List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of the Supreme Court of India, comprising Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar, in Reliance Eminent Trading and Commercial Private Limited v. Delhi Development Authority (2026), allowed a commercial appeal and set aside the Delhi High Court's refusal to summarily dispose of a money recovery suit under Order XIII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 

• The Court held that where foundational facts are undisputed, no oral evidence is required, and the defendant fails to raise any defence with a real prospect of success, courts should not be reluctant to grant summary judgment. It further laid down non-exhaustive guidelines to govern the exercise of jurisdiction under Order XIII-A CPC.

What was the Background of Reliance Eminent Trading and Commercial Private Limited v. Delhi Development Authority (2026) Case? 

• The dispute originated from a public auction conducted by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) in 2007 for a commercial plot in Jasola, New Delhi. The appellant emerged as the highest bidder and paid over ₹164 crore, following which a conveyance deed was executed in 2008. 
• Subsequently, the title of the land came under a cloud after litigation by an erstwhile owner. It was found that the acquisition had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Despite being granted time, the DDA failed to re-acquire the land. 
• With the title rendered defective and possession lost, the appellant filed a commercial suit seeking a refund of the entire consideration paid, along with interest. The central question before the courts was whether the suit could be decided summarily under Order XIII-A CPC without a full trial. 
• The Delhi High Court refused to summarily dispose of the suit, which led to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Object of Summary Judgment: The Court held that summary judgment under Order XIII-A is a vital procedural mechanism intended to promote efficiency and prevent unnecessary trials in commercial disputes. It cautioned courts against permitting litigation to continue on the basis of illusory or fanciful defences. 
• On the Standard for Grant: The Court clarified that summary judgment must be granted where the defence is merely speculative or lacks a real prospect of success, and where a full trial would serve no meaningful purpose. Where foundational facts are undisputed and no oral evidence is required, courts should not be reluctant to summarily dispose of commercial suits. 
• On the Respondent's Opposition: The Court rejected the DDA's opposition to summary disposal, holding that such arguments amounted to no more than an attempt to prolong litigation and reopen issues already settled. The appellant was found to have prima facie discharged the burden of showing a real prospect of success, while the respondent failed to rebut the same by raising only insignificant grounds that did not require adjudication through a full trial. 
• On the Directions: The Court allowed the appellant's plea for summary disposal and directed the DDA to refund ₹164.91 crore with interest at 7.5% per annum from 12 July 2007, within eight weeks.

What are the Guidelines Laid Down under Order XIII-A CPC? 

The Court laid down the following non-exhaustive guidelines to be complied with while considering an application for summary judgment under Order XIII-A of the CPC: 

• The procedural mandate under Order XIII-A CPC must be strictly complied with. 
• The Court must consider whether the plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue, or whether the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim or issue. 
• The Court must also consider whether there is no other reason why the case or issue should be allowed to go to trial. 
• While ascertaining the above, the Court need not take everything at face value, but must also not conduct a mini trial. 
• The Court must differentiate between a cause of action or defence that presents a real prospect of success, as opposed to one that is fanciful. 
• The Court ought to grasp the nettle when dealing with summary judgment applications, and decide short points of law and interpretation. 
• The Court must take into account not only the evidence before it, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be led or available at trial. 
• The power under Order XIII-A CPC is exceptional, as it cuts short the process of trial, and ought to be exercised only where oral evidence and a full trial are not required. 
• To determine whether a full trial is necessary, the Court must consider whether the interest of justice requires trial to weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of deponents, or draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.

What is Order XIII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? 

Order XIII-A CPC — Summary Judgment:  

Scope (Rule 1): 

• A court may decide any "claim" in a commercial dispute without oral evidence. 
• "Claim" includes the whole claim, part of a claim, or a counterclaim. 
• Summary suits under Order XXXVII are excluded, as they are already summary in nature. However, if a summary suit is converted into a commercial suit, Order XIII-A becomes applicable. 

Stage of Application (Rule 2): 

• An application for summary judgment can be filed after summons is served on the defendant and before the framing of issues. 
• Once issues are framed, the suit proceeds to trial and the provision ceases to apply. 

Grounds for Grant (Rule 3)  

Two mandatory and conjunctive grounds must be satisfied: 

• There is no real prospect of the plaintiff or defendant succeeding on the claim; and 
• There is no other compelling reason why the claim should not be disposed of before recording oral evidence. 

