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Civil Imprisonment Does Not Extinguish Husband’s Duty to Pay Maintenance

 25-Mar-2026

Hasina Khatoon v. State of UP & Another 

"Merely committing a defaulter to civil prison does not absolve him of the liability to pay monthly maintenance to the aggrieved wife." 

Justice Praveen Kumar Giri 

Source: Allahabad High Court 

Why in News?

A bench of Justice Praveen Kumar Giri of the Allahabad High Court, in the case of Hasina Khatoon v. State of UP and Another (2026), held that civil imprisonment for non-payment of maintenance under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 does not extinguish the husband's continuing liability to pay arrears.  

  • The Court further clarified that the doctrine of double jeopardy under Section 300 CrPC (Section 337 of BNSS) is wholly inapplicable to proceedings under the DV Act.

What was the Background of Hasina Khatoon v. State of UP (2026) Case? 

  • The petition was filed by Hasina Khatoon, a wife challenging a January 2023 order passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division)/Fast Track Court (Crime against Women), Moradabad. 
  • In July 2019, a Magistrate had directed the petitioner's husband to pay interim maintenance of Rs. 4,000 to the wife and Rs. 4,000 to their disabled son every month. 
  • The husband consistently failed to make these payments, allowing arrears to accumulate to Rs. 2,64,000, prompting the wife to file an execution application. 
  • On the wife's plea, a recovery warrant was issued and the husband was arrested on October 30, 2022. Upon his refusal to deposit the awarded amount, the Judicial Magistrate committed him to civil prison for 30 days. 
  • Even after his release, the husband failed to pay the maintenance amount. The wife consequently filed a fresh application for recovery of the same arrears of Rs. 2,64,000. 
  • The Civil Judge (Junior Division)/Fast Track Court rejected this subsequent application, holding that the husband had already served 30 days of civil detention in respect of those arrears, and relying upon Section 300 CrPC to bar further proceedings on the same amount. 
  • The husband further defended this position by arguing that having served his term of imprisonment, no arrears remained outstanding, and also challenged the maintainability of the wife's petition under Section 482 CrPC on the ground that the impugned order was appealable under Section 29 of the DV Act.

What were the Court's Observations? 

  • On the inapplicability of double jeopardy, the Court held at the outset that Section 300 CrPC, which embodies the principle of double jeopardy, is entirely inapplicable to proceedings under the DV Act, since such proceedings result in neither a conviction nor an acquittal.  
  • Refusing to execute a maintenance award by invoking Section 300 CrPC, the bench observed, reflects a non-application of judicial mind. 
  • On the nature of maintenance proceedings, the Court relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Rina Kumari v. Dinesh Kumar Mahto (2025) to affirm that even where non-compliance with a maintenance order attracts penal consequences, the proceedings themselves do not constitute criminal proceedings in the traditional sense. 
  • On the continuing liability of the husband, the bench categorically held that committing a defaulting husband to civil prison is a coercive mechanism to enforce compliance — it is not a discharge or satisfaction of the underlying debt. 
  • The liability to pay maintenance, both current and arrears, survives the period of civil detention. 
  • On the remedy available, the Court directed that since the husband had already undergone a period of civil detention, further civil imprisonment for the same arrears would not be appropriate.  
  • Instead, the appropriate recourse was attachment of the husband's property, with proceeds applied toward payment of arrears along with simple bank interest at 6% per annum on the delayed amount.

What is Section 337 of BNSS? 

Section 337, BNSS — Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence 

  • Core Rule: A person once convicted or acquitted by a competent court cannot be tried again for the same offence, or on the same facts for any other offence that could have been charged at the original trial. 

Exceptions (When a Second Trial Is Permitted): 

  • Distinct offence — A person may be tried for a separate, distinct offence arising from the same transaction, but only with the State Government's consent. 
  • Unforeseen consequences — If an act leads to consequences that were unknown or hadn't yet occurred at the time of the first conviction (e.g., a victim later dying from injuries), the accused may be tried for the graver offence arising from those consequences. 
  • Incompetent court — If the original court lacked jurisdiction to try a particular offence, the accused may be tried for that offence before a competent court, despite the earlier conviction or acquittal. 
  • Discharged accused — A person discharged under Section 281 BNSS may be tried again for the same offence, but only with the consent of the discharging court or a superior court.

What Does NOT Count as Acquittal: 

The dismissal of a complaint or discharge of the accused does not amount to an acquittal for the purpose of this section — meaning double jeopardy protection does not attach in such cases.

