List of Current Affairs

Source: High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh

Why in News? 

Justice Sanjay Parihar of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, in the case of Kali Dass & Anr. v. State of J&K (2026), held that registration of a second FIR is not barred under law where it relates to a wider conspiracy uncovered during investigation of an earlier FIR, so long as the two FIRs do not pertain to the same incident or occurrence. 

• The Court applied the "test of sameness" as the decisive standard, relying on T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) and subsequent precedents, to uphold the maintainability of the second FIR and dismiss the petitions challenging framing of charges.

What was the Background of Kali Dass & Anr. v. State of J&K (2026) Case? 

• The petitions were filed challenging a trial court order framing charges against the petitioners, who were officials in the Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs & Public Distribution (CAPD) Department. 
• An earlier FIR (No. 91/2006) had been registered in connection with a specific incident of black-marketing of kerosene oil under the public distribution system, arising from the detection of excess kerosene stock traced to a particular allotment order suspected to be fake. 
• During investigation of that case, it was revealed that similar forged allotment orders were being circulated in the market, indicating a larger racket. This led to the registration of a second FIR (No. 31/2006), pertaining to a broader conspiracy involving the preparation and circulation of multiple forged allotment orders. 
• The petitioners — CAPD Department officials — were arrayed as accused in the second FIR on allegations of conniving with private individuals to facilitate the use of these forged documents. They challenged the framing of charges primarily on the ground that the second FIR was barred in law as it related to the same transaction already covered by the earlier FIR.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court held that the prohibition against registering multiple FIRs, as laid down in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001), is not absolute. It applies only where the subsequent FIR relates to the same incident or occurrence that forms the subject matter of the earlier FIR. The decisive test, the Court reiterated, is the "test of sameness." 
• Applying this test, the Court distinguished the two FIRs — the earlier one pertained to a specific instance of black-marketing based on a single allotment order, while the second pertained to a larger conspiracy involving the preparation and circulation of multiple forged allotment orders over a period of time. Although connected, the two FIRs were found to operate in distinct spheres of criminality. 
• The Court relied on Babubhai v. State of Gujarat (2010) to affirm that even connected FIRs may be legally sustainable if they concern a "distinct conspiracy" rather than the "same transaction." 
• On the question of framing of charges, the Court reiterated — relying on State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) and Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (1979) — that a court at this stage is not required to conduct a meticulous evaluation of evidence. The existence of a prima facie case or grave suspicion founded on material on record is sufficient. 
• The Court further noted that offences involving conspiracy are typically proved through circumstantial evidence, and the absence of direct evidence does not render the allegations implausible at the threshold stage. 
• Dismissing the petitions, the High Court directed the trial court to proceed with the trial in accordance with law.

What is the "Test of Sameness" in the Context of Multiple FIRs? 

• The "test of sameness" is the governing legal principle to determine whether a second FIR is barred in law. As crystallised by the Supreme Court in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001), the bar against multiple FIRs operates only when both FIRs arise from the same incident or occurrence — i.e., when the subject matter of the two FIRs is identical or substantially the same. 
• Where the subsequent FIR relates to a distinct transaction, a broader conspiracy, or a separate sphere of criminality — even if factually connected to the earlier FIR — it does not fall foul of this bar and is maintainable in law. 
• The principle ensures that investigation is not artificially fragmented, while simultaneously preventing harassment of accused persons through multiple proceedings arising from a single incident. Courts apply this test by examining the substance and scope of each FIR, not merely their factual overlap.

What is FIR under Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)? 

• The information given under Section 154 of the CrPC is commonly known as the First Information Report (FIR), though this term is not used in the Code. 
• This is provided for under Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). 
• The new features introduced in BNSS with respect to FIR are as follows:  
  • Zero FIR: BNSS provides that the information relating to commission of cognizable offence is to be registered irrespective of the area where the offence is committed. 
  • FIR can be registered in electronic form: Section 173 (1) provides that the information can be given in electronic form as well. In this case the FIR shall be taken on record on being signed within three days by the person giving it. 
  • Provision for Preliminary Investigation: in case the cognizable offence is such which is made punishable for 3 years or more but less than 7 years, the officer in charge of the police station may with the prior permission of Deputy Superintendent of Police, considering the nature and gravity of offence:  
    • Proceed to conduct preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter within a period of fourteen days; or 
    • Proceed with investigation when there exists a prima facie case. 

