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Belated Objection Cannot Stall Execution of Decree

04-May-2026

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC)

Challani Ginning and Pressing Factory v. Kamal

"The objector having asserted that she was all along residing in the said property, cannot feign ignorance of the execution proceedings and delay a proper objection being taken up till dispossession is threatened."

Justice Sanjay Kumar & Justice K. Vinod Chandran

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

A Division Bench of the Supreme Court of India, comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, in Challani Ginning and Pressing Factory v. Kamal (2026), set aside an order of the Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) that had interfered with the concurrent decisions of the Executing Court and the First Appellate Court, both of which had declined to entertain a belated objection to the execution of a decree.

The Court held that a third party who had prior knowledge of the decree and the ongoing execution proceedings cannot raise a fresh objection at an advanced stage of execution merely to obstruct recovery, as such conduct amounts to a deliberate attempt to stall the enforcement of the decree.

What was the Background of Challani Ginning and Pressing Factory v. Kamal (2026) Case?

A decree was passed in 2017 in favour of the Appellant-decree-holder for recovery of dues arising from a loan transaction.
The loan had been availed for a family-run business in which the Respondent-judgment debtor and his family members, including his mother, were actively involved.
Upon default in repayment, the Appellant initiated execution proceedings to enforce the decree against the property in question.
Execution proceedings remained pending for nearly nine years, during which multiple objections were filed by or on behalf of the judgment debtor — each of which was considered and dismissed by the Executing Court.
At a significantly advanced stage of execution, when the threat of dispossession became imminent, the mother of the original judgment debtor filed a fresh objection under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, claiming an independent 1/3rd share in the subject property.
The decree-holder opposed the objection, contending that the objector had been residing in the property throughout and was fully aware of both the original suit and the prolonged execution proceedings, and that the objection was belated, mala fide, and strategically raised to delay recovery.
Both the Executing Court and the First Appellate Court dismissed the belated objection.
The Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench), however, allowed the objection, prompting the decree-holder to approach the Supreme Court.

What were the Court's Observations?

On Belated Objections to Execution: The Court held that it is impermissible for a third party to raise a belated objection to the execution of a decree when that party had a fair chance and prior knowledge of the decree and the execution proceedings at an earlier stage. Such an objection, raised only when dispossession becomes imminent, amounts to a deliberate attempt to stall enforcement.
On the Conduct of the Objector: The Court observed that the objector, having asserted that she had been residing in the subject property throughout, could not claim ignorance of the execution proceedings. The suit had been decreed in 2017, and execution had been pending for nine years during which several objections — all of which were declined — had been raised. A fresh objection at this stage by the mother of the judgment debtor, claiming a 1/3rd share, was inconsistent with the admitted facts regarding the family's joint conduct of business.
On the Absence of Prima Facie Proof: The Court noted that no material had been produced to prima facie substantiate the claim of co-ownership of the subject property, and that the obvious facts on record were clearly against such a claim. The mere possibility of a claim being sustainable did not justify extending an opportunity to lead evidence.
On Restoring the Orders Below: Finding no reason to sustain the High Court's order, the Court set aside the impugned order and restored the concurrent orders of the Executing Court and the First Appellate Court rejecting the objection. It directed that the property, if not yet handed over, be expeditiously vacated and handed over to the Appellant by the Executing Court.

What is Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?

Order XXI Rule 97 provides a legal remedy when decree-holders or auction purchasers face resistance while taking possession of immovable property.
The aggrieved party must file a specific application to the court complaining about the resistance or obstruction.
Upon receiving such application, the court must adjudicate the matter through a summary proceeding rather than requiring a separate suit.
This provision ensures effective implementation of court decrees by empowering courts to remove obstacles preventing execution of their own orders.
The court will determine if the resistance is justified and may pass appropriate orders to ensure rightful possession.

Constitutional Law

Principles for Exercise of Article 227 Jurisdiction

04-May-2026

Constitution of India, 1950 (COI)

Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. v. B. Gurappa Naidu & Ors.

"The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported."

Justice Aravind Kumar & Justice N.V. Anjaria

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

A Division Bench of the Supreme Court of India, comprising Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice N.V. Anjaria, in Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. v. B. Gurappa Naidu & Ors. (2026), set aside a High Court order that had reduced the compensation amount fixed by the executing court, holding that the High Court had transgressed the narrow limits of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.

The Court reiterated that a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot re-examine the merits of a case or substitute its own view for a reasonable finding of the subordinate court, and that such jurisdiction is strictly confined to correcting unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, gross abuse of jurisdiction, or unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction.

What was the Background of Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. v. B. Gurappa Naidu & Ors. (2026) Case?

In 2007, a compromise was arrived at between Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. (NICE) and landowners in Bengaluru, whereby NICE had acquired a portion of their land for a road project.
Under the terms of the compromise, NICE was obligated to either provide alternate land to the affected landowners or pay compensation calculated on the basis of the government guideline value.
NICE failed to provide any alternate land, whereupon the landowners approached the executing court for enforcement of the compromise and payment of compensation.
The executing court, upon due consideration, fixed the compensation at ₹1,000 per sq. ft.
NICE challenged this determination before the High Court by invoking its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.
The High Court, exercising its powers under Article 227, reduced the compensation to ₹500 per sq. ft., thereby substituting its own assessment for that of the executing court.
Aggrieved by this reduction, NICE preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court.

What were the Court's Observations?

On the Nature and Scope of Article 227 Jurisdiction: The Court held that the power of superintendence under Article 227 is not to be exercised unless there has been an unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction not vested in the court or tribunal, a gross abuse of jurisdiction, or an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction that is duly vested.
On the Distinction between Supervisory and Appellate Jurisdiction: The Court emphasised that the High Court, while acting under Article 227, cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment for that of the subordinate court. It is not open to the High Court to correct an error that is not apparent on the face of the record.
On Re-appreciation of Evidence: The Court held that supervisory jurisdiction does not permit the High Court to reappreciate or reweigh the evidence or facts on which the challenged determination is based. Such jurisdiction is not meant to correct every error of fact or legal flaw where the final finding is otherwise justified or capable of being supported.
On the Limits of Interference: The Court held that a High Court cannot replace a reasonable decision of a subordinate court with its own view merely because it disagrees with the conclusion. By adopting an alternative view to that taken by the executing court, the High Court travels beyond the narrow and circumscribed limits of scrutiny permissible under Article 227.
On the Facts of the Present Case: The Court found that the executing court had fixed the compensation at ₹1,000 per sq. ft. through a reasoned determination, and that no jurisdictional error had been committed. The High Court, by re-determining the compensation amount and reducing it to ₹500 per sq. ft., had effectively acted as an appellate court and modified the executing court's findings, which was impermissible under Article 227. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the determination of the executing court. The appeal was allowed.

What is Article 227 of the Constitution of India?

This Article is enshrined under Part V of the Constitution which deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court.
It states that-
- Clause (1) states that every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.
- Clause (2) states that without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may—
  - Call for returns from such courts.
  - Make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts.
  - Prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts.
- Clause (3) states that the High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practicing therein.
- Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed, or tables settled under clause (2), or clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force and shall require the previous approval of the Governor.
- Clause (4) states that nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court in power of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.