List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News?

A bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran of the Supreme Court, in Kuldeep Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Anr. (2026), allowed an appeal filed by members of a Scheduled Caste community, cancelling the anticipatory bail granted to upper-caste respondents by the Punjab & Haryana High Court.  

• The Court held that an attempt at reconciliation by the police does not bar registration of an FIR for cognizable offences, and that an FIR lodged on the basis of a police officer's eyewitness statement is perfectly valid in law.

What was the Background of Kuldeep Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Anr.(2026) Case? 

• The dispute arose between two groups in a locality in Punjab — the appellants belonging to a Scheduled Caste community and the respondents from an upper-caste group. 
• The conflict originated over allegations that drainage water was being diverted into the houses of the Scheduled Caste appellants. 
• Police reached the spot and attempted to mediate the dispute. However, the situation allegedly turned violent during the reconciliation attempts. 
• According to the prosecution, shots were fired and caste-based abuses were hurled at members of the Scheduled Caste community during this period. 
• An FIR was subsequently registered on the First Information Statement of a police official who had witnessed the incident firsthand. 
• The Punjab & Haryana High Court granted anticipatory bail to the respondents, reasoning that the FIR was based on a police officer's statement rather than a complaint by the victims themselves. 
• Members of the Scheduled Caste community challenged this order before the Supreme Court.

What were the Court's Observations? 

On FIR by a Police Witness: 

• The Court rejected the High Court's reasoning that an FIR based on a police officer's statement is inherently suspect.  
• It held that an FIR can validly be lodged on the basis of a statement by a police officer who personally witnessed the commission of the offence, irrespective of whether the victims themselves had made a formal complaint. 
• "The FIR cannot be doubted merely because it is based on a police statement." 

On Reconciliation and Cognizance of Crime: 

• The Court held that the police retain their statutory duty to register and investigate cognizable offences even while simultaneously making attempts at reconciliation between disputing parties.  
• Reconciliation or mediation efforts — whether initiated by the police or otherwise — cannot override or curtail the statutory obligation of the police to enforce criminal law. 
• "Even the police admit that there was tension prevailing in the locality which led to criminal acts being perpetrated." 

On Police Powers and Duty: 

• The Court reaffirmed that the police has discretionary power to register an FIR upon receiving information about the commission of a cognizable offence.  
• This power cannot be curtailed merely because reconciliation or mediation proceedings between the parties are simultaneously underway.  
• The police are duty-bound to act when criminal offences occur, regardless of any parallel dispute resolution attempts. 

On Relief: 

• The Court set aside the High Court's order granting anticipatory bail. Noting that a prima facie case under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act was made out against the respondents, the anticipatory bail was cancelled and the appeal of the Scheduled Caste community members was allowed.

Key Legal Principles Reaffirmed: 

• Validity of police-statement FIR: A First Information Report is validly registered even when the informant is a police officer who witnessed the offence and cannot be discredited on that basis alone. 
• Statutory duty overrides reconciliation: Attempts at mediation or reconciliation by the police do not create a bar to the exercise of their statutory duty to take cognizance of cognizable offences. 
• Anticipatory bail in SC/ST cases: Courts must be mindful of the legislative intent behind the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act while considering anticipatory bail, particularly where a prima facie case is made out. 
• Source of information immaterial: The source of information for lodging an FIR — whether victim, witness, or police officer — does not determine its legal validity.

What is Taking Cognizance of an Offence? 

About: 

• "Taking cognizance" determines when a judicial authority first becomes aware of and takes judicial notice of an alleged offence. 
• It is the threshold that must be crossed before any criminal proceedings can be initiated. 

Meaning of Cognizance: 

• It is the pivotal moment when a Magistrate or Judge transitions from being unaware of an alleged crime to actively considering it in a judicial capacity. 
• This transformation carries significant legal implications for both the accused and the prosecution. 

Historical Legal Precedents: 

• In Gopal v. Emperor (1913), approved in R. R. Chari v. State of U.P. (1951), the Court held that cognizance is "the point when the Magistrate or Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence" and is a condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings. 
• Two key principles emerge — cognizance is distinct from and precedes the initiation of proceedings, and it is a mandatory prerequisite before any criminal process can commence. 

Contemporary Legal Understanding: 

• In Ajit Kumar Palit v. State of W.B. (1963), the Supreme Court clarified that "cognizance" carries no mystical significance — it simply means "becoming aware of" in a judicial context. 
• The concept is defined plainly as taking judicial notice of an offence, emphasising its practical rather than esoteric character. 