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

A bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta of the Supreme Court of India, in the case of J. Sri Nisha v. The Special Director, Adjudicating Authority, Directorate of Enforcement & Anr. (2026), reiterated that the general rule discouraging writ challenges to show cause notices (SCNs) is a rule of prudence — not an inviolable bar — and that High Courts retain jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to intervene at the SCN stage in exceptional circumstances.

What was the Background of J. Sri Nisha v. The Special Director, Adjudicating Authority, Directorate of Enforcement & Anr. (2026) Case? 

• The petitioner challenged a show cause notice issued in adjudication proceedings under the Foreign Exchange Management Act before the High Court. 
• The High Court declined to entertain the writ petition on the ground that challenges to show cause notices are ordinarily not maintainable at the notice stage, as the authority issuing the SCN must first be allowed to complete its adjudicatory process. 
• Aggrieved by the High Court's refusal to exercise writ jurisdiction, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court, raising the question of whether and in what circumstances a writ petition against a show cause notice would be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court held that while the ordinary rule discourages judicial interference at the stage of a show cause notice — so as not to pre-empt or derail the adjudicatory process — this principle is not absolute and does not operate as a rigid jurisdictional bar. 
• The bench affirmed that High Courts are empowered to exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and intervene at the SCN stage in the following exceptional circumstances: 
  • Where the notice suffers from a patent lack of jurisdiction. 
  • Where it reflects non-application of mind by the issuing authority. 
  • Where it is issued with a predetermined or premeditated approach. 
  • Where it amounts to an abuse of the process of law. 
  • Where it results in a violation of the principles of natural justice. 
• The Court emphasised that in such situations, the High Court would be justified in exercising its writ jurisdiction to prevent manifest injustice, and that the reluctance to interfere at the SCN stage is a rule of judicial prudence rather than a constitutional prohibition. 
• Reliance was placed on the judgment in Union of India v. VICCO Laboratories (2007), wherein the Court had previously observed that where a show cause notice is issued either without jurisdiction or in abuse of the process of law, a writ court would not hesitate to interfere even at the notice stage. 

What is a Show Cause Notice? 

• A Show Cause Notice is a formal communication issued by a court, government agency, or another authoritative body to an individual or entity, asking them to explain or justify their actions, decisions, or behaviour. 
• The purpose of a show cause notice is to give the recipient an opportunity to provide a response or clarification regarding specific concerns or alleged violations. 

What is Article 226 of the COI?  

• Article 226 is enshrined under Part V of the Constitution which puts power in the hand of the High Court to issue the writs. 
• Article 226(1) of the COI states that every High Court shall have powers to issue orders or writs including habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari, to any person or any government for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for other purpose. 
• Article 226(2) states that the High Court has the power to issue writs or orders to any person, or government, or authority -  
  • Located within its jurisdiction or 
  • Outside its local jurisdiction if the circumstances of the cause of action arises either wholly or partly within its territorial jurisdiction. 
• Article 226(3) states that when an interim order is passed by a High Court by way of injunction, stay, or by other means against a party then that party may apply to the court for the vacation of such an order and such an application should be disposed of by the court within the period of two weeks.  
• Article 226(4) says that the power granted by this article to a high court should not diminish the authority granted to the Supreme Court by Clause (2) of Article 32. 
• This Article can be issued against any person or authority, including the government. 
• This is merely a constitutional right and not a fundamental right and cannot be suspended even during an emergency. 
• Article 226 is of mandatory nature in case of fundamental rights and discretionary nature when it is issued for “any other purpose”. 
•  It enforces not only fundamental rights, but also other legal rights.