List of Current Affairs

Source: Gujarat High Court 

Why in News? 

A Single Bench of Justice JC Doshi of the Gujarat High Court dismissed an appeal in the matter of Gujarat Energy Transmission Company Ltd. v. Naniba Wd/O Gemarsinh Rupsinh Sodha & Ors. (2026), holding that an electricity company carrying on the business of transmitting a hazardous substance is absolutely liable to compensate a person killed by accidental contact with a live wire, and cannot defend itself by attributing negligence to the deceased. 

What was the Background of  Gujarat Energy Transmission Company Ltd. v. Naniba Wd/O Gemarsinh Rupsinh Sodha & Ors. (2026) Case? 

• GETCO had challenged a judgment and decree dated 31.1.2012 passed by the trial court, which had directed it to pay Rs. 9,40,000 along with 9% annual interest from the date of filing of the suit till realisation, as compensation for the death of Gemarsinh Sodha. 
• The deceased, who worked as a Maldhari (livestock owner), was passing through an area along with his sheep and goats when he reached near an open tube well. Due to wind, he came into contact with a 66 KV electric line that was passing through the branches of a tree, and was electrocuted, resulting in his death. 
• GETCO contended before the High Court that the trial court had erred in fastening liability on it, arguing that the accident occurred due to the deceased's own negligence and that the mishap could have been avoided had he taken proper care. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

On the Principle of Absolute Liability: 

• The Court held that when energy transmitted through an electric line causes injury or death to a person who unknowingly comes into contact with it, the primary liability to compensate the sufferer rests on the electricity company, in accordance with the principle of absolute liability. It observed that electricity transmitted through wires carries a potentially dangerous dimension, and it is the duty of the electricity company to take all safety measures to prevent its escape or to ensure that the wires do not expose human beings to risk. 

On the Distinction Between Strict Liability and Negligence: 

• The Court clarified that the basis of such liability lies in the foreseeable risk inherent in the nature of the activity itself. Such liability, known in law as "strict liability," is conceptually distinct from fault-based liability arising from negligence. While negligence presupposes that foreseeable harm could have been avoided through reasonable precautions, strict and absolute liability do not depend on proof of fault or the availability of any defence. 

On Reliance on M.C. Mehta v. Union of India: 

• The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987), in which the principle of strict liability laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) was extended and elevated to the standard of absolute liability, without exceptions, for enterprises engaged in hazardous activities. 

On GETCO's Status as an Enterprise Dealing in a Hazardous Substance: 

• The Court observed that GETCO, being engaged in the business of selling and transmitting electricity, a hazardous product, could not escape liability by raising the defence of contributory negligence. It held that without going into the merits of the rival contentions, the fact that GETCO deals in a hazardous substance itself attracts the principle of absolute liability, obligating it to pay compensation for the death caused by its activity. 
• Applying these principles, the Court dismissed GETCO's appeal and upheld the trial court's award of compensation.

What is Strict Liability & Absolute Liability? 

About:  

• The law of torts generally requires proof of negligence, but certain inherently dangerous activities attract liability regardless of fault.  
• Two doctrines govern this: strict liability and absolute liability. 

Strict Liability – Origin: 

• The doctrine originated in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), where a mill owner's reservoir water escaped through old mine shafts and flooded a neighbouring coal mine.  
• Justice Blackburn held that anyone who brings onto their land something likely to cause mischief if it escapes must keep it at their peril and is answerable for the natural consequences of its escape.  
• Though initially called "absolute liability," Winfield later termed it "strict liability" since the rule carried exceptions. 

