List of Current Affairs

Source: Telangana High Court

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice Gadi Praveen Kumar of the Telangana High Court, in M Divya And Three Others v. M/s. Pavani Estates Private Limited (2026), held that parties cannot cure or remove foundational defects at a subsequent stage to validate the institution of a suit, and set aside a trial court order that had allowed the plaintiff to replace the original basis of its authority to sue through a later board resolution. 

What was the Background of M Divya and Three Others v. M/s. Pavani Estates Private Limited (2026) Case? 

• The respondent-plaintiff company had filed a commercial recovery suit in 2016. 
• The suit was instituted on the plaintiff's behalf by one Archit Reddy, purportedly acting as its duly authorised signatory under a Board Resolution dated 29.08.2016. 
• During the proceedings, the plaintiff filed two applications before the Commercial Court: one seeking permission for Archit Reddy to represent the company as its authorised signatory, and another seeking to bring on record a fresh Board Resolution dated 18.06.2025, ratifying the earlier 2016 resolution, along with an accompanying list of documents. 
• The Commercial Court allowed both applications, holding that the defect in the earlier authorisation was curable and that no prejudice would be caused to the defendants if the new resolution was taken on record. 
• The petitioners-defendants challenged this order before the Telangana High Court by way of a civil revision petition.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the distinction between curable defects and foundational defects: The Court observed that a marked distinction exists between a procedural correction of facts and a defect that strikes at the foundation of a pleading or the institution of a suit. It clarified that defects such as defective verification, defective signing, or a delayed filing of authorisation are curable, but these cannot be equated with a complete absence of authority at the very inception of filing. 
• On the nature of the 2025 resolution: The Court held that the subsequent resolution dated 18.06.2025 did not merely ratify the earlier resolution of 29.08.2016, but sought to replace the original basis of authority altogether. It found that this was not a procedural correction but an erosion of the very foundation on which Archit Reddy had filed the suit in 2016. 
• On the plaintiff's knowledge of the defect: The Court noted that the plaintiff company was aware, even in 2016, that Archit Reddy was not a Director at the relevant time and therefore lacked authority under the 2016 resolution to institute the suit. It held that this was not a defect discovered later or occurring through inadvertence, but one known to the plaintiff from the outset. 
• On the attempt to regularise the institution of the suit: The Court held that substituting the 2016 resolution with the 2025 resolution amounted to a deliberate attempt to subsequently clothe an incompetent person with authority, in order to regularise the institution of the suit after the completion of evidence. It held that such a foundational defect could not be rectified in this manner, and that the Trial Court had failed to appreciate the distinction between a curable procedural irregularity and a defect going to the very validity of the institution of the suit. 
• On disclosure of documents under the Commercial Courts Act: The Court examined Order XI CPC, as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, governing disclosure, discovery, and inspection of documents in commercial suits, and held that the plaintiff could not rely on the belated resolution without establishing "reasonable cause" for its non-disclosure at the time of filing the plaint. 
• On relief granted: The Court allowed the revision petition and set aside the Commercial Court's order permitting the plaintiff to bring the 2025 resolution on record. 

What is Order XI CPC? 

Order XI CPC – Disclosure, Discovery and Inspection of Documents in Suits before the Commercial Division: 

• Under Rule 1, it is mandatory for the plaintiff to file, along with the plaint, a list of all documents in its power, possession, control, or custody that are relevant to the suit, together with copies of such documents. 
• Under Rule 1(4), the plaintiff is required to disclose and file such documents within a cut-off period of thirty days from the date of filing of the suit. 
• Under Rule 1(5), the plaintiff cannot subsequently rely on documents that were not disclosed with the plaint, except with the leave of the court, and only where the plaintiff establishes "reasonable cause" for the non-disclosure. 
• The provision does not expressly contemplate the filing of documents beyond the prescribed cut-off period, making the burden on the plaintiff to justify any delay a strict one.

