List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of the Supreme Court of India, comprising Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti, in Jennifer Messias v. Leonard G. Lobo (2026), held that a preliminary decree in a partition suit does not become inexecutable merely because no separate application for passing a final decree under Order XX Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) was filed, where the decree itself provided that the property should be auctioned if partition by metes and bounds was not possible. 

• The Court held that in such circumstances, the preliminary decree acquires the character of a final decree upon the Advocate Commissioner's report establishing that physical partition was impracticable, and the Executing Court's direction for a public auction of the property was therefore valid and executable. 

What was the Background of Jennifer Messias v. Leonard G. Lobo (2026) Case? 

• The dispute arose out of a partition suit concerning a residential flat, in which a preliminary decree was passed in favour of the Appellant. 
• The preliminary decree directed an Advocate Commissioner to examine whether the suit property could be physically divided by metes and bounds between the parties. 
• The preliminary decree further provided that if such physical division was found to be infeasible, appropriate compensation or sale of the property could be resorted to. 
• Based on the Commissioner's report confirming that the flat could not be partitioned by metes and bounds owing to the impracticability of physical division, the Executing Court ordered a public auction of the property. 
• The Madhya Pradesh High Court interfered with the execution proceedings and held that the decree was merely a preliminary decree and could not be executed unless a separate final decree was first drawn up. 
• The High Court interfered on two separate occasions with the execution of the partition decree passed on the Appellant's suit. 
• Aggrieved by the High Court's orders, the Appellant approached the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Executability of the Preliminary Decree: The Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with the execution of the decree. Upon the Commissioner's report confirming that partition of the suit property by metes and bounds was impractical, the preliminary decree attained the status of a final decree, as the only option that survived was an open auction sale of the property to provide the respective shares to the parties. 
• On the Character of the Preliminary Decree: The Court observed that since the preliminary decree had already adjudicated the rights and entitlements between the parties, including mesne profits, it was impermissible for the High Court to require a separate application for a final decree. The preliminary decree, by virtue of having determined entitlement, right to possession, mesne profits, and the mode of working out shares in the event of default, was to be construed as a final decree for the purpose of execution. 
• On the High Court's Approach: The Court held that the High Court's direction to file a fresh application after the passing of a final decree was completely unwarranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Requiring a fresh application ignored the reality that the preliminary decree had become final upon the failure to effect partition by metes and bounds. 
• On the Ends of Justice: The Court observed that for the ends of justice to be met, the decree dated 13.04.2012 was required to be construed as having determined entitlement, right to possession, mesne profits, and the first option regarding the mode and manner of working out shares in the event of default in the sale of the subject matter. 

What is Order XX Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? 

Order XX Rule 18 CPC — Decree in Suit for Partition of Property or Separate Possession of a Share: 

Where the Court passes a decree for the partition of property or for the separate possession of a share therein — 

Sub-rule (1) — Revenue-Assessed Estates: 

• Applies where the decree relates to an estate assessed to the payment of revenue to the Government. 
• In such cases, the decree shall declare the rights of the several parties interested in the property. 
• The decree shall direct the partition or separation to be made by the Collector, or any gazetted subordinate of the Collector deputed by him in this behalf. 
• Such partition or separation shall be carried out in accordance with the declaration in the decree and with the provisions of Section 54 CPC. 

Sub-rule (2) — Other Immovable Property or Movable Property: 

• Applies where the decree relates to any immovable property not assessed to government revenue, or to movable property. 
• Where the partition or separation cannot be conveniently made without further inquiry, the Court may pass a preliminary decree. 
• The preliminary decree shall declare the rights of the several parties interested in the property. 
• It shall also give such further directions as may be required for effecting the partition or separation. 

Source: Madras High Court 

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of the Madras High Court, comprising Justice L Victoria Gowri and Justice N Senthilkumar, in Chockalingam v. State (2026), stayed a May 8 notice issued by the Cyber Crime Wing of the Tamil Nadu Police directing X (formerly Twitter) to block multiple posts uploaded by the North Tamil Nadu unit of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP).  

• The Court held that political criticism, satire, dissent and robust public debate are protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, and that a blanket blocking direction issued without individualised reasons and without affording the affected users an opportunity of hearing was constitutionally infirm. 
• The Court further directed the Cyber Crime Wing to communicate with X Corp to unblock and restore all URLs mentioned in the impugned notice, while clarifying that the State retains the liberty to act against specific content independently, subject to compliance with Article 19(2) and the procedure prescribed under the Information Technology Act, 2000. 

What was the Background of Chockalingam v. State (2026) Case? 

