List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice KV Viswanathan and Justice Vijay Bishnoi, in Manash Kamal Bezboruah v. M/S Bokahola Tea Company Private Limited & Ors. (2026), held that it is impermissible for a High Court to interfere, under Article 227, with an Arbitral Tribunal's rejection of a Section 16 application, and set aside the Gauhati High Court's order staying the arbitral proceedings. 

What was the Background of Manash Kamal Bezboruah v. M/S Bokahola Tea Company Private Limited & Ors. (2026) Case? 

• The dispute stemmed from a partnership firm constituted in 1948 by the Bezboruah family, governed by a partnership deed executed on November 16, 1976, which contained an arbitration clause. 
• After the plea seeking reference to arbitration was rejected by the trial court and the High Court, the Supreme Court, with the consent of parties, appointed a Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes. 
• Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, though parties to the proceedings, did not contest the reference. 
• Following the reference, the Arbitral Tribunal framed issues. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 filed applications seeking deletion of their names, contending that being non-signatories, they were not bound by the arbitration agreement. The Tribunal rejected the applications on August 4, 2025. 
• Aggrieved, Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 filed a revision petition under Article 227 before the Gauhati High Court. The High Court stayed the Tribunal's notices on September 2, 2025, and on January 28, 2026, held the revision petition maintainable. 
• Aggrieved, the appellant moved the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the scheme of the Act: The Court observed that the Act is a "self-contained code" and that Section 5 restricts judicial intervention except where expressly contemplated under the Act, with Section 16 empowering the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction under the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz. 
• On the error committed by the High Court: The Court held that the High Court committed an egregious error in entertaining the revision petition under Article 227, since interference under that provision is permissible only in cases of a "patent lack of inherent jurisdiction." 
• On the role of the referral court and non-signatory parties: The Court held that in cases involving the joinder of non-signatory parties, the referral court is only required to prima facie rule on the existence of the arbitration agreement, leaving the determination of whether the non-signatory is bound by the agreement to the Arbitral Tribunal. This gives true effect to the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz under Section 16, and accordingly the Tribunal possessed the competence to decide whether Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were parties to the arbitration agreement notwithstanding their non-signatory status. 
• On the High Court's duty before invoking Article 227: The Court held that the High Court must exercise extreme circumspection while invoking supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in matters challenging a Tribunal's rejection of a Section 16 application. In the absence of a manifest jurisdictional defect, interference at the interlocutory stage is unwarranted and contrary to the legislative policy of minimal court intervention in arbitral proceedings. Before entertaining such revision petitions, the High Court should record a prima facie finding of patent lack of inherent jurisdiction, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the rival parties. 
• On relief granted: The Court set aside both impugned orders of the High Court and dismissed the revision petition, allowing the appeal. 

What is Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996? 

Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Competence of Arbitral Tribunal to Rule on its Jurisdiction  

• Sub-section (1): The arbitral tribunal has the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, including objections regarding the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For this purpose:  
  • An arbitration clause forming part of a contract is treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. 
  • A decision by the tribunal that the contract is null and void does not automatically render the arbitration clause invalid. 
• Sub-section (2): A plea challenging the tribunal's jurisdiction must be raised no later than the submission of the statement of defence. Merely having appointed or participated in the appointment of an arbitrator does not preclude a party from raising such a plea. 
• Sub-section (3): A plea that the tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority must be raised as soon as the matter allegedly beyond its authority arises during the proceedings. 
• Sub-section (4): The tribunal may admit a late plea under Sub-sections (2) or (3) if it considers the delay to be justified. 
• Sub-section (5): The tribunal shall decide on any such plea and, if the plea is rejected, shall continue with the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award. 
• Sub-section (6): A party aggrieved by such an arbitral award may seek its setting aside by making an application under Section 34.

Article 227 – Power of Superintendence Over All Courts by the High Court 

• Clause (1) – General power of superintendence: Every High Court has superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. 
• Clause (2) – Specific powers without prejudice to generality: The High Court may —  
  • (a) Call for returns from such courts; 
  • (b) Make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and 
  • (c) Prescribe forms in which books, entries, and accounts shall be kept by the officers of such courts. 
• Clause (3) – Power to settle fees: The High Court may settle tables of fees allowed to the sheriff, clerks, officers of such courts, and to attorneys, advocates, and pleaders practising therein.  
  • Proviso: Any rules made, forms prescribed, or fee tables settled under clause (2) or (3) must not be inconsistent with any law for the time being in force, and require the previous approval of the Governor. 
• Clause (4) – Exclusion: Nothing in this Article confers on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. 

