List of Current Affairs

Source: Delhi High Court 

Why in News? 

The Delhi High Court in CBI v. I M Quddusi (2025) upheld the protection of accused persons against compelled self-incrimination, ruling that Section 91 CrPC cannot be used to extract information from an accused that would require them to impart personal knowledge. 

What was the Background of CBI v. I M Quddusi (2026) Case? 

• The CBI registered FIR No. RC 217/2019/A/0009 dated December 4, 2019, against the respondent (a retired Judge of Chhattisgarh High Court), Justice Shri Narayan Shukla (Judge of Allahabad High Court), M/s. Prasad Education Trust, and others. 
• The accused were charged under Section 120-B IPC read with Sections 7, 8, 12, and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 
• The allegations involved a criminal conspiracy to obtain favorable orders for Prasad Educational Trust, whose college was debarred by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, allegedly involving illegal gratification. 
• On February 11, 2020, the CBI issued a Notice under Section 91 CrPC to the respondent seeking: (i) details of mobile numbers used during 2017, (ii) details of all bank accounts with statements for May-October 2017, and (iii) details of drivers/servants employed during May-October 2017. 
• The respondent challenged the notice through Miscellaneous Application No. 1 of 2020 before the Special Judge for CBI Cases, arguing it violated Article 20(3) of the Constitution. 
• On April 1, 2021, the Special Judge allowed the respondent's application and set aside the Section 91 notice, relying on State of Gujarat v. Shyamlal Mohanlal Choksi (1965). 
• The CBI filed the present petition under Section 482 CrPC challenging the Special Judge's order, arguing the information sought was non-incriminating and necessary for investigation. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court examined the constitutional protection under Article 20(3), referring to MP Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954), which held that "to be a witness" includes oral as well as documentary evidence and extends beyond courtroom testimony. 
• The Court distinguished between testimonial evidence (imparting personal knowledge) and material evidence (fingerprints, specimen writings) based on State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961). 
• The Court emphasized that Section 91 CrPC presupposes the existence of a specific, tangible document or thing already in possession, not the creation of new records. 
• The Court observed that the CBI's notice did not seek production of pre-existing documents but demanded the accused provide information by applying their mind and memory to create a new record. 
• The Court noted that the CrPC provides distinct mechanisms: Section 91 for securing real evidence (existing documents/things) and Section 161 for securing oral evidence through interrogation. 
• The Court held that treating a demand for details as a demand for a document would stretch Section 91 beyond its permissible limits. 
• The Court affirmed that while Kathi Kalu Oghad laid down broad contours of Article 20(3), Shyamlal Choksi specifically interpreted Section 91 CrPC and concluded the legislature did not intend to include accused persons within its ambit. 
• The Court noted that Shyamlal Choksi (1964) was decided after Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961), and the Constitution Bench was aware of the earlier principles but carved out a specific statutory exception regarding Section 91. 
• The Court emphasized that compelling the accused to identify and list mobile numbers, bank accounts, and employees would require applying mind, searching memory, and compiling information based on personal knowledge, which constitutes testimonial compulsion. 
• The Court ruled that Section 91 cannot be used as a shortcut to compel the accused to assist in building the case against himself when the agency can collect evidence from independent sources.

What is Section 91 of CrPC?  

About:  

• This Section deals with the summons to produce documents or other things whereas the same provision has been covered under Section 94 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). It states that -  

(1) Whenever any Court or any officer in charge of a police station considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code by or before such Court or officer, such Court may issue a summons, or such officer a written order, to the person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be, requiring him to attend and produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place stated in the summons or order.

(2) Any person required under this section merely to produce a document or other thing shall be deemed to have complied with the requisition if he causes such document or thing to be produced instead of attending personally to produce the same.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed--

(a) to affect sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 or the Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891, or 
(b) to apply to a letter, postcard, telegram or other document or any parcel or thing in the custody of the postal or telegraph authority. 

Case Law:  

In the case of Nitya Dharmananda v. Gopal Sheelum Reddy (2018), the Supreme Court observed that the accused cannot invoke and would not have right to invoke Section 91 CrPC at the stage of framing of charge. 

Source: Gauhati High Court

Why in News?

