Divorced Muslim Woman Can Reclaim Marriage Gifts

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

The bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh in the case of Rousanara Begum v. S.K. Salahuddin and Anr. (2025) set aside the Calcutta High Court's judgment and directed the return of Rs. 7 lacs and 30 bhories of gold ornaments to a divorced Muslim woman, emphasizing purposive construction of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. 

What was the Background of Rousanara Begum v. S.K. Salahuddin and Anr. (2025) Case? 

• The appellant, Rousanara Begum, and respondent, S.K. Salahuddin, were married on 28th August 2005. 
• Differences arose shortly after marriage, and the appellant left her matrimonial home on 7th May 2009. 
• The appellant filed proceedings under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 
• The marriage ended in divorce on 13th December 2011. 
• The appellant approached the Court under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 seeking return of Rs. 17,67,980/-, including dower amount, dowry, gold ornaments, and household articles. 
• The Chief Judicial Magistrate initially allowed the application and granted Rs. 8.3 lacs against the claim of Rs. 17.5 lacs. 
• After multiple rounds of revision petitions and remands between the Magistrate and Sessions Court, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate in 2017 awarded Rs. 7 lacs and 30 bhories of gold ornaments to the appellant. 
• The key evidence included two qabilnamas (marriage register entries) - Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 8. Exhibit 8, the original entry, recorded that the bride's father gave Rs. 7 lacs and 30 bhories of gold to the son-in-law, while Exhibit 7 recorded the amounts without specifying the recipient. 
• The Sessions Court dismissed the respondent's criminal revision petition in December 2018, finding no irregularity in the Magistrate's order. 
• The Calcutta High Court, in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, allowed the respondent's petition in November 2022 and set aside the lower courts' orders. 
• The High Court's reasoning was based on the statement of the appellant's father in Section 498A IPC proceedings, where he categorically stated he had given the amount and gold to the respondent (bridegroom). 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's reasoning, noting that the High Court had missed the purposive construction goalpost and treated the matter purely as a civil dispute. 
• The Court observed that the High Court gave undue weight to the father's statement in the Section 498A proceedings, despite the respondent having been acquitted in those proceedings, suggesting the evidentiary value of that statement was questionable. 
• The Court emphasized that when the marriage registrar produced the original marriage register before the Court and explained the discrepancy regarding entries, his statement should have been accepted in its entirety. 
• The Court stated that mere allegations about suspicious conduct regarding overwriting in the marriage register were insufficient to discard the registrar's testimony. 
• The bench highlighted that the Constitution of India prescribes equality as an aspiration, and courts must ground their reasoning in social justice adjudication to contribute toward achieving this goal. 
• The Court emphasized that the scope and object of the 1986 Act is to secure the dignity and financial protection of Muslim women post-divorce, which aligns with women's rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 
• The Court observed that construction of the Act must keep equality, dignity and autonomy at the forefront and must be done considering the lived experiences of women, particularly in smaller towns and rural areas where inherent patriarchal discrimination remains prevalent. 
• The Court directed the respondent to remit the awarded amount directly into the appellant's bank account within the specified timeframe, with an interest of 9% per annum for non-compliance. 

What is the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986? 

About: 

• The Act was enacted to protect the rights of Muslim women who have been divorced by, or have obtained divorce from, their husbands. It provides for matters connected with or incidental to the protection of these rights. 
  • This Act was a response to the Mohd. Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985), in which the Supreme Court delivered held that section 125 of the CrPC (Section 144 of BNSS) is a secular provision applicable to all, irrespective of religion. 
  • The right to maintenance under CrPC (Now BNSS) is not negated by provisions of personal law.

Provisions:  

• A divorced Muslim woman is entitled to a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance from her former husband, to be paid within the iddat period. 
  • Iddat is a period, usually of three months, which a woman must observe after the death of her husband or a divorce before she can remarry. 
• The Act also covers the payment of mahr (dower) and the return of properties given to the woman at the time of marriage. 
  • It allows a divorced woman and her former husband to choose to be governed by the provisions of CrPC, 1973 (Now BNSS). If they make a joint or separate declaration to this effect at the first hearing of the application.

Evolution:

• A Constitution bench of the Supreme Court had in its 2001 judgement in the case Danial Latifi & Another v. Union of India upheld the constitutional validity of the 1986 Act and said that its provisions do not offend Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 
• It extended the right of Muslim women to receive maintenance until they remarry beyond the iddat period. 
  • Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan Case (2009): The Supreme Court reiterated that divorced Muslim women could claim maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC, even beyond the iddat period, as long as they do not remarry. This affirmed the principle that the CrPC provision applies irrespective of religion.