List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice NV Anjaria of the Supreme Court of India, in Israfil @ Pappu @ Naimuddin Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2026), modified the sentence of a convict under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC (Sections 338, 336(3), and 340 of BNS) to the period already undergone, holding that the long lapse of time without any material indicating involvement in similar criminal activity is a relevant sentencing consideration, and that the principle of proportionality must remain central to the sentencing process. 

What was the Background of Israfil @ Pappu @ Naimuddin Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2026) Case? 

• The Appellant was convicted by the trial court for using a forged revenue document to furnish surety in judicial proceedings. 
• He was found guilty of offences punishable under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC, which deal with forgery of valuable security, forgery for the purpose of cheating, and using a forged document as genuine, respectively. 
• The trial court sentenced him to five years' rigorous imprisonment on each count along with a fine of Rs. 1,000/- under each head, with substantive sentences directed to run concurrently. 
• The High Court affirmed both the conviction and the sentence, following which the Appellant approached the Supreme Court on the limited question of quantum of sentence. 
• Before the Supreme Court, the Appellant contended that he was not a habitual offender, that no subsequent criminal antecedents had been brought on record against him, and that the sentence warranted reconsideration in light of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 
• The Appellant had already undergone the rigours of criminal proceedings for over a decade since 2014. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On lapse of time as a sentencing consideration: The Court held that the long lapse of time without any material indicating repetition of similar criminal conduct is a relevant consideration while moulding sentence. It noted that no material had been placed before it to indicate that the Appellant was a habitual offender or that he was involved in similar criminal activity either prior or subsequent to the present occurrence. 
• On the principle of proportionality: The Court observed that while considering the question of sentence, a court is required to balance the nature of the offence with the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, the role attributed to the accused, the period of incarceration undergone, the passage of time, and other mitigating circumstances relevant to sentencing jurisprudence. It held that the principle of proportionality remains central to the sentencing process and that sentencing cannot be reduced to a purely retributive exercise divorced from the factual matrix of the case and the overall circumstances of the offender. 
• On the precedent relied upon: The Court drew reference from Padum Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020), where, in a similar set of facts involving conviction under Sections 467 and 468 of the IPC, the sentence was reduced by taking into account the age of the matter, the sentence already undergone, and the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 
• Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal and modified the sentence to the period already undergone by the Appellant. 

What are Sections 336, 338, and 340 of BNS? 

Section 336 BNS – Forgery: 

• Definition: Making a false document or electronic record (wholly or in part) with intent to:  
  • Cause damage or injury to the public or any person 
  • Support any claim or title 
  • Cause any person to part with property 
  • Enter into any express or implied contract 
  • Commit fraud or enable fraud 
• Punishment:  
  • S. 336(1) – Basic forgery → up to 2 years, or fine, or both 
  • S. 336(2) – Forgery for cheating → up to 7 years + fine 
  • S. 336(3) – Forgery to harm reputation → up to 3 years + fine

Section 338 BNS – Forgery of Valuable Security, Will, etc. 

• Scope: Applies when the forged document purports to be a:  
  • Valuable security or Will 
  • Authority to adopt a son 
  • Authority to make/transfer valuable security 
  • Authority to receive principal, interest, or dividends 
  • Authority to receive/deliver money, movable property, or valuable security 
  • Acquittance or receipt acknowledging payment of money or delivery of property 
• Punishment: Imprisonment for life, or up to 10 years + fine

Section 340 BNS – Forged Document and Using it as Genuine 

• S. 340(1) – Definition: A document made wholly or partly by forgery is designated a "forged document or electronic record" 
• S. 340(2) – Offence: Fraudulently or dishonestly using a document known or believed to be forged → punished in the same manner as if the person had forged it 
• Classification:  
  • Cognizable 
  • Bailable 
  • Triable by Magistrate of the First Class  

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News? 

Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Sharma v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation and Anr. (2026) held that a regulation framed under a parent statute, being a piece of subordinate legislation, cannot curtail or fetter the power of a competent legislature to amend the statute in a manner that overrides such regulation. 

What was the Background of Rajesh Sharma v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation and Anr. (2026) Case? 

• The Appellant, Rajesh Sharma, served as an Executive Engineer (Group-A officer) with the North Delhi Municipal Corporation. 
• He was convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, following which the Commissioner of the North Delhi Municipal Corporation dismissed him from service in 2011. 
• He challenged the dismissal on the ground that under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959, the competent authority to impose a major penalty (including dismissal) on a Group-A officer was the Corporation, and not the Commissioner. 
• The Central Administrative Tribunal upheld his contention, set aside the dismissal, and directed the disciplinary authority to pass a fresh penalty order. 
• The respondents challenged this before the Delhi High Court, which reversed the Tribunal's order in 2019 and upheld the Commissioner's authority to dismiss the Appellant. 
• Aggrieved, the Appellant approached the Supreme Court.

What were the Court's Observations? 

The Supreme Court, while upholding the High Court's order, made the following key observations: 

On the interpretative conundrum: 

• The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 did not originally specify the disciplinary authority for Group-A officers; accordingly, the 1959 Regulations designated the Corporation as the competent authority. 
• By the 1993 amendment, the parent legislation was modified to designate the Commissioner as the disciplinary authority under Section 59(d), adding the phrase "subject to any Regulation that may be made in this behalf." 
• The interpretative question was whether the phrase "subject to any Regulation that may be made" preserved the operation of the pre-existing 1959 Regulations.

On the meaning of "may be made": 

• The Court relied on Stroud's Judicial Dictionary to hold that the expression "may be" signifies futurity, referring only to regulations that may be framed after the 1993 amendment, and not to the already existing 1959 Regulations. 
• Reading the clause otherwise would render the words "may be made" redundant or superfluous, which is a construction that must be eschewed.

On the primacy of legislative power over subordinate legislation: 

• Regulations are a piece of subordinate legislation framed under the parent enactment. 
• What can be achieved by a subordinate legislation under a statute can always be achieved — and overridden — by an amendment to that statute by the competent legislature. 
• The existence of a regulation framed under an Act cannot fetter the legislative power to amend the Act in a manner that overrides the regulation. 
• Had the legislature not intended to override the 1959 Regulations, it would not have designated the Commissioner as disciplinary authority or used the forward-looking phrase "any Regulation that may be made."

What is Subordinate Legislation? 

Subordinate legislation refers to rules, regulations, bye-laws, notifications, and orders made by an authority (such as the executive, a statutory body, or a local authority) under powers delegated to it by the parent or enabling statute enacted by the legislature. It is also called delegated legislation. Key features are as follows: 

• Derivative in nature: Subordinate legislation derives its validity from the parent statute. Any provision of subordinate legislation that is ultra vires the enabling Act is void and of no effect. 
• Cannot override the parent Act: Since subordinate legislation is made under powers conferred by the legislature, it cannot exceed or contradict the provisions of the enabling Act. Where a conflict exists, the parent Act prevails. 
• Subject to legislative amendment: The legislature retains plenary power to amend the parent statute at any time. Such an amendment will automatically prevail over any inconsistent subordinate legislation made under an earlier version of the statute. 
• Judicial review: Courts can strike down subordinate legislation on grounds of being ultra vires the parent Act, violation of fundamental rights, or manifest arbitrariness. 
• Forms of subordinate legislation in India: These include statutory rules framed under specific Acts (such as service rules, procedural rules), regulations made by statutory bodies (such as SEBI Regulations, RBI Directions), bye-laws of local bodies (such as municipal corporations), and notifications and orders issued under enabling provisions.