Justice Pranjal Das in the case of Tufazzul Hussain v. Fulmala Khatun (2025) held that a marriage cannot be dissolved by way of an affidavit made before a Notary, and in the absence of material showing invocation of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, a claim of divorce based merely on a notarised affidavit cannot be accepted.

What was the Background of Tufazzul Hussain v. Fulmala Khatun (2025) Case? 

• The case arose from a criminal revision petition challenging an order passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Barpeta. 
• The Family Court had directed the petitioner-husband to pay Rs. 3,000 per month as maintenance to the respondent-wife. 
• The respondent-wife had approached the Family Court under Section 125 CrPC claiming maintenance. 
• She asserted that she had married the petitioner under Islamic law, had lived with him, and was later driven out after alleged torture and monetary demands. 
• The petitioner disputed the marital relationship and contended that the respondent had an earlier marriage with one Manik Ali which had not been lawfully dissolved. 
• The respondent admitted in cross-examination that she had married her earlier husband in 2000 and had three children from that marriage. 
• She stated that her earlier husband did not divorce her, but that she had given divorce to him in 2017. 
• Both sides referred to a photocopy of an affidavit mentioning divorce, but the document was not exhibited during the proceeding. 
• The respondent mentioned dissolving her marital tie with Manik Ali from her side and stated about submitting a copy of the affidavit, while retaining the original. 
• During the proceeding before the Family Court, the respondent could not adduce sufficient evidence to show that her earlier marriage with Manik Ali had been lawfully dissolved.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court observed that a marriage cannot be dissolved by way of an affidavit made before a Notary, stating "Needless to say that a marriage cannot be dissolved by way of an affidavit made before the Notary." 
• The Court noted that there was no material to indicate that the respondent invoked the provisions of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 for dissolving her marital tie with Manik Ali. 
• The Court recorded that the earlier marriage of the respondent with Manik Ali was an admitted position. 
• The Court found that the respondent could not adduce sufficient evidence to show that her earlier marriage had been lawfully dissolved and that she was no longer his legally wedded wife. 
• The Court clarified that merely referring to an affidavit in cross-examination and submitting a copy in the maintenance proceeding would not constitute sufficient proof of dissolution of earlier marriage. 
• The Court held that any affidavit sworn by the respondent before Notary Public would not constitute legally acceptable dissolution of the marriage. 
• The Court stated that such evidence would not confer any status of wife of the present petitioner, even if it was accepted that she had married the present petitioner. 
• The Court concluded that the Family Court erred in overlooking this aspect and in accepting the marital status of the respondent as wife of the petitioner. 
• The Court held that the wife could not have claimed maintenance from the petitioner husband as his legally wedded wife and therefore, she cannot be granted maintenance from his side. 
• The impugned judgment and order passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court was set aside and quashed. 
• The revision petition was allowed and disposed of.

What is the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939? 

About: 

• The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 is a legislation that provides Muslim women in India with the right to seek divorce under certain specified grounds. 
• The Act was enacted to consolidate and clarify the law relating to the dissolution of Muslim marriages. 
• Prior to this Act, Muslim women had limited rights to seek divorce, and the law governing divorce was often unclear and varied based on different schools of Islamic jurisprudence. 
• The Act provides specific grounds on which a Muslim woman can seek divorce, including husband's whereabouts unknown for four years, failure to provide maintenance for two years, husband's imprisonment for seven years or more, husband's failure to perform marital obligations for three years, husband's impotency, husband's insanity or suffering from leprosy or virulent venereal disease, repudiation of marriage by the wife before attaining puberty, cruelty by the husband, and any other ground recognized under Muslim law. 
• The Act empowers Muslim women to approach the court for dissolution of marriage on these grounds. 

Marriage Dissolution Requirements: 

• Under Muslim law, marriage dissolution requires following proper legal procedures as prescribed by law. 
• A marriage cannot be dissolved merely by executing an affidavit before a Notary Public. 
• For a valid divorce under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, the woman must invoke the provisions of the Act and follow the prescribed procedure. 
• The dissolution must be legally established through proper evidence and documentation, not just through unilateral declarations or private documents. 
• Merely referring to or submitting a copy of a notarized affidavit does not constitute sufficient proof of lawful dissolution of marriage. 
• The dissolution of marriage must be done through judicial process or through recognized legal methods under Muslim personal law. 
• Without proper legal procedure, a claimed divorce lacks legal validity and cannot establish changed marital status.