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Source: Madhya Pradesh High Court

Why in News? 

A Single Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, comprising Justice Himanshu Joshi, in Vinay Pratap Singh v. Pushpendra Singh,(2026), held that the proviso to Section 223(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which mandates that an accused be given an opportunity of hearing before a Magistrate takes cognizance, does not impose an obligation upon the complainant to supply the entire evidence to the accused at the threshold stage of cognizance proceedings. 

• The Court set aside the Trial Court's order dismissing the private complaint solely on account of the complainant's failure to supply documents and electronic evidence to the proposed accused, and restored the complaint with a direction to proceed in accordance with law.

What was the Background of Vinay Pratap Singh v. Pushpendra Singh (2026) Case? 

• The applicant-complainant, Vinay Prakash Singh, was engaged in the lawful business of supplying gravel through Hyva dumpers to a construction company. On October 30, 2023, approximately 1800 litres of diesel were procured for operational purposes and temporarily stored at his farmhouse due to the absence of a nearby fuel station. 
• The complainant alleged that the respondents, including Pushpendra Singh and two others, on account of prior business rivalry, pressured him to arrange an illegal advance payment of ₹1 crore and threatened to implicate him in false criminal cases. 
• On the same evening, the respondents, allegedly along with certain police officials, unlawfully entered the farmhouse, assaulted the complainant, threatened him, and forcibly removed the fuel without following any lawful seizure process. 
• The complainant also alleged that a subsequent FIR registered at Mauganj Police Station, alleging robbery, was fabricated as a counterblast to shield the illegal acts committed against him. He relied upon electronic evidence, including CCTV footage, to challenge the prosecution's narrative. 
• The complainant instituted a private complaint alleging offences of voluntarily causing hurt (Section 323 IPC), obscene songs and actions (Section 294 IPC), criminal intimidation (Section 506 IPC), and acts done in furtherance of common intention (Section 34 IPC). 
• During proceedings, the complainant moved an application under Section 223(1) of BNSS. However, by order dated January 17, 2026, the Magistrate directed the complainant to supply all documents and electronic evidence to the proposed accused, holding that a meaningful hearing could not be afforded without such disclosure, and further directed that non-compliance would result in dismissal of the complaint. 
• On January 22, 2026, the complaint was dismissed solely for failure to comply with the said direction. Aggrieved, the applicant filed a petition before the High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Scope of Section 528 BNSS: The Court noted that the scope of interference under Section 528 BNSS is to prevent abuse of the process of law. For its applicability, the Court must examine whether the impugned order suffers from illegality, perversity, or material irregularity. 
• On the Purpose of the Proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS: The Court held that the proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS is intended to ensure that the principles of natural justice are followed, meaning that the accused is afforded an opportunity of hearing before cognizance is taken. However, such an opportunity does not automatically translate into an obligation to supply the entire evidence to the accused at the threshold stage of cognizance proceedings. 
• On the Trial Court's Error: The Court held that the Trial Court erred in mechanically dismissing the complaint without examining whether partial compliance with the impugned direction was sufficient, or assessing the merits and procedural fairness of the complaint in totality. Such mechanical dismissal of a complaint involving serious allegations results in a miscarriage of justice. 
• On Restoration of the Complaint: The Court allowed the petition, set aside the impugned order dated January 22, 2026, and restored the complaint case, directing the Trial Court to proceed in accordance with law.

What is Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023? 

About: 

• The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) received Presidential assent on December 25, 2023 and came into force on July 1, 2024, repealing the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 
• Section 223 of BNSS corresponds to Section 200 of the erstwhile Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 
• The introduction of a proviso to Section 223(1) has completely changed the manner in which Magistrates deal with private complaints. 

Text of Section 223 BNSS: 

Section 223(1): 

• A Magistrate having jurisdiction while taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and signed by the complainant, witnesses, and the Magistrate. 

First Proviso (Key Change): 

• No cognizance of an offence shall be taken by the Magistrate without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard. 

Section 223(2): 

• For complaints against public servants, the Magistrate shall not take cognizance unless the public servant is given an opportunity to make assertions about the incident and a report from the superior officer is received.

Legislative Intent and Objectives: 

The legislature, following the principle of "audi alteram partem," introduced this statutory safeguard with two objectives: 

1. To provide the proposed accused in a private complaint an opportunity of being heard before cognizance and summoning. 
2. To discourage filing of private criminal complaints laden with subterfuges, concealments and misrepresentation of facts. 

