SC Clarifies Law on Approver's Evidence

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Manoj Misra of the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2026), held that corroboration of an approver's testimony is not an invariable requirement of law. The Court summarised the legal principles governing the evidentiary value of an accomplice's testimony and affirmed that a conviction may rest on an uncorroborated approver's statement, provided the court records reasons for its satisfaction that such reliance is safe.

What was the Background of Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2026) Case? 

• The case arose from a double murder committed in July 1984. According to the prosecution, a group of five individuals conspired to steal a truck by hiring it under the pretext of transporting goods and subsequently murdering both the driver and the cleaner. 
• The prosecution's case largely rested on the testimony of one of the accused who was subsequently granted pardon and turned approver. The trial court convicted the appellant on the basis of the approver's testimony, corroborated by independent evidence. 
• Before the Supreme Court, the appellant challenged the conviction on the ground that the approver's testimony was exculpatory in nature and lacked adequate independent corroboration. The Court rejected these contentions and upheld the conviction, while modifying the sentence in light of the time already served.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the nature of an approver's testimony: The Court held that an approver's testimony must be inculpatory and not exculpatory. However, where the testimony is not entirely exculpatory and makes a full and complete disclosure of events relating to the commission of the crime in a manner that inspires confidence, such testimony cannot be discarded merely because the approver does not implicate himself to the same extent as he implicates the co-accused. 
• On the statutory framework: The Court clarified that Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Section 138 of BSA)  permits a conviction to rest on an uncorroborated accomplice testimony. However, Section 133 cannot be read in isolation — Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act adds a note of caution that an accomplice's testimony is unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars. As a matter of practice and prudence, therefore, corroboration from direct or circumstantial evidence in material particulars is desirable before recording a conviction on an approver's testimony. 
• On the legal principles summarised: The Court laid down the following principles governing corroboration of an approver's testimony: 
  • Corroboration of an approver's testimony in material particulars is not an inviolable rule of law; it is a rule of prudence. A court may convict on an uncorroborated approver's testimony if it records reasons for its satisfaction that reliance on such testimony is safe. 
  • Corroborating evidence, if required, may be direct, circumstantial, or both. 
  • Where corroboration is considered necessary, it must come from independent sources. Ordinarily, the testimony of one approver cannot be used to corroborate another approver. 
  • Corroboration, when required, must render the approver's testimony believable in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is not, however, required that every material circumstance against the accused be independently confirmed. 
• On the facts of the case: The Court found that the approver had not attempted to absolve himself completely. His testimony disclosed his own participation in events leading to the murders, including physically assisting in restraining one of the victims. The Court further found substantial corroboration from independent evidence — including recovery and identification of the stolen truck, forensic evidence, identification of the victims, and circumstances consistent with the approver's narration. 
• Accordingly, the appeal was partly allowed. The conviction was upheld; however, noting that the appellant had already served 18 years of imprisonment, the Court applied the principle in Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016) and modified the life sentence to the period already undergone, directing the appellant's release.

What is Section 138 of BSA? 

Section 138 of BSA: 

• An accomplice is a competent witness against an accused person. 
• A conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice.

Section 133 of IEA vs. Section 138 of BSA: 

Why was the Change Made? 

• The original Bharatiya Sakshya Bill retained the word "uncorroborated" from Section 133 IEA. 
• The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs (Report No. 248) flagged a contradiction between the original clause and Illustration (b) to Clause 119(1) of the Bill (equivalent to Illustration (b) to Section 114 IEA), which cautioned that an accomplice's testimony is unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars. 
• The Committee recommended suitable amendment to remove this contradiction. 
• Accordingly, "uncorroborated" was substituted with "corroborated" in the final enacted text of Section 138, BSA.

Impact of the Change: 

• Section 138, BSA is now consonant with Illustration (b) to Section 119(1), BSA — removing the internal contradiction that existed under the IEA regime. 
• The substitution amounts to statutory recognition of the settled judicial principle laid down by the Supreme Court on the combined effect of Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the IEA — that as a matter of prudence, corroboration is required before acting on an accomplice's testimony.