List of Current Affairs

Source: High Court of Allahabad 

Why in News? 

Justice Madan Pal Singh of the Allahabad High Court, in the case of Humaira Riyaz v. State of U.P. and Another (2026), held that under Mohammedan Law, talaq takes effect from the date of its pronouncement by the husband. A court decree passed subsequently is merely declaratory in nature — it recognises and confirms the divorce that had already occurred and does not create a fresh divorce from the date of the judgment. 

• The Court also reaffirmed the entitlement of a wife to maintenance where her second marriage was entered into after a valid talaq, even if the court's declaratory decree confirming that talaq came at a later date.

What was the Background of Humaira Riyaz v. State of U.P. (2026) Case? 

• The revisionist (wife) filed a criminal revision before the Allahabad High Court challenging a Prayagraj Family Court order that denied her maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, even while it awarded maintenance to her two minor sons. 
• The Family Court's denial rested primarily on the finding that the revisionist's first marriage had not been legally dissolved as of the date of her second marriage, and therefore her second marriage was void under Mohammedan Law. 
• Before the High Court, the wife's counsel submitted that her first husband had pronounced talaq on February 27, 2005.  
• A declaratory suit was subsequently filed, and on January 8, 2013, a court decree was passed recognising and confirming the validity of the 2005 talaq. After duly observing the iddat period, the revisionist solemnised her second marriage in May 2012, and her second husband had full knowledge of the earlier divorce. 
• It was further argued that a woman cannot be denied maintenance merely on technical objections regarding the validity of a marriage — particularly when the husband had knowingly entered into the union and both parties had lived together as husband and wife. 
• The husband's counsel, on the other hand, argued that since the divorce decree was granted only in 2013, the second marriage solemnised in 2012 was void, as no valid court-recognised divorce existed at that time.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court rejected the husband's contentions and held that a court decree passed after the pronouncement of talaq is declaratory in nature — it merely confirms the status of divorce that had already taken effect from the date of pronouncement. Such a decree relates back to the original date of the talaq and does not constitute a fresh divorce from the date of judgment. 
• The Court noted that the approach adopted by the Family Court was not in consonance with settled legal position. By treating the 2013 decree as the operative date of divorce, the Family Court had overlooked the retrospective character of a declaratory decree confirming a pronouncement already made in 2005. 
• The High Court, however, also clarified an important qualification — where the validity of a talaq is disputed, trial courts are required to examine the evidence carefully and properly determine whether the talaq was validly given in accordance with law. The declaratory nature of the decree does not insulate it from such scrutiny in contested cases. 
• Accordingly, the High Court set aside the Family Court's order to the extent that it denied maintenance to the revisionist and remanded the matter back to the Family Court to decide the wife's maintenance claim afresh on its merits. 

What is Talaq under Muslim Law? 

Dissolution of Muslim Marriage: 

• Under Muslim Law, marriage dissolves either by death of a spouse or by divorce. The right to divorce primarily vests with the husband, who may exercise it unilaterally without providing any reason. 

By Husband (Talaq): 

Talaq broadly means repudiation of the marriage tie. It takes three forms: 

• Talaq-ul-Sunnat is the approved form, further divided into Talaq-i-ahasan (single pronouncement followed by a three-month iddat, revocable during this period) and Talaq-i-hasan (three declarations across successive menstrual cycles, the first two being revocable). 
• Talaq-ul-Biddat (triple talaq) was an irrevocable instant divorce, struck down by the Supreme Court in Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) as violative of Article 14, and subsequently criminalised. 
• Other husband-initiated forms include Ila (oath of abstinence for four months) and Zihar (unlawful comparison of wife to a prohibited female relative), the latter giving the wife a right to seek judicial divorce. 

By Wife: 

• A wife can divorce only if the right is delegated to her by the husband (Talaaq-i-tafweez), or if the husband makes a false charge of adultery (Lian), entitling her to sue for divorce. 

By Mutual Consent: 

• Khula is a wife-initiated divorce where she returns the mahr as consideration. Mubarat is a divorce by mutual agreement, irrevocable under both Shia and Sunni law. 

Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939: 

• A Muslim wife may seek judicial divorce on statutory grounds including the husband's disappearance for four years, failure to maintain her for two years, imprisonment for seven or more years, impotency, insanity, cruelty, and repudiation of a child marriage before age 18. 