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of the Supreme Court of India, comprising Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar, in M/s Tarini Prasad Mohanty v. M/s Sunflag Iron and Steel Company Limited (2026), held that the writ jurisdiction of a High Court cannot be invoked to challenge an arbitral tribunal's order passed under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act). The Court affirmed that any such challenge must be raised under Section 34 of the Act at the conclusion of the arbitral proceedings, as envisaged under Section 16(6).

What was the Background of M/s Tarini Prasad Mohanty v. M/s Sunflag Iron and Steel Company Limited (2026) Case? 

• An agreement for sale of iron ore was executed on February 12, 2004, between M/s Tarini Prasad Mohanty (mine owner) and M/s Sunflag Iron and Steel Company Limited (SISCO). Upon the arising of disputes, the matter was referred to a Sole Arbitrator. 
• During arbitration proceedings, the mine owner filed an application under Section 16 of the A&C Act on February 5, 2024, contending that the agreement and supplementary agreements were insufficiently stamped. 
• The mine owner argued that the contract was in the nature of a "conveyance" requiring stamping under Article 23 of Schedule I to the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and not under Article 5(c) as claimed by SISCO. 
• The Arbitrator rejected the objection on May 30, 2024, holding that the agreement was "an agreement to sell" and not a "conveyance," and that it had been properly stamped. The arbitrator decided to continue the arbitration. 
• Aggrieved by this decision, the mine owner filed a Writ Petition before the Orissa High Court. The Single Judge interfered with the Arbitrator's decision, prompting SISCO to file an intra-court appeal before the Division Bench. 
• The Division Bench set aside the Single Judge's order, holding that it was impermissible to challenge the arbitrator's decision under Section 16 through writ jurisdiction, and that the appropriate remedy was to file an application under Section 34 at the conclusion of proceedings. 
• The mine owner then appealed to the Supreme Court.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Impermissibility of Writ Jurisdiction under Section 16: The Court held that it was not open for a Single Judge, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, to enter into the merits of a dispute while adjudicating a challenge to an order passed under Section 16 of the A&C Act. The invocation of writ jurisdiction would only be permissible in cases involving a complete lack of inherent jurisdiction on the part of the arbitrator, which was not the case here. 
• On the Arbitrator's Competence to Decide Stamping Issues: Relying on the seven-judge Constitution Bench decision in In Re: Interplay, the Court affirmed that the issue of stamping of a document falls squarely within the ambit of the Arbitral Tribunal. The arbitrator's decision under Section 16 was therefore within jurisdiction, and the mere labelling of circumstances as "exceptional" could not justify the exercise of writ jurisdiction. 
• On the Proper Remedy: The Court held that even assuming the arbitrator's order under Section 16 was erroneous in law, the appropriate remedy available to the aggrieved party was to challenge the same under Section 34 of the A&C Act at the conclusion of arbitral proceedings, as expressly provided under Section 16(6). 
• On the Scope of Extraordinary Jurisdiction: The Court held that the interpretation of various agreements between the parties required a detailed exercise that ought not to have been undertaken in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. The Single Judge erred in going into the merits of the dispute regarding the nature of the agreements while exercising writ jurisdiction.

What is Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996? 

Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Competence of Arbitral Tribunal to Rule on its Jurisdiction  

• Sub-section (1): The arbitral tribunal has the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, including objections regarding the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For this purpose:  
  • An arbitration clause forming part of a contract is treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. 
  • A decision by the tribunal that the contract is null and void does not automatically render the arbitration clause invalid. 
• Sub-section (2): A plea challenging the tribunal's jurisdiction must be raised no later than the submission of the statement of defence. Merely having appointed or participated in the appointment of an arbitrator does not preclude a party from raising such a plea. 
• Sub-section (3): A plea that the tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority must be raised as soon as the matter allegedly beyond its authority arises during the proceedings. 
• Sub-section (4): The tribunal may admit a late plea under Sub-sections (2) or (3) if it considers the delay to be justified. 
• Sub-section (5): The tribunal shall decide on any such plea and, if the plea is rejected, shall continue with the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award. 
• Sub-section (6): A party aggrieved by such an arbitral award may seek its setting aside by making an application under Section 34.