Both grounds must coexist — neither alone is sufficient. 

Source: Allahabad High Court

Why in News?

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, comprising Justice Saral Srivastava and Justice Garima Prashad, in Aseen v. State of UP and 3 Others (2026), dismissed a writ petition filed by one Aseen, who sought a direction to the authorities to provide security and permission to offer Namaz on a piece of land in a village in District Sambhal. 

• The Court held that the introduction or expansion of a religious practice not previously prevalent — particularly where it disturbs the existing social balance — is not protected under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. It further held that the State is not required to wait for an actual disruption and may take reasonable preventive measures where such activity is likely to affect public life.

What was the Background of Aseen v. State of UP and 3 Others (2026) Case? 

• The petitioner claimed ownership of a private piece of land in District Sambhal based on a gift deed executed in June 2023. He alleged that the respondent authorities were restraining him from offering Namaz on the said land, thereby violating his fundamental rights under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. He accordingly approached the High Court seeking security and permission to conduct prayers at the location. 
• The State, on the other hand, contended that the land in question was recorded as Abadi land — land meant for public use — and that the petitioner had no valid ownership rights over it. 
• The State further submitted that Namaz had traditionally been offered at the said location only on the occasion of Eid, and that no restriction had been imposed on this established practice. However, the petitioner was attempting to introduce regular large-scale congregational prayers by inviting persons from within and outside the village, which amounted to the introduction of a new and non-traditional religious practice. 
• The State argued that while religious practices are to be respected, no new or non-traditional activities can be permitted beyond established practices, as doing so would disturb public order.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Scope of Articles 25 and 26: The Court held that while the Constitution protects the right to practice religion, this right is expressly subject to public order, morality, and health. The right to practice religion is not unlimited and must be exercised in a manner that does not affect others or disrupt the normal functioning of public life. 
• On Existing vs. New Religious Practices: The Court drew a clear distinction between existing lawful religious practices and the introduction of new or expanded ones. It held that existing lawful religious practices and long-regulated arrangements or permissions granted for limited or specific purposes may stand on their own footing, but no new or unilateral claim can be founded merely on religion or personal preference. 
• On Private Religious Activities: The Court observed that private prayers, family worship, and other limited devotional activities ordinarily fall within the protected domain of religious freedoms under Articles 25 and 26. However, this protection is confined to activity that is truly private, occasional, and non-disruptive. It does not extend to transforming any private premises into a de facto public religious venue. 
• On Preventive State Action: The Court held that the law does not require the authorities to wait for an actual disturbance to occur. Where an activity is likely to affect public order, the State is entitled to act in advance. The test, the Court emphasised, is not the religious nature of the activity, but its public consequences. 
• On the Principle of Secularism: The Court held that this approach is consistent with the constitutional principle of secularism, which requires equal treatment of all religions and equal application of law. While the State must permit private worship, it is equally bound to regulate activities that affect public order, whether on public land or on private premises. 
• On the Merits of the Present Case: The Court noted that the land in question is recorded as public land and that the petitioner's claim of ownership rested only on vague boundary descriptions. Even assuming the land to be private, the Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to relief, as he was seeking to introduce a new religious practice rather than protect an existing one. The record showed that Namaz was earlier offered only on specific occasions such as Eid, and the petitioner's attempt to expand this to regular congregational gatherings — including persons from within and outside the village — fell outside the protected domain and was subject to regulation. Finding no enforceable legal right, the Court dismissed the writ petition.

What are Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India? 

Article 25 of COI: 

• This Article deals with the freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion. It states that-  

(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. 

(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law. 

(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice. 

(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus  

Explanation I - The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion  

Explanation II - In sub clause (b) of clause reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly. 

• It covers not only religious beliefs but also religious practices. 
• These rights are available to all persons—citizens as well as non-citizens.

Article 26 of COI: 

• Article 26 deals with freedom to manage religious affairs. It states that subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right- 

(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; 

(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; 

(c)  to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and 

(d) to administer such property in accordance with law 

• This Article protects collective freedom of religion.  
• The right guaranteed by Article 26 is the right of an organized body like the religious denomination or their sections.  
• The Supreme Court held that a religious denomination must satisfy the following three conditions:  
  • It should be a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being. 
  • It should have a common organization. 
  • It should be designated by a distinctive name.