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Criminal Law

Trial Court Cannot Refuse Admission or Denial of Documents Based on Relevance

 21-Apr-2026

M/s Ascent Ventures & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. 

"The learned Trial Court committed an error in rejecting the application solely on the ground of relevancy of the documents sought to be relied upon by the petitioner/accused." 

Justice Mehroz K. Pathan 

Source: Bombay High Court

Why in News? 

Justice Mehroz K. Pathan of the Bombay High Court, in the case of M/s Ascent Ventures & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2026), held that Section 294 CrPC (Section 330 of BNSS) is mandatory and a Trial Court cannot reject an application seeking to compel the opposite party to admit or deny documents merely on the ground of relevancy. The Court quashed the Trial Court's order and directed it to call upon the complainant to admit or deny the documents in accordance with Section 294 CrPC.

What was the Background of M/s Ascent Ventures & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2026) Case? 

  • The matter arose out of a cheque dishonour case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before a Magistrate's court. 
  • The accused sought to rely upon certain defence documents — including a sale deed, a correction deed, and development permissions — as part of their defence. 
  • The accused filed an application under Section 294 CrPC seeking to call upon the complainant to admit or deny the genuineness of these documents. 
  • The complainant opposed the application on the grounds of lack of relevance and alleged delay tactics. 
  • The Trial Court, while permitting production of the documents, refused to compel admission or denial, citing want of relevancy. 
  • The accused challenged this order by way of a criminal writ petition before the Bombay High Court.

What were the Court's Observations? 

  • The Court examined Section 294 CrPC and clarified that it governs the procedure for documents placed on record, requiring the opposite party to admit or deny their genuineness. 
  • Section 294 CrPC does not bar the filing of documents at a later stage, provided they are properly brought on record in accordance with law. 
  • Since the Trial Court had already permitted production of the documents, there was no justification to refuse the second prayer seeking admission or denial under Section 294 CrPC. 
  • The Trial Court erred in entering into the question of relevancy at that stage; relevance is a matter for final adjudication and cannot be a ground to refuse the statutory procedure under Section 294 CrPC. 
  • Merely calling upon a party to admit or deny the genuineness of documents does not determine their admissibility or evidentiary value — the complainant retains the right to dispute the documents at trial. 
  • The use of the word "shall" in Section 294 CrPC indicates a mandatory obligation, leaving no discretion with the Trial Court to refuse compliance. 
  • The procedure under Section 294 CrPC is intended to avoid unnecessary delay and facilitate an expeditious trial by dispensing with formal proof of documents where their genuineness is not disputed. 
  • Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed, the impugned order was quashed and set aside, and the Trial Court was directed to comply with Section 294 CrPC.

What is Section 330 of BNSS? 

  • About:  
    • Section 330 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 provides the documents whose formal proof is not required.   
    • It was covered under Section 294 of CrPC earlier.   
    • Two new proviso have been added under Section 330 of BNSS.  
  • Section 330  
    • Clause (1) states that here any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of every such document shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the accused or the advocate for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document soon after supply of such documents and in no case later than thirty days after such supply:   
      • Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, relax the time limit with reasons to be recorded in writing:   
      • Provided further that no expert shall be called to appear before the Court unless the report of such expert is disputed by any of the parties to the trial.  
    • Clause (2) states that the list of documents shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government.  
    • Clause (3) states that where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed:  
    • It is provided that the court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved.

Civil Law

Legal Representatives can Challenge Arbitral Awards u/s 34 & not Article 227

 21-Apr-2026

V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra and HUF (Died) Represented by LRs. & Ors. 

"In the considered view of this Court, the appropriate relief for a legal representative to challenge an arbitral award is under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and not under Article 227 of the Constitution/Section 115 of the CPC." 

Justice Sanjay Karol & Justice N. Kotiswar Singh 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh of the Supreme Court, in the case of V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra and HUF (Died) Represented by LRs. & Ors. (2026), held that the appropriate remedy for a legal representative aggrieved by an arbitral award is to file an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and not a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution or Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Madras High Court's direction to avail the remedy under Section 34.

What was the Background of V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra and HUF (Died) Represented by LRs. & Ors. (2026) Case? 

  • The dispute arose from a 2007 sale agreement executed by the appellant's uncle, Appu John, who passed away shortly after executing the agreement. 
  • Arbitration proceedings were initiated, but allegedly against an incorrect legal representative. An arbitral award passed in 2011 directed execution of the sale deed. 
  • The appellant, claiming to be the sole legal heir and asserting want of notice, challenged the arbitral award before the Madras High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
  • The High Court dismissed the petition and directed the appellant to avail the remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 instead. 
  • The appellant challenged this order before the Supreme Court.

What were the Court's Observations? 

The Court, in a judgment authored by Justice Sanjay Karol, laid down the following key principles: 

  • The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a complete code in itself. It does not envision arbitration proceedings ceasing upon the death of a party. 
  • The term 'party' under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act includes 'legal representatives' claiming thereunder. Upon the death of a party, legal representatives step into the shoes of that party for all purposes under the Act. 
  • Section 35 of the Arbitration Act extends the finality of an arbitral award not only to parties to the award but also to 'parties claiming under them', which necessarily includes legal representatives. 
  • Denying a legal representative the right to challenge an award under Section 34 would defeat the object of the Arbitration Act as a self-contained code of dispute resolution, and would render legal representatives remediless on one hand while making them liable to fulfil the award on the other. 
  • The right to legal representation cannot be frozen upon the death of a litigant party to an arbitral proceeding. 
  • Recourse to Article 227 of the Constitution or Section 115 CPC in such circumstances is impermissible, as the Act itself provides the adequate and appropriate remedy. 
  • Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's findings and directing the appellant to challenge the award under Section 34 of the Act.

What is Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996? 

Section 34 – Setting Aside Arbitral Awards: 

  • What it does: Provides the only recourse against an arbitral award — an application to set it aside. 
  • Grounds for setting aside (S. 34(2)): 
    • Party-based grounds: 
    • Incapacity of a party 
    • Invalid arbitration agreement 
    • No proper notice / unable to present case 
    • Award beyond scope of arbitration 
    • Improper composition of tribunal/procedure 

Court-initiated grounds: 

  • Dispute not arbitrable under law 
  • Award conflicts with public policy of India (includes fraud/corruption, violation of fundamental policy of Indian law, or basic notions of morality/justice) 
  • Additional ground for domestic awards (S. 34(2A)): Patent illegality apparent on the face of the award (merits re-appreciation not allowed). 
  • Time limit (S. 34(3)): 3 months from receipt of award + 30 days condonation (no further extension) 
  • Procedure: Prior notice to other party + affidavit of compliance mandatory; disposed of within 1 year of notice. 

What is Article 227 of the COI? 

  • This Article is enshrined under Part V of the Constitution which deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court.  
  • It states that-  
    • Clause (1) states that every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.  
    • Clause (2) states that without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may—  
      • Call for returns from such courts.  
      • Make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts.  
      • Prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts.  
    • Clause (3) states that the High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practicing therein.  
    • Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed, or tables settled under clause (2), or clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force and shall require the previous approval of the Governor.  
    • Clause (4) states that nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court in power of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.