List of Current Affairs

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta of the Supreme Court, in the case of Accamma Sam Jacob v. The State of Karnataka & Anr. (2026), held that a High Court exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC cannot quash a Magistrate's order for investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC (Section 173(3) of BNSS) by examining and relying upon the defences raised by the accused.  

• The Court set aside the Karnataka High Court's order which had interfered with an ongoing police investigation by undertaking a detailed examination of documents produced by the accused. 

What was the Background of Accamma Sam Jacob v. The State of Karnataka & Anr. (2026) Case? 

• The dispute originated from a civil transaction between the parties, which acquired a criminal character when the complainant (Accamma Sam Jacob) alleged offences of theft, criminal breach of trust, cheating, forgery, preparation and use of forged documents, and criminal conspiracy against the accused. 
• On the basis of these allegations, the Magistrate ordered a police investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC, recording that the complaint prima facie disclosed the ingredients of a cognizable offence. 
• The accused approached the Karnataka High Court seeking quashing of the Magistrate's order. The High Court, instead of confining itself to the averments in the complaint, proceeded to examine the documents relied upon by the accused — including sale deeds executed in their favour — and treated these documents as determinative of the dispute. It further observed that the sale deeds must be cancelled and delivered up before criminal law could be set into motion, and accordingly interfered with the investigation. 
• Aggrieved by this order, the complainant approached the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court's interference was bad in law. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court held that the High Court had clearly fallen into error by quashing the Magistrate's order directing registration of an FIR and investigation at the very threshold of criminal proceedings. The judgment, authored by Justice Sandeep Mehta, underscored the following key principles: 
• At the stage of a Magistrate's order under Section 156(3) CrPC, the court must remain confined to the allegations made in the complaint and the material placed by the complainant. It cannot travel beyond this to examine defences put forward by the accused. 
• Consideration of defence material — such as sale deeds or other title documents — necessarily involves adjudication on disputed questions of fact, which fall squarely within the domain of investigation and, if necessary, trial. Any such exercise at the pre-trial stage amounts to conducting a mini-trial and is wholly impermissible. 
• Permitting defence material to be weighed at this threshold stage would frustrate and defeat the very purpose of directing a police investigation. 
• The mere existence of a civil remedy does not by itself bar criminal proceedings where the allegations prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. 
• By entering into a merit-based evaluation and quashing the order directing investigation, the High Court effectively stifled the investigative process at its inception — an approach contrary to settled principles consistently laid down by the Supreme Court. 
• Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the impugned order of the Karnataka High Court was set aside, and the police investigation was revived from the stage at which it had been interfered with. 

What is Section 175of BNSS? What is Section 175 of BNSS? 

Section 175 BNSS – Police Officer’s Power to Investigate Cognizable Case: 

• The officer in charge of a police station may investigate a cognizable offence without prior permission of a Magistrate. 
• Such investigation can be conducted for offences which a court having jurisdiction over the local area can inquire into or try. 
• Superintendent of Police (SP) may, considering the nature and gravity of the offence, direct that the investigation be conducted by a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP). 
• Validity of investigation protected: 
  No proceedings of a police officer shall be questioned merely on the ground that the officer was not empowered to investigate the case. 
• A Magistrate empowered under Section 210 BNSS may order investigation: 
• After considering an application supported by an affidavit under Section 173(4), and 
• After making such inquiry as deemed necessary and considering the police officer’s submission. 
• In cases involving a complaint against a public servant arising during discharge of official duties, the Magistrate may order investigation only after: 
• Receiving a report from the superior officer of the public servant, and 
• Considering the version/explanation of the public servant regarding the incident. 
• Key Change: 
  Section 175 BNSS replaces Section 156 of the CrPC, introducing additional safeguards, particularly in cases involving public servants. 

What are the Safeguards Introduced by Section 175 of BNSS? 

• The following are the new changes which are introduced in the form of safeguards to prevent abuse of process of law: 
• Firstly, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate under Section 175(3). 
• Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing registration of FIR. 
• Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions under Section 175(3). 
• It is to be noted that Section 175 (3) of BNSS is a result of law laid down by the judicial decisions over the years. 
• In the case of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. (2015) the Court held that prior to making an application to the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, the applicant must necessarily make applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3). 
• It was further observed by the Court that applications made under Section 156(3) of the CrPC must necessarily be supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant. 
• The reason given by the Court for introducing such a requirement was that applications under Section 156(3) of the CrPC were being made in a routine manner and in a number of cases only with a view to cause harassment to the accused by registration of FIR. 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Rajesh Bindal and Justice Vijay Bishnoi of the Supreme Court, in the case of Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi (2026), held that a spouse cannot withdraw consent for mutual divorce where such consent was given as part of a comprehensive mediation settlement resolving all disputes between the parties.  

• The Court dissolved the marriage under Article 142 of the Constitution and quashed the Domestic Violence Act proceedings initiated by the wife, holding them to be an afterthought filed in order to sustain litigation after she had resiled from the settlement. 

What was the Background of Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi (2026) Case? 

