the Background of New Mangalore Port Trust & Anr v. Clifford D Souza Etc. (2025) Case?   

• Initial Allotment (2003): The respondents (Licensees) received allotments from NMPT (New Mangalore Port Trust) in 2003. 
• License Fee Revisions: 
  • First revision: 20^th  June 2005 (effective from February 2002) 
  • Second revision: 23^rd  July 2010 (effective from 20th  February 2007 for five years) 
• Demand Notices: 
  • March 2011: Assistant Estate Manager/Estate Officer issued demand notices to Licensees for arrears from 20th  February 2007 to 23rd  July 2010. 
  • 15th  January 2015: Final notice demanding Rs. 55,32,234/- for difference in license fee. 
• Legal Proceedings: 
  • 2011-2012: Licensees filed writ petitions challenging the retrospective revision. 
  • 28th June 2013: Single Judge dismissed petitions, upholding retrospective revision. 
  • Licensees filed appeals before Division Bench (still pending without interim orders). 
• Response to Demands: 
  • 4th February 2015: Licensees responded to demand notice, arguing the matter was pending in court. 
  • Similar responses were given to subsequent notices. 
• Estate Officer's Action: 
  • 12th August 2015: Estate Officer issued notice under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (PP Act) Section 7(3). 
  • 15th  February 2016: Estate Officer issued another notice giving three weeks to show cause. 
  • Estate Officer eventually passed an order under PP Act Section 7(1) demanding payment. 
• Appeal to District Judge: 
  • Licensees appealed under Section 9 of PP Act. 
  • 15th  March 2017: District Judge allowed appeals, holding proceedings were time-barred. 
• High Court Petition: 
  • NMPT filed writ petitions against District Judge's order. 
  • These were dismissed, leading to the present appeals. 
• The core dispute concerns whether NMPT could retrospectively revise and collect license fees for the period from 20th February 2007 to 23rd July 2010.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Court rejected arguments from both sides about objections not being taken at the right time, choosing to deal with the plea of limitation based on undisputed facts and correspondence. 
• The Court acknowledged that the District Judge had allowed the respondents' appeal and quashed the demand notice on the finding that it was barred by limitation, with the calculated deadline being 11th May 2015. 
• The Court held that once the Limitation Act, 1963 (LA) applies to proceedings under the PP Act, all its provisions, including Section 18, will be applicable. 
• The Court found that the respondents' communication dated 4th February 2015 constituted an acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the LA, which extended the limitation period to 3rd February 2018. 
• The Court determined that the respondents were not denying the revised tariff but only challenging its retrospective application, and they were bound by the notification until it was set aside by a court. 
• The Court found that the High Court should have deferred hearing the writ petition until the disposal of the pending intra-court appeals, as their outcome would directly affect the writ petition. 
• The Court concluded that the respondents were attempting to delay payment while being bound by the Single Judge's decision and had no substantial objection to the demand except for the pending appeals. 
• The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's order, and restored the writ petitions to be heard after the disposal of the pending intra-court appeals. 
• The Court ruled that if the respondents' appeals are allowed by the Division Bench, the demands would be withdrawn, but if they fail, they would be liable to pay the demand with applicable interest. 

What is Section 18 of the Limitation Act? 

• Section 18 (1) lays down the following: 
  • This provision creates a mechanism to extend the limitation period when a debtor acknowledges liability in writing. 
  • The acknowledgment must occur before the original limitation period expires. 
  • The acknowledgment must be in writing. 
  • The writing must be signed by the party against whom the claim exists (the debtor) or their representative. 
  • When these conditions are met, a fresh limitation period begins from the date of the signed acknowledgment. 
  • This provision prevents debtors from benefiting from limitation periods when they have actually recognized their liability. 
  • It applies to suits or applications regarding property rights or other legal rights. 
  • It essentially "resets the clock" on the time limit for bringing legal action when liability is acknowledged. 
  • While protecting creditors who receive acknowledgments, it still provides certainty by creating a new defined limitation period. 
• Section 18 (2) lays down the following: 
  • This provision addresses situations where a written acknowledgment exists but lacks a date. 
  • In such cases, oral testimony is permitted to establish when the acknowledgment was signed. 
  • While oral evidence can be used to determine the date of signing, it cannot be used to establish the contents of the acknowledgment. 
  • Any oral evidence provided must comply with the rules set out in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 
  • This provision maintains the primacy of written evidence for the substance of the acknowledgment while allowing flexibility for establishing its timing. 
  • It resolves potential disputes about whether an acknowledgment was made within the original limitation period. 
  • It balances the need to determine accurate timing with the need to prevent fabrication of content. 
  • It provides a clear rule for courts to follow when handling undated acknowledgments in limitation cases. 
• Further the explanations attached to Section 18 provides for the following: 
  • Explanation (a) provides: 
    • An acknowledgment can be valid even if it doesn't precisely describe the property or right in question. 
    • An acknowledgment remains valid even if it states that the time for payment, delivery, performance, or enjoyment hasn't yet arrived. 
    • An acknowledgment remains effective even when accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform, or permit enjoyment. 
    • The presence of counterclaims or set-off claims doesn't invalidate an acknowledgment. 
    • An acknowledgment is valid even if addressed to someone other than the person entitled to the property or right. 
  • Explanation (b) provides: 
    • The word "signed" has a specific legal meaning in this context. 
    • A signature can be made personally by the acknowledging party. 
    • Alternatively, a signature can be made by a duly authorized agent acting on behalf of the acknowledging party. 
  • Explanation (c) provides: 
    • Applications for executing court decrees or orders are specifically excluded from being considered as applications regarding property or rights under this section. 
    • This ensures that enforcement proceedings for existing court orders don't restart limitation periods for the underlying claims. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Manmohan held that a suit for specific performance of a cancelled agreement to sell is not maintainable without seeking declaratory relief challenging the cancellation. 

