Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India (2024)

Introduction 

In this significant case, the Supreme Court addressed a critical jurisdictional question: whether an ICC constituted at one Central Government department can entertain a sexual harassment complaint against an employee working in a different department.  

• The judgment, authored by Justice J.K. Maheshwari, settles ambiguity surrounding inter-departmental POSH complaints and provides clarity on the dual role of ICCs in conducting preliminary fact-finding inquiries and formal disciplinary inquiries.

Facts 

• Dr. Sohail Malik, a 2010 batch IRS officer, was posted as OSD, Investigation, Central Board of Direct Taxes, Delhi.  
• The aggrieved woman, a 2004 batch IAS officer, was posted as Joint Secretary, Department of Food and Public Distribution at Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi.  
• On May 15, 2023, she alleged that the Appellant sexually harassed her at her workplace. An FIR was registered on May 16, 2023, and a chargesheet was filed on March 9, 2024.  
• The aggrieved woman filed a complaint under the POSH Act before the ICC at her department on May 24, 2023. The ICC issued a notice on June 13, 2023 to the Appellant for a hearing. 
• The Appellant challenged this before the CAT, contending that the ICC at the aggrieved woman's department lacked jurisdiction since he was employed at a different department.  
• The CAT dismissed his challenge. The High Court of Delhi also dismissed his writ petition. 
• The Appellant approached the Supreme Court, which permitted the inquiry to continue but directed the final report be kept in a sealed cover. 

Issues Involved 

1. Whether the ICC constituted in one department of the Central Government has jurisdiction to entertain a complaint against an employee of a different department? 
2. Whether "where the respondent is an employee" in Section 11 of the POSH Act mandates that ICC proceedings must be at the respondent's workplace? 
3. Under Section 13, how is action to be taken by the respondent's department based on findings of the ICC at the aggrieved woman's department? 
4. Whether the ICC proceedings at the aggrieved woman's workplace caused prejudice to the Appellant? 

 Court’s Observations 

On Statutory Interpretation: 

• The Court emphasized that the POSH Act is social welfare legislation enacted to uphold women's fundamental rights to equality (Articles 14, 15) and dignified life (Article 21).  
• The Act evolved from the Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan guidelines and must be interpreted purposively, considering both text and context. 

On Section 11 Interpretation: 

• The Appellant argued that "where the respondent is an employee" means only the ICC at the respondent's workplace has jurisdiction.  
• The Court rejected this interpretation, holding that "where" is used as a conditional conjunction (meaning "if"), not denoting place.  
• Section 11(1) envisages three contingencies: (i) if the respondent is an employee, inquiry shall follow applicable service rules; (ii) if no such rules exist, inquiry shall be as prescribed; (iii) if the respondent is a domestic worker, the complaint goes to police. The word "where" is a procedural trigger, not a jurisdictional constraint. 

On Definitions Under POSH Act: 

The Court examined key definitions: 

• "Respondent" (Section 2(m)): Any person against whom a complaint is made. 
• "Employee" (Section 2(f)): Broadly defined. 
• "Workplace" (Section 2(o)): Expansively defined, including any place visited during employment. 

On Purposive Interpretation: 

• Requiring aggrieved women to approach the ICC at the respondent's workplace would create procedural and psychological barriers, defeat the purpose of expanding "workplace" definition, and undermine the POSH Act's social welfare intent.  

On Role of ICC and Employer: 

• The Court clarified that Section 13 differentiates between authority to inquire (ICC) and authority to enforce (employer).  
• The ICC conducts factual inquiry and makes recommendations, which are sent to the respondent's employer who must act within sixty days. The employer of the aggrieved woman and respondent need not be the same. 
• The ICC at the aggrieved woman's workplace may conduct Stage 1. Upon receiving the report, if the respondent's employer initiates disciplinary proceedings, the ICC at the respondent's workplace may conduct Stage 2. This balances the aggrieved woman's right to accessible redressal with the respondent's right to fair hearing. 

Conclusion 

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held: 

1. "Where the respondent is an employee" in Section 11 cannot be interpreted to mean ICC proceedings may only be at the respondent's workplace. The ICC at the aggrieved woman's workplace has jurisdiction for preliminary inquiries. 
2. Restrictive interpretation would contradict the expansive definition of "workplace" and defeat the POSH Act's remedial intent as social welfare legislation. 
3. The ICC at the aggrieved woman's workplace conducts Stage 1 (preliminary inquiry) and sends its report to the respondent's employer. If disciplinary proceedings are initiated, the ICC at the respondent's workplace conducts Stage 2 (formal inquiry). 
4. The respondent's employer must comply with Section 19(f) duties and cooperate with the ICC at the aggrieved woman's workplace. 
5. The ICC report shall be transmitted to the Appellant's department for further action under applicable service rules. 

This judgment removes procedural barriers for aggrieved women, clarifies jurisdictional ambiguity in inter-departmental complaints, upholds the social welfare intent of the POSH Act, and reinforces employer obligations for inter-departmental cooperation in POSH inquiries.