List of Current Affairs

Source: Madhya Pradesh High Court

Why in News? 

Justice Vivek Jain of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur in the case of Mahendra Prasad Tiwari v. Smt. Chinti Yadav and Others (2026) directed the trial court to ensure that the decree conforms with the judgment after finding a clear error where recovery of possession was omitted from the decree despite being explicitly granted in the judgment.

What was the Background of Mahendra Prasad Tiwari v. Smt. Chinti Yadav and Others (2026) Case? 

• The plaintiff filed a suit seeking declaration of title, recovery of possession, and permanent injunction regarding land in Survey No. 615/2, measuring 0.105 hectare, located in Village Kaithaha, Tehsil Ramnagar, District Satna, Madhya Pradesh. 
• The trial court framed six issues for determination in the case. 
• Issue No. 2 concerned whether defendants 1 to 4 had encroached upon the plaintiff's land in Survey No. 615/2. 
• Issue No. 3 related to whether the plaintiff was entitled to relief of recovery of possession. 
• After trial, the court marked all relevant issues as proven in favor of the plaintiff. 
• In paragraph 18 of the judgment, the trial court categorically found that the defendants had illegally encroached upon the plaintiff's land and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover vacant possession from the defendants. 
• However, when the draft decree was prepared, the court only passed an order for permanent injunction but failed to include the relief of recovery of possession in the decree. 
• The plaintiff filed an objection application under Section 152 CPC seeking amendment or correction of the decree before it was finally signed. 
• The trial court rejected the application on 13th November 2025, holding that such objections were not maintainable under Section 152 CPC, and proceeded to finalize and sign the decree. 
• The plaintiff then filed Civil Revision No. 1364 of 2025 before the High Court challenging this order.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The High Court noted that there was a clear error in the decree whereby the trial court had skipped recording the recovery of possession despite categorically finding in the judgment that defendants had encroached upon the land and the plaintiff was entitled to decree of recovery of possession. 
• The Court observed that permanent injunction should have been consequential to recovery of possession, not a standalone relief. 
• The Court held that irrespective of whether the application was correctly captioned under Section 152 CPC or not, once the trial court had been pointed out that despite noting in the judgment that the petitioner was entitled to recovery of possession, the decree omitted this relief, the trial court should have addressed this anomaly. 
• The Court emphasized that the trial court was not required to mechanically sign the decree by holding that Section 152 CPC was not made out. 
• The High Court stated that even if the trial court concluded that the application was wrongly captioned, if there was an error in the decree, then the trial court was under obligation to correct the error before the decree was finally signed. 
• The Court criticized the trial court for summarily rejecting the objection and then proceeding to sign the decree without addressing the substantive error. 
• The High Court directed that now as the decree has been finally signed, objections under Section 152 CPC would indeed be maintainable. 
• The trial court was directed to pass a specific order under Section 152 CPC and ensure that the decree should be in accordance with the judgment and not contrary to the judgment. 
• The Court ordered the trial court to pass appropriate orders within 30 days.

What is Section 152 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908? 

About: 

• This section deals with the amendment of judgments, decrees or orders.  
• It states that clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties. 
• This section is based on two important principles:  
  • An act of court should not prejudice any party.  
  • It is the duty of the courts to see that their records are true, and they represent the correct state of affairs. 
• It allows courts to correct any clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees, or orders arising from any accidental slip or omission at any time. 
• The provision enables correction of errors that are apparent on the face of the record. 
• Section 152 can be invoked either on the application of parties or suo motu by the court. 
• The objective is to ensure that the final decree accurately reflects the court's intention as expressed in the judgment. 

Scope of Amendment under Section 152 CPC: 

• The section permits correction of clerical mistakes, which include typographical errors, computational mistakes, and errors in recording what was actually decided. 
• It does not allow for substantive changes to the judgment or decree that would alter the rights of parties. 
• Courts can correct errors where the decree fails to give effect to what has been clearly decided in the judgment. 
• The correction must be to rectify an obvious mistake, not to review or reconsider the decision. 

Timing of Application: 

• Section 152 applications can be filed at any time, even after the decree has been signed and executed. 
• However, it is advisable to raise objections before the decree is finalized to avoid complications in execution. 

Obligation of Courts: 

• Courts have a duty to ensure consistency between judgments and decrees. 
• When a manifest error is pointed out, courts should correct it regardless of the technicality of how the application is captioned. 
• The principle established in this case reinforces that courts must not mechanically reject applications for decree correction when genuine errors exist that contradict the judgment's findings. 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

The bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and Pankaj Mithal in the case of Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust (2026) set aside the Madras High Court Division Bench judgment, which had allowed the appeal against the Single Judge's order refusing to set aside the arbitral award. 

