Section 362 CrPC Does Not Curtail High Court's Inherent Power to Recall Judgment

Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandshekhar, in Mahavir alias Avnish v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2026), set aside a 2018 order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Gwalior Bench) which had declined to recall the appellant's conviction despite a finding that he was a juvenile on the date of the offence, holding that the High Court had wrongly treated Section 362 CrPC (403 of BNSS) as a bar on the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC (528 of BNSS).  

What was the Background of Mahavir alias Avnish v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2026) Case? 

• The appellant, Mahavir alias Avnish, had been convicted under Section 201 Part II of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (now Section 238 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) for causing disappearance of evidence in connection with the deaths of a woman and her infant daughter. 
• Charges of murder and dowry death under Sections 302 and 304B IPC against the accused were not proved, but the appellant and other accused were convicted under Section 201 Part II IPC, and this conviction was affirmed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in 2017. 
• The appellant subsequently approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking recall of the appellate judgment on the ground that he was a juvenile at the time the offence was committed. 
• On the High Court's direction, the Juvenile Justice Board conducted an inquiry and, relying on school records, a birth certificate, and other evidence, found that the appellant was 17 years, 2 months and 12 days old on the date of the incident. 
• Despite this finding of juvenility, the High Court declined to reopen the case on the ground that the conviction had attained finality up to the Supreme Court. 
• Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court in appeal. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the High Court's Error Regarding Finality: The Court found that the High Court had committed an error of record in treating the appellant's conviction as having attained finality, since only the SLPs filed by the appellant's parents had been heard and decided on merits with a reduction in sentence, while the appellant's own SLP had merely been dismissed as withdrawn, without any adjudication on merits. 
• On the Credibility of the Juvenility Claim: The Court observed that it did not appeal to common sense that the appellant would have withdrawn his petition without reason while his parents secured relief on sentence, and held that this supported his claim that he withdrew the SLP only to pursue the plea of juvenility before the High Court. 
• On the Relationship Between Section 362 and Section 482 CrPC: The Court explained that while Section 362 CrPC bars a court from altering or reviewing its judgment except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error, it does not take away the High Court's inherent power to recall an order passed without jurisdiction, in violation of natural justice, or under a mistake causing prejudice to a party. Relying on Ganesh Patel v. Umakant Rajoria, State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar & Ors., and Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held that such a recall amounts to a procedural review, distinct from the substantive review barred by Section 362 CrPC. 
• On the High Court's Inherent Jurisdiction to Do Complete Justice: Citing A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, the Court reiterated that procedural rules are meant to serve justice rather than defeat it, and that a wrong occasioned by a mistake of the Court must be remedied wherever it lies within the judicial machinery to do so. The Bench held that so long as the High Court remains seized of the matter, it retains inherent jurisdiction to correct its own order where a fundamental issue capable of altering the outcome exists, subject only to the self-restraint of judicial propriety, and that this power is not excluded by the limitations built into Section 482 CrPC. 
• On the Effect of the Juvenility Finding: The Court held that where a juvenile has been denied the statutory benefit of the Juvenile Justice framework and has thereby suffered grave prejudice, the High Court has the power to remedy the situation in the interest of justice. 
• On the Validity of the Conviction under Section 201 Part II IPC: Noting that the appellant had already been acquitted of the charges of murder and dowry death, the Court held that a conviction under Section 201 Part II IPC requires a finding that an offence was committed and that the accused caused evidence of that offence to disappear with intent to screen the offender. In the absence of any finding on the underlying offence, the appellant's conviction under this provision could not be sustained and was held to be illegal. 
• Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside both the High Court's order and the appellant's conviction, and discharged him from his bail bonds. 

What are Sections 403 & 528 of BNSS? 

Section 403 of the BNSS: 

Corresponding Old Provision: Section 362, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 

Bare Act Text: 

Court not to alter judgment. — Save as otherwise provided by this Sanhita or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.

Key Features: 

• Rule of Finality: Once a criminal court signs its judgment or final order disposing of a case, it becomes functus officio in respect of that matter and cannot revisit its own decision on merits. 
• Limited Exception: The only alteration permissible is the correction of a clerical or arithmetical error — that is, an error apparent on the face of the record, not a re-examination of the reasoning or conclusion. 
• "Save as Otherwise Provided": The bar operates subject to any contrary provision either within the BNSS itself (such as provisions for review, revision, or appeal) or under any other law in force, meaning Section 403 does not override express statutory powers of review found elsewhere. 
• Applies to Signed Judgments/Final Orders: The bar is triggered only once the judgment or final order has been signed; it does not restrict a court from altering a draft or unsigned order. 
• Object: The provision is intended to promote certainty and finality in criminal proceedings and to prevent courts from becoming appellate authorities over their own decisions. 

Section 528 of BNSS: 

Corresponding Old Provision: Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Bare Act Text: 

"528. Saving of inherent powers of High Court. — Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." 

Key Features: 

Section 528 does not confer a new power but saves and recognises three categories of inherent power already vested in the High Court: 

1. To give effect to any order passed under the Sanhita. 
2. To prevent abuse of the process of any court. 
3. To otherwise secure the ends of justice. 

• Applicable Only to High Courts: This inherent power is exercisable exclusively by the High Court and not by subordinate criminal courts. 
• Wide but Not Unfettered: Though expressed in broad terms, the power is to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and only in the rarest of cases, and not as a substitute for statutory remedies such as appeal or revision. 
• Self-Restraint, Not Statutory Limitation: Limits on the exercise of this power arise from judicial self-restraint and propriety rather than from any express restriction under the Sanhita.