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice KV Viswanathan, in Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass & Ors. (2026), held that where a Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, mere examination of an attesting witness does not amount to proof of the Will's genuineness, and set aside a Himachal Pradesh High Court judgment that had upheld a disputed 1974 Will. 

What was the Background of Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass & Ors. (2026) Case? 

• Bhambo Devi, widow of Chhajju Ram, instituted a suit claiming ownership and possession of her late husband's properties, asserting that he had died intestate and that she was his sole Class I heir. 
• The defendants relied on a registered Will dated November 6, 1974, under which the testator, an illiterate agriculturist who could only thumbmark documents, had allegedly bequeathed his entire movable and immovable estate to them. 
• The defendants claimed the testator executed the Will in their favour because they had looked after him. 
• The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court discarded the Will after finding several suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution. 
• The High Court, in second appeal, reversed these concurrent findings and upheld the Will, holding that once attestation was duly proved by the attesting witness, execution of the Will stood proved, particularly since it was a registered document. 
• Aggrieved, the widow's legal representative approached the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the true scope of proving a Will: The Court held that proving a Will is not merely an exercise in establishing the testator's signature and its attestation under Section 63 of the Succession Act. It is an exercise to satisfy the court's conscience that the testator signed the Will of his own free will, being aware of its contents and understanding the nature and effect of its dispositions. 
• On the propounder's burden where suspicion exists: The Court held that where suspicious circumstances surround the execution of a Will, the propounder must explain those circumstances and dispel all reasonable doubts regarding its execution before the document can be accepted as genuine. 
• On what constitutes "suspicious circumstances": The Court observed that the phrase has deliberately been left open-ended by judicial pronouncements to cover any circumstance casting doubt on whether the Will truly reflects the testator's free will, though it would not extend to a mere figment of imagination or a doubting mind. Illustrative circumstances include a shaky or doubtful signature, a feeble or uncertain mental state of the testator, an unfair disposition of property, unjust exclusion of legal heirs (particularly dependents), and an active or leading role played by the beneficiary in the making of the Will. 
• On the specific doubts in this case: The Court found that the defendants failed to dispel several legitimate doubts, namely: 
  • The Will completely excluded the testator's wife, his sole Class I heir, while conferring the entire estate on persons who were not even close relatives. 
  • The beneficiaries were described as the testator's nephews, though no such relationship was established in evidence. 
  • Unauthenticated alterations existed on the reverse of the registered Will, where the name "Laxmi Kant" in the registration endorsement had been struck off and replaced with "Chhajju" at multiple places, without the Sub-Registrar's initials or authentication. 
• On the role of attesting-witness examination: The Court held that examination of an attesting witness is not an empty procedural formality. The propounder continues to bear the onus of dispelling suspicious circumstances surrounding the genuineness and authenticity of the Will, even where attestation has been proved. 
• On relief granted: The Court allowed the appeal, restored the decisions of the First Appellate Court and Trial Court, declared the widow to be the owner of the suit property, and discarded the disputed Will. 

What is Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925? 

Section 63– Execution of Unprivileged Wills: 

Applies to every testator other than a soldier in actual warfare/expedition, an airman similarly employed, or a mariner at sea. Such testators must execute their Will as follows: 

• Signing requirement: The testator must sign or affix his mark to the Will himself, or have it signed by another person in his presence and under his direction. 
• Placement of signature: The signature or mark (whether of the testator or of the person signing on his behalf) must be positioned so as to show it was intended to give effect to the document as a Will. 
• Attestation by witnesses: The Will must be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom must have either: (i) seen the testator sign or affix his mark, or (ii) seen another person sign the Will in the testator's presence and by his direction, or (iii) received a personal acknowledgment from the testator of his signature/mark or of the other person's signature. 
• Witness signature: Each attesting witness must sign the Will in the presence of the testator, but it is not necessary for all witnesses to be present at the same time. 
• No prescribed form: No particular form of attestation is required by law.