• The Court stated that the arbitral award cannot be touched by the court unless it is contrary to the substantive provision of law or any provision of the Act or the terms of the agreement. 

What was the Background of Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust (2026) Case? 

• The dispute arose from a 2010 dredging contract awarded by Tuticorin Port Trust to Jan De Nul for deepening its channel. 
• The company completed the work eight months ahead of schedule. 
• A dispute arose over final payments, leading to arbitration. 
• The Arbitral Tribunal in 2014 allowed several claims worth more than ₹14.66 crore, including Claim No. 7 for idling charges of a Backhoe Dredger (BHD) deployed for the project. 
• The idling was attributed to the Port Trust's failure to provide site access in time. 
• The Port Trust's challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was dismissed by a single judge of the Madras High Court in 2019, who found no grounds to interfere. 
• A Division Bench, in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, reversed this in March 2021. 
• The Division Bench accepted the Port Trust's argument that contractual Clause 38, which mentioned idle time charges for "major dredgers," excluded compensation for a BHD, which it termed a "minor dredger." 
• The Division Bench justified its intervention on the ground that the Arbitral Tribunal failed to adopt what it considered to be a "better" interpretation of the contract, treating this as a ground for interference on the premise that the award was contrary to the substantive provisions of law. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court disagreed with the Division Bench's decision, stating that a different interpretation of the contract by itself cannot be a ground to interfere with an award. 
• The Court noted that the Arbitral Award contained logical reasons in construing the License Agreement clauses, and the view taken had been accepted under Section 34 as reasonable and possible. 
• The Court emphasized that if the arbitral tribunal's interpretation remains undisturbed under Section 34, it cannot be disturbed under Section 37 appeals. 
• The Court clarified that appellate courts under Section 37 have no authority to consider the dispute on merits or determine whether the arbitral award is right or wrong. They cannot sit as ordinary appellate courts and reappraise evidence. 
• The Court held that arbitral awards cannot be touched unless contrary to substantive law, the Act's provisions, or the agreement terms. 
• The Court observed that the Appellate Court was bound by the interpretation given by the Arbitral Tribunal and accepted by the Single Judge under Section 34. 
• The Court noted that the Arbitration Act aims to resolve commercial disputes with minimum court intervention. Allowing courts to step in at every stage would defeat the Act's very purpose. 
• The Court stated that arbitral awards must be accepted if not patently illegal or outside Section 34's scope of intervention. Appeals have a much narrower scope, particularly when awards are upheld under Section 34. 
• Resultantly, the appeal was allowed, restoring the arbitral award. 

What is Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996? 

Section 34: Application for Setting Aside Arbitral Awards: 

General Principle: 

• Recourse against an arbitral award can only be made through an application for setting aside under Section 34. 

Grounds for Setting Aside (Sub-section 2(a)): 

Party must establish on record that: 

• A party was under some incapacity. 
• The arbitration agreement is not valid under applicable law. 
• Party was not given proper notice of arbitrator appointment or arbitral proceedings. 
• Party was unable to present their case. 
• Award deals with disputes not contemplated by or falling outside the arbitration agreement. 
• Award contains decisions beyond the scope of submission to arbitration. 
• Composition of arbitral tribunal or procedure was not in accordance with parties' agreement or the Act. 

Grounds for Setting Aside (Sub-section 2(b)): 

Court finds that: 

• Subject matter of dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under law. 
• Award is in conflict with public policy of India. 

Public Policy Clarification: 

Award is in conflict with public policy only if: 

• Making of award was induced by fraud or corruption or violated Section 75 or 81. 
• Award contravenes fundamental policy of Indian law. 
• Award conflicts with most basic notions of morality or justice. 
• Important: Test for contravention with fundamental policy does not entail review on merits 

Patent Illegality (For Domestic Arbitrations): 

• Award may be set aside if vitiated by patent illegality appearing on face of award. 
• Exception: Award cannot be set aside merely on ground of erroneous application of law or reappreciation of evidence. 

Time Limit: 

• Application must be filed within 3 months from receiving the award. 
• Extension of maximum 30 days possible if prevented by sufficient cause. 
• No application entertained after total period of 3 months + 30 days. 

Procedural Requirements 

• Prior notice must be issued to other party before filing application. 
• Application must be accompanied by affidavit confirming compliance with notice requirement. 
• Application must be disposed of expeditiously within 1 year from service of notice. 

Court's Discretionary Power: 

• Court may adjourn proceedings to allow arbitral tribunal opportunity to resume proceedings or take corrective action to eliminate grounds for setting aside.