List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N Kotiswar Singh of the Supreme Court of India in the matter of Makardhwaj Ram v. Jagdish Rai (Dead) Th. Lrs. & Anr. (2026) summarised the governing principles of constructive res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court reiterated that parties are required to raise all grounds that "might and ought" to have been raised in earlier proceedings and cannot escape the doctrine's operation by attributing omissions to negligence, inadvertence or accident.  

• While restating these principles, the Court set aside a Chhattisgarh High Court judgment that had dismissed a suit for declaration of title on the ground of constructive res judicata, holding that the doctrine had been misapplied on the facts of the case.

What was the Background of Makardhwaj Ram v. Jagdish Rai (Dead) Th. Lrs. & Anr. (2026)  Case? 

• The dispute concerned land originally belonging to one Mahabir Rai. In July 1960, he transferred 95.80 acres of land to his mother Raj Mohani alias Roopjhari and his son Makardhwaj Ram. 
• In April 1962, Mahabir Rai, his wife Gulmati, and his mother executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of Mahabir's cousin Rambhajan. Acting under that authority, Rambhajan sold 21.43 acres to one Prem Prakash in January 1969 and 33.76 acres to one Chandra Sao in February 1969. The power of attorney was subsequently cancelled in June 1969. 
• Two suits challenging the two sale deeds were dismissed. Later, when Rambhajan sought mutation of his name in the revenue records, Makardhwaj Ram instituted a fresh suit seeking declaration of title and possession over the remaining land. 
• The trial court partly decreed the suit in May 1993, holding that Makardhwaj Ram was entitled to 43.69 acres out of the claimed 95.80 acres. On appeal, the Chhattisgarh High Court in second appeal set aside this judgment and dismissed the suit as barred by constructive res judicata, on the ground that Makardhwaj Ram could have asserted ownership based on the 1960 transfer deed in the earlier proceedings.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the purpose of constructive res judicata: The Court held that the doctrine is intended to prevent multiplicity of proceedings by requiring parties to urge all available grounds at the appropriate stage. It is founded on public policy and the principle that a person should not be "vexed twice over" for the same kind of litigation. 
• On application to writ proceedings: The Court reaffirmed that constructive res judicata applies not only to civil proceedings but also to writ proceedings under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution of India. 
• On the deeming fiction and its limits: The Court observed that while constructive res judicata is a deeming fiction in law, its application is not uniform and depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, with due regard to the ambit of the earlier proceedings and the nexus between the omitted issue and the controversy involved therein. 
• On the meaning of "ought": Clarifying the expression "ought" in the phrase "might and ought", the Court held that the threshold is above mere possibility. Whether a ground ought to have been raised must be assessed from the perspective of reasonable diligence and the legitimate scope of the litigation. 
• On negligence or inadvertence as no excuse: The Court held that the doctrine applies with equal force even where a ground was omitted due to negligence, inadvertence or accident. In such cases, the litigant bears the consequences of the omission and commits such errors at their own peril. 
• On misapplication by the High Court: The Court disagreed with the High Court's reasoning, holding that Makardhwaj Ram's ownership over the larger parcel already rested undisputedly in his favour by virtue of the 1960 deed. The earlier suits were directed specifically against the alienations made by Rambhajan under the power of attorney, and there was no occasion in those proceedings to seek a declaration of title over the remaining land. The need to assert such title arose only when Rambhajan sought mutation of his name in respect of land beyond what was covered by the sale transactions. 
• On equity in family property disputes: The Court observed that applying constructive res judicata on the facts of the case would lead to an unduly harsh and unjust consequence, offensive to both law and equity. It further held that courts dealing with inter-family property disputes must not rigidly apply legal principles without considering the surrounding facts and circumstances.

What are the Principles of Constructive Res Judicata? 

Constructive res judicata is governed by Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with Explanation IV. The doctrine bars not only issues actually raised and decided in earlier proceedings but also those which could and should have been raised therein. 

The Supreme Court summarised the governing principles as follows: 

• Constructive res judicata mandates that all grounds that might and ought to have been employed in earlier proceedings must be employed, so as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. 
• It is a deeming fiction of law, but its application is not uniform and depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, with due regard to the ambit of the earlier proceedings and the nexus between the omitted matter and the nature of the controversy. 
• The doctrine is founded on public policy and the principle that a person should not be "vexed twice over" for the same kind of litigation. It applies equally to proceedings under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution of India. 
• The word "ought" in the phrase "might and ought" implies a threshold above mere possibility. 
• Parties conducting litigation are expected to apply reasonable diligence. It is from this perspective that courts must assess whether all issues properly arising from the dispute, which ought to have been raised, were in fact raised. 
• The doctrine applies with equal force where the ground that might and ought to have been raised was not raised on account of negligence, inadvertence or accident. The requirements of "might" and "ought" operate cumulatively and without exception, and the party commits such errors at their own peril.

