List of Current Affairs

Source: Rajasthan High Court

Why in News? 

Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand of the Rajasthan High Court, in the case of C v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (2026), allowed a petition challenging the trial court's rejection of an application under Section 311 of the CrPC (Section 348 of BNSS) and directed the trial court to summon the principal of the prosecutrix's school along with her Class I admission records, holding that the provision is intended to unravel the truth and not to favour either the prosecution or the accused. 

What was the Background of C v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (2026) Case? 

• The petitioner was accused in a case under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), wherein the age of the prosecutrix was a material question for determining the applicability of the Act. 
• The trial court had relied upon the prosecutrix's Class IV admission form, which recorded her birth year as 2001, to establish that she was a minor at the time of the alleged incident. 
• The petitioner contended that contradictory documents existed regarding the prosecutrix's age: her Class X mark-sheet issued by the Board of Secondary Education recorded her birth year as 2000, and her Class I admission form from another school recorded her birth year as 1999. 
• On the basis of these contradictions, the petitioner submitted an application under Section 311 CrPC seeking to summon the principal of the other school along with the prosecutrix's Class I admission records, in order to establish that she was a major at the time of the alleged incident. 
• The trial court rejected this application on the ground that it had been filed at the stage of final arguments, i.e., at the "fag end" of the trial. 
• Aggrieved by this rejection, the petitioner filed the present petition before the Rajasthan High Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the purpose of Section 311 CrPC: The Court held that the provision does not exist to favour or disfavour either the prosecution or the accused. Its sole purpose is to naturally unravel the truth so that the court may exercise a just decision in the matter. The stage of the trial, including the final argument stage, is not a bar to its invocation. 
• On age determination under the Juvenile Justice Act: The Court referred to Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, and held that where there are reasonable grounds to doubt the age of a person, age must be determined on the basis of the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination board, if available. 
• On contradictory documents: The Court noted that contradictory documents were on record regarding the prosecutrix's date of birth, and that this created a genuine dispute as to her age at the time of the alleged incident. 
• On summoning of school records: The Court held that in order to bring out the correct facts regarding the actual date of birth of the prosecutrix, it was essential to summon the record of her other school, as sought by the petitioner through the application under Section 311 CrPC. 
• On direction to trial court: Allowing the petition, the Court set aside the trial court's order of rejection and directed it to summon the principal of the concerned school along with the relevant records. 

What is Section 348 of BNSS? 

Section 348 BNSS, 2023 — Power to Summon Material Witness or Examine Person Present: 

Section 348 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) is the provision corresponding to Section 311 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), with no substantive change in content. 

Key Provisions: 

• Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial, or other proceeding under the BNSS, exercise the following powers:  
  • Summon any person as a witness. 
  • Examine any person present in court, even if not formally summoned as a witness. 
  • Recall and re-examine any person already examined. 
• The Court shall (mandatory) summon, examine, or recall any such person if their evidence appears essential to the just decision of the case.

Two-Part Structure: 

• The first part is discretionary — the Court may exercise the power at its own initiative. 
• The second part is mandatory — the Court is obliged to act where the evidence of a person is essential for a just decision. 

Judicial Interpretation (applicable to Section 348 BNSS by parity): 

• The power must be exercised sparingly and with caution. 
• It cannot be invoked merely to fill up lacunae or rectify oversights in the case of either the prosecution or the defence. 
• The object is to serve the ends of justice, not to give a party a second opportunity to cure its own lapses. 
• In sensitive cases, particularly involving victims of sexual offences, courts must weigh the hardship caused to the witness by repeated appearances before ordering recall. 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News?

A Division Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan of the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Jittu Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others (2026), set aside the Chhattisgarh High Court's decision and held that delay in filing a statutory appeal against an externment order under the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 is condonable under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, where the special statute does not expressly or by necessary implication exclude that provision.

What was the Background of Jittu Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others (2026) Case? 

• The District Magistrate, Balodabazar-Bhatapara, passed an externment order on June 18, 2025, directing the appellant to remain outside the district for a period of one year. 
• The appellant filed a statutory appeal before the State Government under Section 9 of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990, which prescribes a 30-day period for filing such appeals. 
• The appeal was dismissed as time-barred on account of having been filed beyond the prescribed period of thirty days. 
• The Chhattisgarh High Court subsequently upheld the dismissal of the appeal. 
• The appellant approached the Supreme Court, raising the principal question of whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 stood excluded — expressly or by necessary implication — in proceedings under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On applicability of Section 5, Limitation Act to special statutes: The Court held that unless a statute expressly or by necessary implication excludes the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the appellate authority retains the discretion to condone delay in appropriate cases. It emphasised that in the absence of any outer limit or express exclusion, Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act apply to proceedings under special statutes by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. 
• On legislative intent and restrictive expressions: The Court observed that when a statute prescribes only a timeline for filing an appeal, but does not contain expressions such as "but not thereafter," "not exceeding," or any other restrictive phrase indicating that delay beyond the prescribed period cannot be condoned, it necessarily implies that the legislature did not intend total insulation from the general law of limitation. 
• On the purpose of limitation law: The Court stated that the law of limitation is intended to regulate the exercise of remedies and ensure diligence, but is not meant to extinguish rights — particularly civil rights — in the absence of an express legislative command. 
• On access to appellate remedy: The Court observed that denial of appellate scrutiny solely on account of delay, despite sufficient cause being shown, may result in irreversible prejudice and effective loss of the appellate remedy itself — particularly where, as in this case, the limitation period is as short as thirty days. 
• On preferred interpretation: The Court held that where a statute is silent on the exclusion of delay condonation powers, an interpretation that preserves the appellate remedy and advances substantial justice must be preferred over one that defeats the remedy on technical grounds alone.

What is Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963? 

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 

About:  

• Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 enunciates the principle of condonation of delay. It states:  

“Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period”  

• Section 5 of this Act states that, to seek condonation of delay a party must show the “sufficient cause” of the delay.  

Condonation of Delay:  

• Condonation of delay is a discretionary remedy exercised by courts wherein, upon an application made by a party who wishes to have an appeal or application admitted after the prescribed period, the court may condone (overlook) the delay if the party provides a “sufficient cause” that hindered them from filing the appeal or application on time.  

Sufficient Cause:  

• Sufficient cause means there should be adequate reasons or reasonable ground for the court to believe the applicant was prevented from proceeding with the application in a Court of Law.  
• Section 5 allows the extension of the prescribed period in certain cases on sufficient cause being shown for the delay.   
• In State of West Bengal v. Administrator (1972):   
  • The Supreme Court held that the extension of time is a matter of concession and cannot be claimed by the party as a matter of right.   
  • It is difficult and undesirable to precisely define the meaning of sufficient cause. It must be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case. However, a sufficient cause should fulfill the following essentials:   
    • It must be a cause which was beyond the control of the party invoking it.   
    • He must not be guilty of negligence.   
    • His diligence and care must be shown.   
    • His intention must be bonafide.