• The parties were married in 2000. In 2023, the husband filed for divorce, and the Family Court referred the matter to mediation.  
• The parties entered into a settlement agreement whereby they agreed to seek divorce on mutual consent and to settle all financial claims between them. Under the settlement, the husband agreed to withdraw the first divorce petition and to pay Rs. 1.5 crores to the wife in two instalments, Rs. 14 lakhs for the purchase of a car, and to hand over certain jewellery items.  
• The wife agreed to execute a gift deed transferring Rs. 2.5 crores from their joint business account to the husband. 
• A joint petition for mutual consent divorce was thereafter filed. The husband paid the first instalment of Rs. 75 lakhs and Rs. 14 lakhs as agreed, and the wife transferred Rs. 2.52 crores to the husband.  
• However, before the second motion for divorce, the wife withdrew her consent. She also filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act against the husband and his mother, upon which the Magistrate issued summons. 
• Aggrieved by the Delhi High Court's refusal to quash the DV Act proceedings, the husband approached the Supreme Court. He also filed an application under Article 142 seeking dissolution of the marriage. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court drew an important distinction in matrimonial law. It acknowledged that under the statutory framework governing mutual consent divorce, either party is ordinarily free to withdraw consent at any stage before the final decree is passed. However, it held that this right does not extend to disregarding obligations arising from a negotiated settlement resolving all disputes between the parties. 
• The Court underscored the following key principles: 
• Once a settlement is authenticated by a mediator and confirmed by the Court, it effectively replaces the original dispute and becomes the governing framework between the parties. A party cannot casually resile from such a settlement, as doing so strikes at the foundational basis of the mediation process. 
• Under the law, a party may resile from a mediation settlement only if it was procured through force, fraud, or undue influence, or if the other party failed to perform obligations set out in the agreement. 
• Unjustified deviation from settlement terms must attract strict consequences, including the imposition of heavy costs, to deter misuse of the process. 
• The wife's claim before the Supreme Court — that apart from the recorded settlement, the husband had privately agreed to transfer jewellery worth Rs. 120 crores and gold biscuits worth Rs. 50 crores, and that these terms were intentionally left unrecorded to avoid tax liability — was met with strong disapproval by the Court, which described itself as "appalled at the sheer audacity of such a submission." 
• Regarding the DV Act proceedings, the Court found that they had been filed for the first time after 23 years of marriage, and only after the husband had filed a contempt petition against the wife for resiling from the settlement. The Court held these proceedings to be premeditated and an afterthought, and accordingly quashed them. 
• Noting that the marriage had irretrievably broken down, the Court dissolved the marriage by invoking Article 142 of the Constitution and directed the husband to pay the remaining dues to the wife. 

What is Divorce by Mutual Consent? 

Divorce by Mutual Consent: 

• Divorce by mutual consent falls under no fault theory where the parties do not have to prove fault on the part of another person. 
• Under Hindu Law divorce by mutual consent was added by Section 13B which was included by way of Amendment by the Marriage law (Amendment) Act, 1976 and it came into force from 25th May 1976. 

Section 13 B of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: 

• For the purposes of divorce by mutual consent two petitions must be jointly filed by the parties. 
• As per Section 13B (1):  
• A joint petition for dissolution of marriage shall be presented before the District Court. 
• Whether the marriage was solemnized before or after commencement of Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976. 
• The parties should have been living separately for a period of one year or more. 
• The petition should provide that they have not been able to live together, and they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. 
• Section 13 B (2) provides for second motion:  
• When should it be filed?  
• Not earlier than six months after the presentation of the first motion and not later than eighteen months after the said. 
• If the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime. 
• How is the decree of divorce passed?  
• After hearing the parties and after making such enquiry as it thinks fit 
• That the marriage has been solemnized and that the averments in the petition are true 
• Pass a decree declaring marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of decree 
• The purpose of prescribing the above procedure is to give parties some period of togetherness before separation. 
• Marriage is a very important part of any individual's life and therefore before the marriage is dissolved by mutual consent the parties must be given some reasonable time to reflect on their move to dissolve the marriage. 

Withdrawal of Consent Under Section 13 B: 

• Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar (2011):  
• The Court is bound to pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage of the parties to be dissolved if the following conditions are met:  
• A second motion of both the parties is made not before 6 months from the date of filing of the petition as required under subsection (1) and not later than 18 months 
• After hearing the parties and making such inquiry as it thinks fit, the Court is satisfied that the averments in the petition are true; and 
• The petition is not withdrawn by either party at any time before passing the decree; 
• Smruti Pahariya v. Sanjay Pahariya (2009):  
• It is only on continued mutual consent of the parties that a decree of divorce under Section 13 B can be passed. 
• The court has to be satisfied about the existence of mutual consent between the parties on some tangible materials which demonstrably disclose such consent. 

Cooling off Period: 

• Under Section 13 B if the petition is not withdrawn post 6 months (and not later than 18 months) from the date of presentation of petition the Court may pass a decree of divorce. 
• Thus, the parties are given a cooling off period of 6 months. 
• The question that is posed is whether the cooling off period is mandatory or directory?  
• Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017):  
• A 2-judge bench comprising of Hon'ble Adarsh Kumar Goel, Justice and Hon'ble Uday Umesh Lalit, Justice held that in determining if the period is directory or mandatory the language alone is not decisive. Rather the Court has to give regard to the context. 
• The Court held that the cooling off period can be waived off only after considering the following factors:  
• the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself; 
• all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order XXXIIA Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts; 
• the parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties; 
• the waiting period will only prolong their agony. 
• Shilpa Shailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023):  
• A Constitution Bench held that Supreme Court can exercise power under Article 142 (1) of the Constitution and grant divorce by mutual consent dispensing with the waiting period prescribed under Section 13 B. 
• The Court held that the cooling off period is not to stretch the already disintegrated marriage or to prolong the agony of the parties. 
• The Court held that apart from the factors mentioned in the case above the Court should also ascertain whether the parties have freely on their own accord arrived at a genuine settlement that took care of alimony, maintenance and other matters. 
• Thus, the Court held that Section 13B does not put any fetters on the powers of the Court to grant a decree of divorce by mutual consent.