Essential Elements: 

• Two conditions must be met: the dangerous substance must escape from the defendant's land to outside their control (illustrated by the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, where methyl isocyanate leaked beyond factory premises), and the land must be put to non-natural use, meaning an unusual activity creating special danger beyond ordinary or community-beneficial use (as clarified in Rickards v. Lothian).  
• Examples include explosives, gas and electricity in bulk, and noxious fumes. What counts as "non-natural" depends on context, as Indian courts have recognised in agricultural cases like Kana Ram Akhul v. Satidhar Chatterjee. Liability also extends to harm caused by independent contractors engaged by the defendant, as held in Rylands itself and T.C. Balakrishnan Menon v. T.R. Subramanian. 

Defences to Strict Liability: 

• Despite its name, strict liability admits several defences: default of the plaintiff, plaintiff's consent (volenti non fit injuria), common benefit (Carstairs v. Tylor), act of a stranger, act of God (Nichols v. Marsland), and statutory authority (Madras Railway Co. v. Zamindar of Carvatenagram). 

Absolute Liability – M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987): 

• Following the Oleum gas leak from Shriram Foods' Delhi factory in 1985, the Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Bhagwati, held the 19th-century Rylands rule inadequate for modern industrial hazards.  
• It evolved a stricter "absolute liability" standard: enterprises engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities owe an absolute, non-delegable duty to the community to prevent harm, with no exceptions available. 

Comparison Between Strict Liability and Absolute Liability: 

Source: Delhi High Court 

Why in News? 

A Single Bench of Justice Neena Bansal Krishna in the matter of Sandeep Goel v. Zavenir Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Connected Matter (2026) dismissed an appeal filed by a chartered accountant challenging a summary decree passed against him in favour of a company, holding that a confirmation of accounts letter acknowledging a loan and its interest terms amounts to a written contract capable of sustaining a suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). 

What was the Background of Sandeep Goel v. Zavenir Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Connected Matter (2026) Case? 

• Zavenir Developers Pvt. Ltd. instituted a summary suit claiming that it had advanced a friendly loan of ₹50 lakh to the Appellant, a chartered accountant, through two bank transactions. 
• The loan was claimed to carry interest at 15% per annum, compounded quarterly. 
• The Plaintiff relied on a confirmation of accounts letter dated April 1, 2019, signed by both parties, recording the loan transactions, the interest liability, and the outstanding balance. 
• The Appellant disputed the claim, contending that the bank transfers were in fact repayment of a cash amount he had arranged for the company, and not a loan advanced to him. 
• The Appellant further argued that a confirmation of accounts could not be treated as a written contract, and therefore could not form the basis of a summary suit under Order XXXVII CPC. 
• The Trial Court rejected these defences, holding that no triable issue was made out, and passed a summary decree in favour of the company for recovery of over ₹72 lakh. The Appellant challenged this decree before the Delhi High Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

On the Confirmation Letter as a Written Contract: 

• The Court examined the confirmation of accounts letter and found that it specifically recorded the transfer of ₹50 lakh, the agreed rate of interest, and the amount outstanding. It noted that the letter bore the signatures of both parties, with the Defendant expressly endorsing its contents by writing "we confirm the above."  
• The Court held that this combination of recorded terms and express acknowledgment elevated the document beyond a mere accounting record to a written agreement enforceable under Order XXXVII CPC. 

On the Defence That the Letter Was Not Meant to Be Acted Upon: 

• The Appellant argued that he had signed the confirmation letter only on an assurance that it would not be relied upon.  
• The Court rejected this explanation, observing that such a defence was especially weak when raised by a chartered accountant, a professional well versed in the legal and financial significance of signing such a document. 

On the Defence of Cash Advance Repayment: 

• The Appellant's alternative case was that the bank transfers received by him were repayment of a cash amount he had earlier arranged for the company, and not a loan extended to him.  
• The Court found this plea unsupported by any material evidence on record and held that a bare assertion, without documentary or other corroboration, could not be treated as raising a genuine dispute. 

On Absence of a Triable Issue: 

• Having rejected both defences, the Court concluded that the Appellant had failed to disclose any triable issue that would entitle him to unconditional leave to defend the suit. Accordingly, it upheld the summary decree passed in favour of the company and dismissed the appeal. 