Savings: 

The section expressly preserves the operation of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and Section 208 of the BNSS, both of which deal with situations where a single act constitutes an offence under multiple laws.

Illustrations (Simplified): 

  • A is acquitted of theft as a servant — he cannot be retried for the same theft, or for simple theft on the same facts. 
  • A is convicted of causing grievous hurt — if the victim later dies, A can be tried afresh for culpable homicide, since the fatal consequence was not known at the time of the first trial. 

Criminal Law

Person Granted Pardon & Examined as Approver U/S 343 BNSS

 25-Mar-2026

Ajaz Ahmed v. UT of J&K through SHO Police Station Poonch & Superintendent, District Jail, Poonch 

"The continued detention of an approver despite compliance with pardon conditions may violate Article 21 of the Constitution guaranteeing a sacred human right of personal liberty." 

Justice Mohd Yousuf Wani 

Source: High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh

Why in News?

Justice Mohd Yousuf Wani of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, in the case of Ajaz Ahmed v. UT of J&K (2026), held that once an approver has fully and truthfully complied with the conditions of pardon granted under Section 343 of the BNSS, 2023, he cannot be kept in mandatory custody until the end of trial.  

  • The Court further held that the High Court retains inherent powers under Section 528 of BNSS to grant bail to such an approver in appropriate cases, balancing statutory intent with constitutional guarantees.

What was the Background of Ajaz Ahmed v. UT of J&K (2026) Case? 

  • The petition was filed under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023, challenging the Trial Court's order rejecting the bail application of the petitioner, Ajaz Ahmed — a government teacher — in an FIR registered under Sections 120-B, 121, 122, 201, 7/25 of the Arms Act, and multiple provisions of the UAPA. 
  • During investigation, it was established that the petitioner was indirectly involved under compulsion and threat from co-accused Gulshan Ahmed, and had no prior knowledge of the criminal intent or conspiracy involved in the recovery of arms, ammunition, and posters of a banned outfit from co-accused individuals. 
  • After the filing of the final report/challan, the petitioner expressed willingness to give a truthful account of facts, conditional on receiving pardon under Section 306 of the Code.  
  • The Chief Judicial Magistrate granted pardon, and the petitioner's statement was recorded as an approver. He was subsequently examined at trial, providing full and consistent testimony in both chief and cross-examination.  
  • Despite this full compliance, the Trial Court rejected his bail application solely on the ground that Section 343(4)(b) of BNSS requires detention until termination of trial. This order was challenged before the High Court.

What were the Court's Observations? 

  • The Court held that custodial detention of an approver under Section 343(4)(b) of BNSS is protective in nature — aimed at shielding the approver from co-accused retaliation and securing truthful testimony — and not a punitive measure. The provision must be read alongside the words "unless he is already on bail," indicating that detention is conditional, not absolute. 
  • The Court further held that once an approver makes a full and true disclosure and complies with pardon conditions, the Trial Court retains discretion to release him on bail. Prolonged detention beyond this point serves no statutory purpose and violates the right to personal liberty under Article 21.  
  • The High Court also clarified that its inherent powers under Section 528 of BNSS are available in appropriate cases to remedy such detention, and that any concerns regarding non-compliance by the approver can be addressed through separate proceedings under Section 308 of CrPC. 
  • Quashing the Trial Court's order, the Court directed that the petitioner be considered for bail subject to reasonable conditions ensuring compliance with pardon terms and his personal safety.

What is Section 343 of BNSS? 

Section 343 of BNSS, 2023 — Tender of Pardon to Accomplice: 

  • Section 343 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, empowers the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a First-Class Magistrate to tender pardon to any person suspected to be directly or indirectly involved in an offence, at any stage of investigation, inquiry, or trial.  
  • The pardon is conditional upon the person making a full and true disclosure of all circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and every other person involved in it. 
  • The section applies to offences triable exclusively by a Court of Session or Special Judge, and to offences punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more. 
  • The Magistrate tendering pardon must record his reasons and whether the tender was accepted, and must supply a copy of such record to the accused free of cost upon application. 
  • A person accepting the pardon must be examined as a witness before the Magistrate and in subsequent trial proceedings, and shall remain in custody until the termination of trial unless already on bail.  
  • Once such a person is examined, the Magistrate must commit the case for trial — to the Court of Session or Special Judge where the offence is exclusively triable by such courts, or to the Chief Judicial Magistrate in all other cases, without conducting any further inquiry.