List of Current Affairs

Source: Madras High Court

Why in News? 

A bench of Justices Anita Sumanth and Sunder Mohan of the Madras High Court, in the case of Nanjil Mugilan v. The State (2026), held that the consent of the Central Government under Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (no is a prerequisite for remission only when the sentence for the offence under the Central Act is still continuing. Once such sentence has been fully served by the convict, the bar under Section 435 no longer operates, and the State Government is free to consider the plea for remission on its own. The court further directed the implementation of the E-Prisons Early Release Processing Module, launched by NALSA, as a pilot project in Puzhal Central Prison, Tamil Nadu.

What was the Background of Nanjil Mugilan v. The State (2026) Case? 

• The petitioner's father was lodged in Chennai Central Prison and was serving a life sentence, having been convicted on October 20, 2004 for offences under Sections 148 (rigorous imprisonment of one year), 341 (simple imprisonment of one month), and 302 (life imprisonment, five counts) of the IPC, along with Section 3 (rigorous imprisonment of one year) of the Explosive Substances Act. 
• Appeals filed before the High Court and the Supreme Court were both dismissed. 
• By the time of the present petition, the convict had been incarcerated for over 21 years and was stated to have undergone substantial reformation. 
• The petitioner filed a representation before the authorities seeking premature release of his father, which was rejected citing a Government Order dated February 1, 2018 (G.O.(Ms).No.64), which barred consideration of cases attracting Section 435 CrPC. 
• Since the conviction included an offence under the Explosive Substances Act — a Central enactment — the State refused remission on the ground that Central Government consent under Section 435 was required. 
• The petitioner contended that his father had already served the sentence under the Central Act in full and that the bar under Section 435 therefore no longer applied.

What were the Court's Observations? 

On the scope of Section 435 CrPC: The court held that Section 435 CrPC obliges the State Government to consult the Central Government before remitting or commuting a sentence only in relation to the offence that attracts the said provision. The requirement of Central Government consent is not a blanket bar on all remission proceedings; it is confined to the period during which the sentence under the Central Act is still operative. 

On applicability once Central Act sentence is served: The court held that once the convict has served the sentence awarded for the offence under the Central Act, the requirement of seeking Central Government consent under Section 435 CrPC ceases to apply. The State Government is thereafter competent to consider the plea for remission without any such consultation. 

On the Government Order of 2018: The court held that the condition in G.O.(Ms).No.64, which referred to Section 435, must be understood in the same manner as the provision itself — that is, as applicable only during the subsistence of the sentence under the Central Act. Any contrary reading would be inconsistent with the explicit intention of the statutory provision and the State's own subsequent Government Orders on the subject. 

On rejection of the State's policy argument: The court rejected the State's submission that it had, as a policy, decided to exclude all cases attracting Section 435 CrPC from the benefit of remission orders. Such a blanket exclusion, without regard to whether the sentence under the Central Act had been served, was held to be contrary to the legal position settled by Supreme Court pronouncements on the matter. 

On directions issued: The court directed the competent authorities to reconsider the petitioner's father's case for premature release and to pass appropriate orders within four weeks.

What is Section 477 of BNSS? 

About: 

Section 477 of the BNSS, 2023 is the successor provision to Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It governs the exercise of the State Government's power to remit or commute sentences in cases where Central Government interests are involved, by making such exercise conditional upon prior concurrence of the Central Government. 

Key Provisions: 

• Sub-section (1) — Mandatory Concurrence: The State Government cannot exercise its powers of suspension, remission, or commutation under Sections 473 and 474 of the BNSS without first obtaining the concurrence of the Central Government, where the offence:  
  • Was investigated by any agency empowered to investigate under any Central Act other than the BNSS; or 
  • Involved misappropriation, destruction of, or damage to any property belonging to the Central Government; or 
  • Was committed by a Central Government servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. 
• Sub-section (2) — Concurrent Sentences Involving Union Matters: Where a convict has been sentenced to separate terms of imprisonment running concurrently, and some offences relate to matters within the executive power of the Union, no State Government order of suspension, remission, or commutation shall have effect unless a corresponding order has also been made by the Central Government in relation to those Union-related offences.

Comparison with Section 435 CrPC: 

• Section 477 BNSS is substantially similar to Section 435 CrPC in its object and operation — both provisions condition State remission powers on Central Government concurrence in specified categories of cases. 
• The key difference in drafting is that Section 477 BNSS uses the term "concurrence" in place of "consultation" used under Section 435 CrPC, indicating a stronger requirement of agreement rather than merely seeking an opinion. 
• Sub-section (2) of Section 477 explicitly addresses the scenario of concurrent sentences straddling both Central and State subject-matter — a position that was largely developed through judicial interpretation under the old CrPC regime.

