List of Current Affairs

Source: Allahabad High Court 

Why in News?

A division bench of Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Achal Sachdev of the Allahabad High Court, in Rubi v. State of U.P. (2026), held that personal law cannot override the statutory prohibition on child marriage under the PCMA and the protections available under the POCSO Act, and declined to quash an FIR registered against persons who allegedly obstructed the rescue of a minor girl from a marriage in Bulandshahr, Uttar Pradesh. 

What was the Background of Rubi v. State of U.P. (2026) Case? 

• On 15th February 2026, local police along with a Child Line team visited a village in Bulandshahr, Uttar Pradesh, acting on information about an impending marriage of a 16-year-old girl. 
• On reaching the spot, the officials informed the girl's parents that she would be produced before the Child Welfare Committee. 
• The petitioners, along with a crowd of roughly 50 persons, allegedly turned hostile, verbally abused and threatened the rescue team, and forcibly took the girl back from the custody of a case worker. 
• The officials were compelled to withdraw from the village to protect themselves, though the girl was rescued subsequently. 
• An FIR was registered against 19 named individuals for obstructing public servants in the discharge of their duty. 
• The accused approached the Allahabad High Court under Article 226, seeking quashing of the FIR. 
• Before the High Court, counsel for the petitioners argued that under Muslim Personal Law, a girl who has attained puberty — generally understood as 15 years of age — is competent to marry, and relied on the Majority Act as well as the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 to contend that the PCMA and the POCSO Act had no application to them. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the conflict between personal law and welfare legislation: The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that Muslim Personal Law could carve out an exception to the statutory age of marriage, holding that no personal law can override the prohibition on child marriage enacted under the PCMA, and that this prohibition operates in conjunction with the POCSO Act, which criminalises sexual intercourse with any person below 18 years. 
• On uniform applicability of the marriage age: The Court held that the age prescribed under the PCMA governs every citizen regardless of religious affiliation, rejecting the plea for a religion-based carve-out from this standard. 
• On the rationale behind the PCMA and POCSO Act: The bench observed that these enactments rest on considerations of public health and national policy, are grounded in scientific understanding, and leave no room for exemption on the basis of personal law or custom. 
• On the inseparability of marriage and sexual offence below 18 years: The Court reasoned that permitting marriage below the age of 18 would inevitably expose the parties to the risk of an offence under the POCSO Act, since sexual relations are ordinarily an incident of marriage. 
• On the legislative hierarchy between personal law and later welfare statutes: The Court clarified that later, comprehensive statutes enacted for the protection of children take precedence over earlier exceptions carved out under personal law. 
• On the conduct of the rescue team: The bench commended the police and the Child Line team for discharging their statutory duties under the PCMA while also acting to prevent a possible violation of the POCSO Act. 
• On refusal to quash the FIR: Finding that the allegations of obstruction and assault against public servants disclosed a cognisable offence warranting investigation, the Court declined to interfere at the threshold and permitted the criminal proceedings to continue, vacating the interim stay that had been granted earlier. 

What is the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA)? 

• Objective: The Act aims to prevent child marriages by penalising specified acts and by designating authorities responsible for their prevention and prohibition. 
• Key Definitions: 
  • Child: A male who has not completed 21 years, or a female who has not completed 18 years, of age. 
  • Child Marriage: A marriage where either contracting party is a child. 
  • Minor: A person who has not attained majority under the Majority Act, 1875 — i.e., a person domiciled in India who has not completed 18 years. 
• Punishment: Child marriage is punishable with rigorous imprisonment up to 2 years, or fine up to ₹1 lakh, or both. Offences under the Act are cognisable and non-bailable. 
• Persons Liable: 
  • Anyone who performs, conducts, directs, or abets a child marriage. 
  • A male adult above 18 years who marries a child (Section 9). 
  • Persons having charge of the child — including parents, guardians, or members of an organisation/association — who promote, permit, or participate in a child marriage.

What is the POCSO Act, 2012? 

• Overview: The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 is a landmark legislation enacted to safeguard children from sexual abuse and exploitation, addressing their inherent vulnerability and ensuring their safety and well-being. It gives effect to India's obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which India acceded to on 11th December 1992. 
• Preamble: The Act protects children from offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment, and pornography, and provides for the establishment of Special Courts for the trial of such offences and connected matters. 
• Key Dates: The Act was enacted on 19th June 2012 and came into force on 14th November 2012. 
• POCSO Amendment Act, 2019: 
  • Came into force on 16th August 2019. 
  • Introduced more stringent penalties for offences under the Act. 
  • Inserted clause (da) in Section 2(1), defining "child pornography." 
  • Amended Section 4 to specifically address aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a child below 16 years of age. 