•  The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Sangita Sinha v. Bhawana Bhardwaj and Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of Sangita Sinha v. Bhawana Bhardwaj and Ors. (2025) Case? 

• Late Kushum Kumari (original defendant/seller) was allotted the subject property by the People's Cooperative House Construction Society Limited vide a registered sub-lease dated 2nd April 1968. 
• On 25th January 2008, an unregistered Agreement to Sell was executed between Bhawana Bhardwaj (Respondent No.1/buyer) and the seller for a total sale consideration of Rs. 25,00,000/-. 
• At the time of execution of the Agreement to Sell, the buyer paid Rs. 2,51,000/- in cash and issued three post-dated cheques worth Rs. 7,50,000/-. 
• On 7th February 2008, the seller wrote a letter to the buyer cancelling the Agreement to Sell, enclosing five demand drafts totaling Rs. 2,11,000/- and returning two of the three post-dated cheques. 
• The buyer subsequently filed Title Suit No. TS/176/2008 in the Trial Court, Sub Judge-IV, Patna, seeking specific performance of the Agreement to Sell. 
• The seller contested the suit by claiming her signatures had been fraudulently obtained on the Agreement to Sell, and that she had filed a police complaint regarding the same on 6th February 2008. 
• Upon the demise of the seller, Sangita Sinha (appellant) was impleaded as defendant no. 3, as the subject property had been bequeathed to her through a Will dated 23rd September 2002. 
• The buyer admittedly encashed the five demand drafts in July 2008, after filing the suit on 5th May 2008. 
• The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the buyer on 27th April 2018, which was upheld by the Patna High Court on 9th May 2024. 
• The appellant challenged these judgments before the Supreme Court of India. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court observed that the buyer's act of encashing the demand drafts established beyond doubt that she was not willing to perform her part of the Agreement to Sell and proceed with execution of the sale deed. 
• The Court determined that the conduct of the buyer in encashing the demand drafts was acceptance of the seller's repudiation, effectively cancelling the Agreement to Sell. 
• The Court held that the buyer should have sought a declaratory relief that the cancellation was bad in law, as existence of a valid agreement is sine qua non for grant of relief of specific performance. 
• The Court noted that continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the buyer from the date of execution of Agreement to Sell till the date of the decree is a condition precedent for grant of relief of specific performance. 
• The Court observed that the buyer's failure to disclose in the plaint that the seller had issued the cancellation letter enclosing demand drafts amounted to suppression of material fact, disentitling her from the discretionary relief of specific performance. 
• The Court determined that the appellant, being a beneficiary under the Will, had the locus standi to file the appeal as she was a necessary and interested party to the lis. 
• The Court concluded that the Agreement to Sell could not be specifically enforced due to the buyer's lack of continuous willingness to perform the contract and suppression of material facts. 

What is Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (SRA)? 

• Section 16(c) states that specific performance cannot be enforced in favor of a person "who fails to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant." 

Key Elements: 

• Burden of Proof: The plaintiff must prove their performance or readiness to perform. 
• Essential Terms Only: This applies only to essential terms of the contract, not minor ones. 
• Exceptions: The plaintiff doesn't need to prove performance of terms that were:  
  • Prevented by the defendant 
  • Waived by the defendant 
• Money Payments: According to Explanation (i), actual tender of money is not essential unless directed by the court. 
• True Construction: Explanation (ii) requires the plaintiff to prove performance or readiness according to the "true construction" of the contract. 
• Section 16(c) embodies the equitable principle that "one who seeks equity must do equity."  
• It places the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate that they have either performed or have continuously been ready and willing to perform their contractual obligations before they can seek the equitable remedy of specific performance.  
• This provision ensures that only parties who have acted in good faith and fulfilled their own obligations can compel the other party to specifically perform the contract.  
• The section recognizes practical exceptions where the defendant has prevented performance or where money payment is involved, balancing strict compliance with practical realities of contractual relationships. 