Source: Kerala High Court

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of Justice Raja Vijayaraghavan V. and Justice K.V. Jayakumar of the Kerala High Court, in the case of M/s Cochin Minerals and Rutile Limited and Ors. v. Directorate of Enforcement (2026), held that the Enforcement Directorate may initiate civil action under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 without the prior registration of an FIR or filing of a complaint in respect of a scheduled offence.  

• The Court dismissed an appeal by Cochin Minerals and Rutile Limited (CMRL) and its officials challenging a Single Bench order that had dismissed their plea to quash the ED proceedings, and upheld the Single Judge's order in its entirety.

What was the Background of M/s Cochin Minerals and Rutile Limited and Ors. v. Directorate of Enforcement (2026)? 

• In 2023, a complaint was filed before the Ministry of Corporate Affairs seeking investigation into the affairs of CMRL under Sections 210 and 212 of the Companies Act, alleging misappropriation of public funds. 
• It was alleged that CMRL paid bribes to Veena Thaikandiyil (Veena Vijayan), daughter of former Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan, her company Exalogic Solutions Pvt. Ltd., and other public servants, and carried out illegal financial transactions. 
• The Ministry appointed three Inspectors to carry out the investigation and assigned SFIO to look into CMRL's affairs. 
• CMRL subsequently learned through media reports that a case had been registered under the PMLA in relation to Exalogic, based on a SFIO complaint. 
• The ED issued summons to CMRL's office bearers, who refused to appear on the ground that the PMLA proceedings lacked jurisdiction. 
• CMRL approached the Kerala High Court seeking to quash the proceedings arising out of the Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) and to stay the summons issued against its officials. 
• The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, holding it premature at the stage of issuance of summons and finding that FIR registration for scheduled offences is not a pre-condition for issuance of summons under the PMLA. CMRL then appealed before the Division Bench.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the nature of ECIR vis-à-vis FIR: The Court held that an ECIR is not a statutory document under the PMLA and is therefore not equivalent to an FIR under the CrPC. Since the ECIR lacks statutory character, even the non-registration of an ECIR does not impede the commencement of civil action under the PMLA, and consequently, no prayer for quashing an ECIR can be granted. 
• On the requirement of a prior FIR for civil action: The Court held that the non-registration of an FIR or non-filing of a complaint in respect of a scheduled offence does not bar the ED from initiating civil action under the PMLA. Registration of a scheduled offence is a pre-requisite only for penal prosecution under Section 3, and not for civil action of attachment under Section 5 or for exercise of the inquiry power under Section 15 of the PMLA. 
• On the scope of Section 50 inquiry power: The Court held that the ED's power of inquiry under Section 50 of the PMLA can be lawfully exercised without a prior FIR or complaint involving a scheduled offence, as no such pre-condition is mandated by the statute for the exercise of inquiry powers. 
• On the premature challenge to summons: The Court affirmed the Single Judge's finding that the challenge to summons at so early a stage was premature, particularly given that the SFIO had subsequently filed a complaint against the petitioners alleging scheduled offences under the PMLA after the case was heard and reserved for orders. 
• Accordingly, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal and upheld the Single Judge's order dismissing the writ petition.

What is the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002? 

About:  

• The PMLA which came into force in 2005, is an act to prevent money-laundering and to provide for confiscation of property derived from, or involved in, money-laundering and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

Enforcement Agency:  

• The act empowers the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) to investigate, attach, confiscate assets, and prosecute offenders. 

Scope: 

• Applies to individuals, companies, financial institutions, and intermediaries involved directly or indirectly in money laundering. 

Key Provisions of PMLA:  

• Offences and penalties: Defines money-laundering offences and prescribes rigorous imprisonment and fines. All the offences under PMLA are cognisable and non-bailable.  
• Attachment and confiscation: Empowers authorities to attach and confiscate proceeds of crime through an Adjudicating Authority.  
• Proceeds of crime: Covers any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, from criminal activity related to scheduled offences, and also includes equivalent property when such proceeds are held or taken outside the country.  
• Reporting Obligations: Mandates banks and financial institutions to maintain records and report suspicious transactions to Financial Intelligence Unit-India (FIU-IND) 
• Institutional framework: Provides for a Designated Authority and an Appellate Tribunal to ensure investigation oversight and appellate review. 

Judicial Pronouncements:  

• Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2022): The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the PMLA, including the ED’s powers of arrest, attachment, and investigation. It ruled that the accused has no right to receive a copy of the ECIR (Enforcement Case Information Report).  
• Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement (2024): The Supreme Court held that arrest under Section 19 of the PMLA must satisfy a high threshold of “reason to believe”, based on material that is legally admissible and not merely on suspicion.