Source: High Court of Allahabad

Why in News? 

Justice Chawan Prakash of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, in the case of Anamika Tiwari and 4 Others v. State of U.P. and Another (2026), held that a legally wedded wife is the absolute owner of her streedhan and cannot be made to face criminal trial under Section 406 IPC for allegedly taking away her own property. 

• The Court further held that while a husband may use the streedhan during times of distress, he carries a moral obligation to restore it or its equivalent value, and neither he nor other in-laws retain any legal control over such property.

What was the Background of Anamika Tiwari and 4 Others v. State of U.P. and Another (2026) Case? 

• The application was filed by Anamika Tiwari and four others seeking quashing of a summoning order and the entire proceedings of a complaint case under Sections 323, 504, and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 
• The applicant-wife had married the opposite party-husband in April 2012, and her family had provided sufficient dowry at the time of marriage.  
• Disputes arose thereafter, and she lodged an FIR against her husband and his family members under Sections 498-A and 323 IPC and under the Dowry Prohibition Act, alleging demands for additional dowry. A charge sheet was submitted in December 2018 in this matter. 
• Subsequently, in May 2022, a court directed the husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs 4,000 to the wife and Rs 1,000 to her son. 
• Following this, the husband filed a counter-complaint alleging that his wife and the other applicants had entered his house in September 2018 and taken away Rs 6,400 in cash, ornaments worth approximately Rs 1,50,000, and certain household articles.  
• On the basis of this complaint and witness statements, the Magistrate passed a summoning order against the wife and her family members. The wife challenged this order before the High Court.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court examined Sections 405 and 406 IPC at the outset and noted that for an offence of criminal breach of trust to be made out, property must be entrusted to a person who subsequently and dishonestly misappropriates or converts it to her own use. 
• The Court held that since a wife is the absolute owner of her streedhan — comprising all properties given to her before, at the time of, or after marriage — no such entrustment by the husband or his family can be said to exist. Consequently, no offence under Section 406 IPC could be made out against the applicant-wife for removing her own ornaments and property. 
• The Court further clarified that streedhan does not become joint property of the husband and wife by virtue of the marriage, and the wife retains an unqualified right to dispose of it as she pleases. While a husband may use streedhan in times of need, this use carries with it a moral obligation to restore the property or its value — it does not confer any right of ownership or control upon him or the in-laws. 
• Regarding the charges under Sections 323 and 504 against the remaining applicants, the Court found the allegations to be general and non-specific in nature. 
• The Court also remarked that the summoning order had been passed in a casual manner, as the Magistrate had failed to properly apply the definitional requirements of criminal breach of trust under Section 405 IPC before issuing process. 
• Accordingly, the summoning order was set aside and the entire proceedings against the wife and her relatives were quashed.

What is the Concept of Streedhan? 

About:  

• The word Streedhan has been derived from the words ‘Stri’ meaning a woman and the word ‘dhana’ means property. 
• Streedhan is whatever a women receives during her life time.  
• It includes all movable, immovable property gifts etc. received by women prior to marriage, at the time of marriage, during childbirth and during her widowhood. 
• Streedhan differs from Dowry in the way that it is the voluntary gift given to a woman before or after her marriage and has no element of coercion.  
• Women have an absolute right over their Stridhan. 

Composition of Streedhan:  

• Streedhan comprises of the following:  
  • Gifts made before the nuptial fire.  
  • Gifts made at the bridal procession.  
  • Gifts made in token of love, that is, those made by her father-in-law and mother-in-law and other elders.  
  • Gifts made by the father of the bride. 
  • Gifts made by the mother of the bride. 
  • Gifts made by the brother of the bride. 

Laws Relating to Streedhan: 

• A woman’s right to her Streedhan is protected under law Section14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 r/w Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 , “even if it is placed in the custody of her husband or her in-laws, they would be deemed to be trustees and bound to return the same if and when demanded by her.  
• Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 provides for women right to her Streedhan in cases where she is a victim of domestic violence. The provisions of this law can be easily invoked for the recovery of Streedhan.The magistrate may direct the respondent to return to the possession of the aggrieved person her Streedhan or any other property or valuable security to which she is entitled.