Source: Punjab and Haryana High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Sureshwar Thakur and Justice Vikas Suri upheld the sector's layout plan including a doctor's clinic, emphasizing that access to prompt medical services is a fundamental right. 

• The Punjab and Haryana High Court held this in the matter of House Owners Welfare Association (Regd.) v. State of Haryana and others (2025). 

What was the Background of House Owners Welfare Association (Regd.) v. State of Haryana and others? 

• The House Owners Welfare Association filed a writ petition seeking quashing of the Part Demarcation Plan/Sectoral Development Plan dated 11th December 2003 that carved out clinic sites in Sector-17, Panchkula. 
• The petitioner also sought quashing of the advertisement dated 12th July 2017 regarding e-auction of clinic sites No. 4 and 5 in Sector-17, Panchkula. 
• The petitioner's association members were allotted residential plots in Sector-17, Panchkula extension, in 2004 through a draw of lots on freehold basis. 
• At the time of purchasing the plots, the petitioner-association claimed they were never informed that institutional sites (clinic sites) would be established in front of their houses or on the same street. 
• The petitioner alleged that the street where the clinic sites were planned had only one entry point with no exit on the other end, creating accessibility issues. 
• The petitioner contended that as per the National Building Code, 2005, no building attracting large crowds should be planned in an area with less than 12 meter width of access. 
• The association made representations to the Administrator, HUDA, Panchkula regarding their concerns, but no action was taken on their representations. 
• The petitioner claimed that no separate provision for parking had been made for the clinic sites, which would exacerbate congestion issues. 
• The petitioner argued that since there were already three nursing home sites in the vicinity, no additional clinic sites were required even in public interest. 
• The petitioner claimed that the sectoral plan required prior sanction and approval from the State Government as per Section 13 of the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977 (HSVP) Act, which was allegedly not obtained. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court observed that no purported prejudice was encumbered upon the petitioner association regarding its incorporeal rights over the subject sites, as no cogent material was placed on record to establish the same. 
• The Court noted that the impugned demarcation plan was made with an insightful vision to promote the health of citizens in the locality, thereby furthering the right to life as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI).  
• The Court held that the grievance regarding traffic congestion should have been raised in 2004 when the members purchased their plots, and the delay in challenging the 2003 layout plan indicated acquiescence by the petitioner. 
• The Court observed that the provision of a twin-level basement for parking would adequately address any concerns regarding congestion on the sectoral road. 
• The Court emphasized that the right to practice business and occupation is a fundamental right of the respondents who were allotted the clinic sites, which cannot be curtailed without demonstrable prejudice to the petitioner's rights. 
• The Court noted that clinic sites providing consultancy services to elderly, disabled, and other patients within the sector would reduce the necessity of traveling long distances to healthcare centers. 
• The Court rejected the argument regarding violation of the National Building Code, 2005, as neither the code was placed on record nor was there evidence that it had an overriding effect over the HSVP Act. 
• The Court concluded that the petitioner's acquiescence to the validity of establishing clinic institutions on the disputed sites and the absence of any conflict with existing laws warranted dismissal of the petition. 

What is Article 21 of Indian Constitution? 

• Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Protection of Life and Personal Liberty: 
• No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. 
• This fundamental right is available to every person, citizens and foreigners alike. 
• Article 21 provides two rights: Right to life and right to personal liberty. 
• The Supreme Court of India has described this right as the 'heart of fundamental rights'. 
• The right to life is not just about the right to survive. It also entails being able to live a complete life of dignity and meaning. 
• The Court referred to this provision when noting that the clinic sites would augment health concerns of elderly citizens and ailing children, thereby furthering the right to life as guaranteed under Article 21. 

What is Section 13 of the Haryana Shahri Vikas Pradhikaran Act, 1977 (HSVP Act)? 

• "The objects of the Authority shall be to promote and secure the development of all or any of the areas comprised in the urban area and for that purpose, the Authority shall have the power to acquire by way of purchase, transfer, exchange or gift, hold, manage, plan, develop and mortgage or otherwise dispose of land and other property, to carry out by itself or through any agency on its behalf, building, engineering, mining and other operations, to execute works in connection with supply of water, treatment and disposal of sewage, sullage and storm water, control of pollution and any other services and amenities and generally to do anything, with the prior approval, or on direction, of the State Government, for carrying out the purposes of this Act." 
• The petitioner argued that prior sanction and approval of the development/sectoral plan was required by the HSVP before implementing it, which they claimed was not obtained. 
• The petitioner also contended that the impugned plan was approved by the Chief Administrator and not by the State Government as allegedly required under this section.