Practical Application: 

• In Emperor v. Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty (1910), the Court held that taking cognizance involves no formal action of any kind. 
• It occurs the moment a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. 
• Where a statute prescribes specific materials for judicial consideration, those requirements must be fulfilled before cognizance can be said to have been taken. 

Statutory Framework: 

• Section 210 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) and the corresponding Section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) dealing with “cognizance of offences by Magistrates” read as follows – 

Why in News? 

Justice Ajay Mohan Goel of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, in Pankaj Chauhan & Others v. State of H.P. & Others  (2026), dismissed a writ petition challenging the appointment of a respondent as Part-Time Multi Task Worker, clarifying that completing Class 8 after attaining the age of fourteen years is not prohibited under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009. 

• The Court held that the RTE Act is a legislation enacted to guarantee access to education for children within the specified age bracket, and its provisions cannot be read to create a disqualification for individuals who continue their schooling beyond that age.

What was the Background of Pankaj Chauhan & Ors. v. State of H.P. & Ors. (2026) Case? 

• The petitioner, Pankaj Chauhan, challenged the appointment of a respondent as Part-Time Multi Task Worker at a Government Primary School in District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh. 
• The petitioner alleged that the selected candidate had earlier failed in Class 8 and subsequently obtained a fresh Class 8 certificate from a private school after crossing the age of fourteen years. 
• He contended that such a certificate was illegal and contrary to the provisions of the RTE Act, 2009. 
• An appeal filed by the petitioner under the Part Time Multi Task Workers Scheme, 2020 was rejected by the first appellate authority on the ground that no material irregularity was found. 
• A further appeal before the Director of School Education was similarly rejected. 
• Aggrieved by these orders, the petitioner approached the Himachal Pradesh High Court by way of a writ petition.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Scope of the RTE Act: The Court clarified that the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 was enacted with the specific purpose of securing free and compulsory education for children falling within the age group of six to fourteen years. A careful reading of the Act's provisions reveals no statutory bar preventing a person above fourteen years of age from being admitted to, or completing, Class 8 in any school. 
• On the Nature of the Certificate: The Court noted that the Class 8 certificate relied upon by the selected candidate had been duly verified by the competent authorities. No ground was found to doubt its authenticity, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate any material irregularity that could render it invalid. 
• On the Challenge to Appointment: The Court found no merit in the petitioner's contentions and upheld the decisions of both the appellate authority and the Director of School Education, affirming that the appointment of the respondent was not vitiated by any legal infirmity. 

What is the Right to Education Act? 

Background: 

• Passed by Parliament in August 2009; came into force in 2010. 
• Based on Article 21A (86th Constitutional Amendment, 2002) — made education a Fundamental Right for children aged 6–14 years. 

Key Provisions: 

• Free and compulsory elementary education for all children (6–14 years) in neighbourhood schools. 
• No fees or charges that could prevent a child from completing education. 
• Non-admitted children must be admitted to age-appropriate classes. 
• Specifies duties of central/state governments, local authorities, and parents. 
• Sets norms for Pupil-Teacher Ratio (PTR), infrastructure, working days, and teacher qualifications. 
• No urban-rural imbalance in teacher postings; teachers cannot be used for non-educational work (except census, elections, disaster relief). 

Prohibitions: 

• Physical punishment and mental harassment 
• Screening procedures for admission 
• Capitation fees 
• Private tuition by teachers 
• Unrecognised schools 

Significance: 

• 25% seats reserved in private schools for EWS/disadvantaged groups (Section 12(1)(c)). 
• Formation of School Management Committees (SMC) for participatory governance. 
• No detention policy until Class 8; introduced Continuous Comprehensive Evaluation (CCE). 
• Zero tolerance for discrimination based on caste, religion, or gender 
• Enrolment at upper primary level increased by 19.4% (2009–2016). 

Criticisms: 

• Children below 6 years not covered. 
• Drafted hastily with little focus on education quality. 
• Implementation issues with 25% EWS reservation in private schools. 
• Orphans excluded due to document requirements (birth certificate, BPL card, etc.). 
• 2019 amendment introduced exams in Classes 5 & 8, diluting the no-detention policy. 
• Difficulty in transitioning to CCE due to lack of teacher training.