Imprisonment for Remainder of Natural Life Without Remission

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih, in Ramasrey @ Fakkad v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2026), dismissed a batch of writ petitions challenging the constitutionality of sentences directing imprisonment for the remainder of a convict's natural life without remission, holding that the point was already settled by a Constitution Bench and that raising it again before a two-judge Bench amounted to an abuse of process. 

What was the Background of the Ramasrey @ Fakkad v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2026) Case? 

• The petitions were filed by four sets of convicts, including death row prisoners whose sentences had either been commuted by constitutional authorities or modified by courts to imprisonment for the remainder of their natural lives. 
• The petitioners contended that Section 302 of the IPC recognised only two punishments for murder — death and life imprisonment — and did not contemplate a sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission. 
• It was further argued that such sentences defeated the statutory remission power available to the appropriate government under Section 432 of the CrPC. 
• The petitioners accordingly sought a declaration that such sentences were unconstitutional, invoking the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 32. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the validity of such sentences: The Court held that the issue stood conclusively settled by the Constitution Bench decision in Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016), which had approved the "special category" of sentence evolved in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008). This category permits constitutional courts, in appropriate cases, to direct imprisonment for the remainder of a convict's natural life instead of the death penalty, placing such sentences beyond the ordinary remission regime. 
• On raising a settled issue before a smaller Bench: The Court found the petitions to be a misuse of process, since a coordinate or larger Bench issue could not be reagitated before a two-judge Bench once conclusively decided by a Constitution Bench. 
• On the continuing applicability of Section 432 CrPC (473 of BNSS): The Court clarified that where a sentence of life imprisonment is awarded without the specific addition of "without remission," the power of the appropriate government under Section 432 CrPC remains unaffected, and an application for remission under that provision would be maintainable. 
• On Article 32 not being a shortcut: The Court held that while Article 32 remains the "heart and soul" of the Constitution, it cannot be used to bypass the constitutional remedies of remission and clemency available under Articles 72 and 161. Since some petitioners had not exhausted these remedies, invoking the Supreme Court's extraordinary jurisdiction directly was unjustified. 
• On the scope of judicial review over clemency powers: The Court observed that the executive powers of the President and Governor under Articles 72 and 161 are unencumbered by other constitutional provisions, and that accepting the petitioners' argument would require the Court to sit in appeal — rather than judicial review — over an exercise of executive power, which is impermissible. 
• On relief granted: The Court dismissed the batch of petitions, holding the sentences of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission to be constitutionally valid. 

What is the "Special Category" Sentence of Imprisonment for Remainder of Natural Life? 

About: 

• It is a sentencing option, distinct from the ordinary sentence of life imprisonment, under which a convict is directed to undergo imprisonment for the rest of their natural life, in some cases without the benefit of remission or parole. 
• It was judicially evolved to bridge the gap between the death penalty and ordinary life imprisonment in cases where the death sentence is considered excessive but ordinary life imprisonment (subject to remission) is considered inadequate. 

Origin and Constitutional Basis: 

• The category traces its origin to Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008), where the Supreme Court held that constitutional courts could impose a sentence of imprisonment for a fixed term exceeding 14 years, or for the remainder of natural life, in place of death. 
• Its constitutional validity was affirmed by a Constitution Bench in Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016), which held that such sentences do not offend Article 20 or the sentencing scheme under the IPC. 

Interplay with Section 473 of BNSS: 

• This Section empowers the appropriate government to suspend or remit a sentence, in whole or in part. 
• Where a court specifically directs that a sentence be served "without remission," the ordinary remission power under this section stands excluded for that sentence. 
• Where no such specific bar is imposed, the government's power under Section 432 CrPC continues to operate even on a sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life. 

Interplay with Articles 72 and 161: 

• Articles 72 and 161 vest the President and the Governor, respectively, with power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions of punishment. 
• These powers operate independently of statutory remission under Section 432 CrPC and are not curtailed by a court's direction restricting statutory remission.