What is Order XXXVII CPC? 

Order XXXVII CPC – Summary Procedure 

Rule 1: Courts and Classes of Suits to Which the Order Applies 

• Applies to High Courts, City Civil Courts, and Courts of Small Causes, as well as other courts notified by the High Court, which may restrict, enlarge, or vary the categories of suits covered. 
• Subject to the above, applies to the following classes of suits:  
  • Suits upon bills of exchange, hundies, and promissory notes. 
  • Suits where the plaintiff seeks only to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money, with or without interest, arising on a written contract, on an enactment (where the sum is fixed or in the nature of a debt other than a penalty), or on a guarantee (where the claim against the principal debtor is for a debt or liquidated demand only).

Rule 2: Institution of Summary Suits 

• A suit under this Order must be instituted by presenting a plaint containing a specific averment that it is filed under Order XXXVII, a statement that no relief outside the ambit of this rule has been claimed, and the prescribed inscription below the suit title. 
• The summons must be in Form No. 4 of Appendix B or such other prescribed form. 
• The defendant must not defend the suit unless he enters an appearance; in default of appearance, the allegations in the plaint are deemed admitted, and the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for the sum claimed (not exceeding the sum in the summons), together with interest at the specified rate up to the date of decree and costs, executable forthwith.

Rule 3: Procedure for Appearance of Defendant 

• The plaintiff must serve a copy of the plaint and annexures along with the summons; the defendant may enter appearance, in person or by pleader, within ten days of service, and must file an address for service of notices. 
• Unless otherwise ordered, service at the address given by the defendant is deemed valid service. 
• On entering appearance, the defendant must notify the plaintiff or his pleader, by delivered or pre-paid letter notice. 
• If the defendant enters appearance, the plaintiff must serve a summons for judgment (Form No. 4A of Appendix B), returnable not less than ten days from service, supported by an affidavit verifying the cause of action, the amount claimed, and stating the plaintiff's belief that there is no defence. 
• The defendant may, within ten days of service of the summons for judgment, apply by affidavit or otherwise for leave to defend, disclosing facts sufficient to entitle him to defend; leave may be granted unconditionally or on terms the Court considers just.  
  • Leave to defend shall not be refused unless the Court is satisfied that the disclosed facts do not indicate a substantial defence, or that the intended defence is frivolous or vexatious. 
  • Where part of the claimed amount is admitted as due, leave to defend shall not be granted unless that admitted amount is deposited in Court. 
• At the hearing of the summons for judgment:  
  • If the defendant has not applied for leave, or the application is refused, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment forthwith. 
  • If the defendant is permitted to defend in whole or in part, the Court may direct security to be given within a fixed time; failure to give such security or comply with directions entitles the plaintiff to judgment forthwith. 
• The Court may, for sufficient cause, excuse delay by the defendant in entering appearance or applying for leave to defend.

Rule 4: Power to Set Aside Decree 

• After a decree, the Court may, under special circumstances, set aside the decree, stay or set aside execution if necessary, and permit the defendant to appear and defend the suit, on terms the Court thinks fit, if it appears reasonable to do so.

Rule 5: Power to Order Bill, etc., to Be Deposited with Officer of Court 

• The Court may order the bill, hundi, or note on which the suit is founded to be deposited with a Court officer, and may further order that proceedings be stayed until the plaintiff furnishes security for costs.

Rule 6: Recovery of Cost of Noting Non-Acceptance of Dishonoured Bill or Note 

• The holder of a dishonoured bill of exchange or promissory note has the same remedies for recovering expenses incurred in noting such dishonour (for non-acceptance, non-payment, or otherwise) as available under this Order for recovery of the bill or note amount. 

Rule 7: Procedure in Suits 

• Except as otherwise provided by this Order, the procedure in such suits follows the same procedure as suits instituted in the ordinary manner.