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

A bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Vipul M Pancholi, in Venkatesha and Anr. v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa (D) Thr. LRs. & Ors. (2026), held that a rectification deed cannot change the identity of the property conveyed under a sale deed unless the original seller consents to and participates in such rectification. 

What was the Background of Venkatesha and Anr. v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa (2026) Case? 

• Thimmadasappa owned property comprised in Survey No. 1/4, which he sold in 1971. The property changed hands twice thereafter and was ultimately purchased by K.M. Venkatamuniyappa (the plaintiff) in 1973. 
• Separately, in 1982, the government re-granted a different property, Survey No. 162, to Thimmadasappa. 
• In 1997, a rectification deed was executed between the plaintiff and his vendor, asserting that the survey number recorded in the 1973 sale deed had been wrongly mentioned and ought to have read Survey No. 162 instead of Survey No. 1/4. Thimmadasappa, the original owner, was not a party to this rectification deed. 
• In 2005, Thimmadasappa partitioned Survey No. 162 between his two sons. The plaintiff filed a suit challenging this partition, claiming ownership over Survey No. 162 on the strength of the 1997 rectification deed. 
• The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove that Survey Nos. 1/4 and 162 referred to the same property. The first appellate court reversed this finding after comparing property boundaries recorded in the documents, and the High Court affirmed the first appellate court's decree. 
• Aggrieved, Thimmadasappa's sons approached the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the rule against unilateral substitution of subject matter: The Court held that a rectification deed cannot, under the guise of correcting an error, substitute the very subject matter of a prior conveyance without the participation of the original transferor. 
• On the application of nemo dat quod non habet: Invoking the maxim that no person can convey a better title than he himself possesses, the Court held that since Thimmadasappa never conveyed Survey No. 162, the defendant no. 3 acquired no title thereto, and consequently the defendant no. 4 could acquire no title either. A rectification deed executed by defendant no. 4 could not therefore confer title to Survey No. 162 upon the plaintiff, since a derivative title cannot outvalue the title from which it is derived. 
• On retention of title by Thimmadasappa: The Court held that since Thimmadasappa continued to retain title to Survey No. 162 notwithstanding the rectification deed, the inclusion of that property in the partition deed executed between him and his sons could not be faulted. 
• On the burden of proof in a title suit: The Court reiterated that a plaintiff seeking a declaration of title must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the perceived weakness of the defence, and that title cannot rest on surmises or probabilities. The burden lay on the plaintiff to establish that the property conveyed under Sale Deeds I, II and III, though consistently described as Survey No. 1/4, was in reality Survey No. 162 — a burden that remained undischarged. 
• On the plaintiff's conduct as evidence: The Court noted that although the rectification deed dated to 1997, no effort was made to have the revenue entries changed in the plaintiff's favour. Even until the institution of the suit in 2007, the revenue entries continued to stand in the name of Thimmadasappa and, thereafter, the appellants. While revenue entries do not themselves confer title, the Court held they may be treated as evidence of possession, and the total absence of any contemporaneous assertion of right by the plaintiff over Survey No. 162 for nearly a decade was a circumstance the first appellate court failed to accord due weight. 
• On the correctness of the first appellate court's judgment: The Court held that the judgment and decree of the first appellate court, as affirmed by the High Court, suffered from manifest errors of law and a complete misappreciation of evidence, and that the trial court was fully justified in dismissing the suit. 
• On relief granted: The appeal was allowed, and the suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed. 

What is the Legal Position on Rectification Deeds and Derivative Title? 

Rectification Deed: 

• A rectification deed is executed to correct a bona fide error in a previously registered instrument, such as a clerical or descriptive mistake. 
• It cannot be used to alter or substitute the fundamental subject matter of the original conveyance, such as the identity of the property itself. 
• Where the original transferor is not a party to the rectification, any change purporting to affect the property he originally conveyed is not binding on him. 

Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet: 

• The maxim means that no person can convey a title better than what he himself possesses. 
• A transferee acquires only such title as the transferor validly held; no rectification or subsequent document can enlarge that title. 
• A derivative title, being dependent on the original grantor's title, cannot outvalue or exceed the title from which it is derived. 

Burden of Proof in Title Suits: 

• A plaintiff seeking a declaratory decree of title must establish his own case affirmatively and cannot rely on weaknesses in the defendant's case. 
• Long-standing revenue entries in another's name, though not conclusive of title, are relevant evidence of possession and can weigh against a plaintiff's belated claim.