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Eerati Laxman v. State of A.P. (2009)

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 21-Jan-2026

    Tags:
  • Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act)

Introduction 

This landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India addressed the critical question of how to compute age for determining whether an accused person qualifies as a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. The case arose from conflicting interpretations regarding age calculation and the relevant date for determining juvenile status, ultimately establishing important principles for age computation in juvenile justice cases. 

Facts 

Chronology of Events: 

  • May 9, 1994 (approximately 1:00 p.m.): Alleged date of offence - Eerati Laxman was accused of murdering Pittala Chandrakala by pouring kerosene over her and setting her on fire with a matchstick. 
  • May 25, 1994: Appellant was produced before the learned Magistrate. 
  • Date of Birth: May 10, 1978 (as recorded in primary school registers). 

Age Determination Issue: 

  • The central question was whether the appellant had completed 16 years of age on May 9, 1994 (date of offence), given his birth date of May 10, 1978. 
  • The trial court rejected the claim of juvenile status, stating that no reliance could be placed on the date of birth recorded in school registers. 

Judicial Proceedings: 

  • Initial Trial Court Decision: The trial judge held that the appellant was not a juvenile, relying on the decision in Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488. 
  • Revision Application: Filed before the High Court challenging the trial court's determination. 
  • High Court Order (July 26, 2000): The matter was remanded back to trial court. The High Court directed the trial court to follow Arnit Das v. State of Bihar, which held that the date of production before the court (May 25, 1994) was the relevant date, not the date of offence. 
  • Sessions Judge's Decision: Following the High Court's direction, held that the accused was not a juvenile when brought before the court. The appellant was convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
  • Appeal to High Court: The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that by May 10, 1994, the accused would start his 17th year of life, and therefore on May 9, 1995 (not 1994), he would be presumed to have completed 16 years if his date of birth was May 10, 1978. 

Issues Involved 

The Supreme Court examined the following critical questions: 

  • Issue 1: What is the correct method for computing age to determine whether an accused has attained a specified age under the Juvenile Justice Act? 
  • Issue 2: Whether the date of commission of offence or the date of production before the court is the relevant date for determining juvenile status? 
  • Issue 3: How should the day of birth be counted when calculating age - should it be included as a whole day or excluded?

Court's Observations 

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment with the following key determinations: 

On the Relevant Date for Juvenile Determination: 

  • Overruling of Arnit Das: The Court noted that Arnit Das v. State of Bihar had been overruled by a Constitution Bench in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2005). 
  • Date of Offence as Relevant Date: The Court affirmed the principle established in Pratap Singh that the date on which the offence was committed, not the date when the accused was first produced before the court, is the relevant date for determining juvenile status. 
  • Beneficial Legislation: The Court emphasized that the Juvenile Justice Act is beneficent legislation, though this does not mean the principle of literal interpretation should not be applied. 

On Age Computation: 

  • Indian Majority Act, 1875: The Court examined Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act, which provides that in computing the age of any person, the day on which he was born is to be included as a whole day, and he shall be deemed to have attained majority at the beginning of the eighteenth anniversary of that day. 
  • Prabhu Dayal Sesma Principle: The Court relied on Prabhu Dayal Sesma v. State of Rajasthan (1986), which held that in absence of any express provision, while calculating a person's age, the day of birth must be counted as a whole day and any specified age in law is to be computed as having been attained on the day preceding the anniversary of the birthday. 
  • Legal Day Definition: A legal day commences at 12 o'clock midnight and continues until the same hour the following night, as established in Salag Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (2005). 
  • Application to Present Case: Since the appellant was born on May 10, 1978, that day was to be counted as a whole day. Therefore, he had not attained the age of 16 years before 12 o'clock midnight of the previous day, i.e., May 9, 1978 (should be 1994). 

Analysis of High Court's Error: 

  • The High Court had erroneously concluded that the accused would complete 16 years only on May 9, 1995, rather than May 9, 1994. 

Conclusion 

  • This judgment reinforced the principle that the day of birth is counted as a whole day when computing age, and a person is deemed to have attained a specified age at the beginning of the anniversary of the day of birth, not on the anniversary itself. 
  • The decision ensured that the beneficial provisions of juvenile justice legislation are properly applied through correct age computation, preventing injustice due to erroneous calculation methods. It emphasized that literal interpretation of statutory provisions regarding age must be followed even in beneficial legislation to ensure legal certainty and proper application of the law.