What is Constructive Res Judicata?  

• The principle of Constructive Res Judicata is an extension of the principle of Res Judicata.  
• The origin of this principle in law can be found in the provisions contained in Order II Rule 2 read with Section 11 of the CPC.  
• Section 11 of the CPC contains the principle of Res Judicata, according to which, a subsequent suit in respect of a claim between the same parties is barred if an earlier suit has been tried involving the same issue which have been directly and substantially in issue and between the same parties.  
• Explanation IV appended to Section 11 of the CPC provides that any matter which might or ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in a former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.  
• The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka, (2011) held that principle of Constructive Res Judicata as explained in the Explanation IV of Section 11 of CPC is applicable to Writ Petitions. 

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of Justice Sandeep Mehta and Justice Vijay Bishnoi of the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Ramesh Kumar Behl v. State of Punjab (2026), denied anticipatory bail to an RTI activist accused of obstructing ongoing government road construction work, assaulting a supervising official, and making caste-based derogatory remarks against labourers at the site. 

• The Court affirmed the Punjab and Haryana High Court's order refusing anticipatory bail, making oral remarks questioning the conduct of so-called RTI activists who obstruct legitimate government work.

What was the Background of Ramesh Kumar Behl v. State of Punjab (2026) Case? 

• The petitioner, Ramesh Kumar Behl, an RTI activist, along with another accused, allegedly obstructed ongoing road construction work being executed under the supervision of the complainant, a public servant. 
• The petitioner and his co-accused are alleged to have intimidated the complainant and the labourers present at the site. It is further alleged that the petitioner inflicted blows on the complainant while the other accused kicked him. Additionally, caste-based derogatory remarks were made against the labourers at the worksite. 
• An FIR was subsequently registered against the petitioner under Sections 304(2), 132, 221, 121(1), 351(2), and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, along with Sections 3(5) and 121(2) of the BNS, 2023, and Section 3(1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 
• The Punjab and Haryana High Court denied anticipatory bail, holding that the allegations in the FIR disclose specific and direct involvement in obstructing government work. The petitioner then approached the Supreme Court assailing this order.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the conduct of RTI activists: The Court made pointed oral remarks questioning the role of so-called RTI activists who position themselves as monitors of government work without any legal authority to do so. Justice Mehta remarked that RTI activism has become a new business, and the petitioner had no standing to interfere with legitimate government-funded construction activity. 
• On the authority to monitor government work: Justice Bishnoi questioned on what basis the petitioner was monitoring the progress of road construction, observing that the petitioner was not a superior or supervisory authority entitled to intervene in the execution of the project. 
• On the High Court's order: The Court found no ground to interfere with the Punjab and Haryana High Court's order, which had concluded that the FIR disclosed specific and direct involvement of the accused in obstructing the discharge of official duties by a public servant. The special leave petition was accordingly dismissed.

What is the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005? 

About: 

• The Right to Information Act, 2005 mandates timely response to citizen requests for government information. 
• Its basic objective is to empower citizens, promote transparency and accountability in government functioning, contain corruption, and make democracy work for the people in a real sense.

Key Provisions: 

• Right to Information (Section 3): All citizens have the right to information, subject to the provisions of the Act. 
• Obligations of Public Authorities (Section 4): Public authorities must maintain and catalogue records, computerise them within a reasonable time, publish organisational details within 120 days of enactment, and provide reasons for administrative or quasi-judicial decisions to affected persons. 
• Public Information Officers (Section 5): Every public authority must designate Central or State Public Information Officers; Assistant PIOs to be designated at sub-divisional or sub-district levels. 
• Request for Information (Section 6): Requests may be made in writing, electronically, or orally; applicants are not required to give reasons for seeking information. 
• Disposal of Request (Section 7): Information must be provided within 30 days; if it concerns life or liberty, within 48 hours; fees may be charged. 
• Exemptions (Section 8): Disclosure may be refused on grounds including national security, commercial confidence, and personal privacy; however, public interest disclosure remains possible despite exemptions. 
• Rejection and Severability (Sections 9–10): Requests infringing copyright may be rejected; where exempt information is severable, access to the remaining part of the record must be provided. 
• Third Party Information (Section 11): A prescribed procedure governs handling of information relating to or supplied by third parties. 
• Information Commissions (Sections 12–17): Central and State Information Commissions are constituted; provisions govern appointment, terms, salaries, and removal of Information Commissioners. 
• Powers of Commissions (Section 18): Commissions may inquire into complaints and exercise powers of a civil court. 
• Appeals (Section 19): First and second appeal mechanisms are provided; decisions of Information Commissions are binding. 
• Penalties (Section 20): Penalties may be imposed on PIOs for unreasonable refusal, delay, or obstruction; persistent violations may attract disciplinary action.