• P Chockalingam, President of the North Tamil Nadu unit of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, filed a writ petition before the Madras High Court challenging a May 8, 2026 notice issued by the Cyber Crime Wing of the Tamil Nadu Police. 
• The notice directed X (formerly Twitter) to remove or block multiple URLs under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, read with Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. 
• The notice clubbed together several URLs belonging to different users under a single common blocking direction, requiring compliance within three hours. 
• Chockalingam argued that the authorities had not separately examined the content, context or constitutional status of each post. 
• It was further contended that the affected users were neither informed of the allegations against them nor given any meaningful opportunity to respond before the blocking direction was issued. 
• The State contended that the notice had been issued in the interest of law and order and public tranquillity. However, no counter-affidavit was filed explaining post-wise reasons or the basis for requiring removal within three hours. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Nature of the Blocking Direction: The Court held that the impugned notice was bereft of post-wise reasons and did not disclose individualised application of mind. An omnibus blocking direction issued without reasons, without explaining its proportionality, and without following due legal procedure cannot be treated merely as an administrative act — it becomes a constitutional concern. 
• On Article 19(1)(a) and Protected Speech: The Court held that Article 19(1)(a) protects not only polite or agreeable speech, but also criticism, dissent, satire, political disagreement and robust public debate. A political opinion cannot be removed merely because it is sharp, inconvenient, satirical, dissenting or unpalatable. The constitutional value of free speech is tested most severely when the speech in question is inconvenient to authority. 
• On the Right to Criticise: The Court reaffirmed that in a constitutional democracy, the right to criticise the government, its functionaries, political actors and public policies is not a concession granted by the State — it is a constitutional guarantee. 
• On the Shreya Singhal Framework: Relying on the Supreme Court's judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, the Court drew a distinction between discussion, advocacy and incitement. It held that discussion and advocacy, even of unpopular or disagreeable causes, remain protected speech, and that State interference is permissible only when speech reaches the level of incitement. 
• On Chilling Effect: The Court warned that vague and open-ended restrictions on online speech operate silently, compelling citizens to self-censor — not because the law prohibits speech, but because the consequences of speaking are uncertain, sudden and opaque. 
• On Section 79(3)(b) IT Act: The Court held that Section 79(3)(b) deals with intermediary safe harbour and is not an independent source of blocking power, and that its invocation in the present notice required deeper judicial scrutiny. 
• On the Three-Hour Deadline: The Court criticised the three-hour compliance deadline as disproportionate, noting that such urgency was unexplained in the absence of any disclosed emergency or imminent threat. 

What is Article 19(1)(a) of the COI? 

• Article 19(1)(a) states that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. 
• This right is available only to a citizen of India and not to foreign nationals.  
• The freedom of speech under Article 19(1) (a) includes the right to express one’s views and opinions on any issue through any medium that is by words of mouth, writing, printing, picture, film, movie etc.  
• The exercise of this right is, however, subject to reasonable restrictions for certain purposes imposed under Article 19(2) of the COI.  
• The Article 19 (2) states that nothing in sub clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. 

What is Section 79 of IT Act, 2000? 

Section 79 — Exemption from Liability of Intermediary in Certain Cases: 

• Core Idea: An intermediary (such as a social media platform or internet service provider) is generally not liable for third-party content hosted or transmitted by it, provided certain conditions are met. 
• Sub-section (1) — The Safe Harbour Rule: An intermediary shall not be liable for any third-party information, data, or communication link made available or hosted by it, subject to sub-sections (2) and (3). 
• Sub-section (2) — When Safe Harbour Applies: The protection is available only if all three of the following conditions are satisfied: 
• The intermediary merely provides access to a communication system over which third-party information is transmitted, temporarily stored, or hosted. 
• The intermediary does not initiate the transmission, select the receiver, or select or modify the information transmitted. 
• The intermediary observes due diligence in discharging its duties and follows such guidelines as the Central Government may prescribe. 
• Sub-section (3) — When Safe Harbour Does Not Apply: The protection is lost if: 
• The intermediary has conspired, abetted, aided, or induced the commission of an unlawful act (whether by threats, promise, or otherwise); or 
• Upon receiving actual knowledge, or upon being notified by the appropriate government or its agency that any information residing in or connected to a computer resource controlled by it is being used to commit an unlawful act, the intermediary fails to expeditiously remove or disable access to such material without vitiating evidence. 
• Explanation — "Third-Party Information": Means any information dealt with by an intermediary in its capacity as an intermediary (i.e., content originating from users/third parties, not from the intermediary itself). 
• Case Law — Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015): The Supreme Court read down Section 79(3)(b) to hold that an intermediary is obligated to act only upon receipt of a court order or a specific government notification directing removal — not merely on the basis of general knowledge of allegedly objectionable content.