Source: Orissa High Court

Why in News?

Justice V. Narasingh of the Orissa High Court, in Ramesh Chandra Behera v. State of Orissa (2026), held that where an accused is convicted for two or more offences committed in a single transaction, the trial court cannot order the resulting sentences to run consecutively, and modified the sentence to run concurrently while also extending probation benefits to the petitioner. 

What was the Background of Ramesh Chandra Behera v. State of Orissa (2026) Case? 

• On 17.03.2023, while the victim was alone at home, the petitioner allegedly entered her house and attempted to commit rape on her. 
• On hearing her shout, the victim's son arrived and resisted the petitioner, who allegedly inflicted injuries on the victim's head and on the son's hand. 
• It was further alleged that the petitioner had earlier threatened to kill the victim. 
• The petitioner was booked under Sections 451, 341, 323, 354 and 506 of the IPC, and the trial court convicted him under Section 451 IPC (house trespass to commit an offence) and Section 323 IPC (voluntarily causing hurt). 
• The trial court rejected the petitioner's prayer for release under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, and sentenced him to one year's simple imprisonment under Section 451 IPC and six months' simple imprisonment under Section 323 IPC, directing that the sentences run consecutively. 
• On appeal, the Sessions Court reduced the sentence under Section 451 IPC from one year to six months but did not interfere with the remaining part of the order. 
• Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a criminal revision before the Orissa High Court, primarily challenging the denial of benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the single transaction rule for sentencing: The Court noted that although the conviction was recorded for offences arising out of a single transaction, both the trial court and the appellate court had directed the sentences to run consecutively. Relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in O.M. Cherian alias Thankachan v. State of Kerala & Ors. (2014), it reiterated that when a prosecution arises from a single transaction constituting two or more offences, the sentences must run concurrently, and there is no rule that consecutive sentencing is the norm with concurrent sentencing as the exception. 
• On the Supreme Court's ruling in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain: The Court relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of Customs (1988), which laid down the single transaction rule for concurrent sentencing — that where a single transaction constitutes two offences under two enactments, consecutive sentences are improper, although this rule does not apply where the offences arise from separate transactions or distinct facts. 
• On mitigating factors in sentencing: Invoking Oscar Wilde's observation that "every saint has a past, and every sinner a future", the Court held that mitigating factors must be considered while imposing sentence. Referring to Section 235(2) CrPC and Section 258(2) BNSS — which require the accused to be heard before sentencing — the Court emphasised that courts must not pass sentencing orders mechanically, but must account for the circumstances of the offence and any mitigating factors. 
• On the fine imposed under Section 451 IPC: The Court set aside the fine imposed under Section 451 IPC and directed instead that the amount be paid as compensation to the victim under Section 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act. 
• On denial of benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act: The Court expressed surprise that the lower courts had not considered the case fit for the benevolent provisions of the PO Act. Relying on the Supreme Court's recent observations in Chellammal v. State represented by the Inspector of Police (2025), it held that courts are duty-bound to record reasons where they decline to apply the PO Act in a given case. 
• On relief granted: The Court modified the sentence to run concurrently instead of consecutively, extended the benefit of probation under Section 4 of the PO Act, and directed the petitioner to deposit compensation of Rs. 1,000 within six months. 

What is Section 25 of BNSS? 

Section 25 BNSS – Sentence in Cases of Conviction of Several Offences at One Trial: 

• Sub-section (1): Where a person is convicted at one trial of two or more offences, the Court may sentence him to the several punishments prescribed for such offences, subject to Section 9 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The Court must, having regard to the gravity of the offences, direct whether such punishments are to run concurrently or consecutively. 
• Sub-section (2): In case of consecutive sentences, the Court is not required to commit the offender for trial before a higher court merely because the aggregate punishment exceeds what it is competent to inflict for a single offence, subject to two provisos: 
• (a) The person shall not be sentenced to imprisonment for a period exceeding twenty years in any case. 
• (b) The aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the punishment the Court is competent to inflict for a single offence. 
• Sub-section (3): For the purpose of an appeal by the convicted person, the aggregate of consecutive sentences passed against him under this section is deemed to be a single sentence. 
• Legislative lineage: Section 25 BNSS corresponds to and is similar in substance to Section 31 of the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.