List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Manoj Misra of the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2026), held that corroboration of an approver's testimony is not an invariable requirement of law. The Court summarised the legal principles governing the evidentiary value of an accomplice's testimony and affirmed that a conviction may rest on an uncorroborated approver's statement, provided the court records reasons for its satisfaction that such reliance is safe.

What was the Background of Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2026) Case? 

• The case arose from a double murder committed in July 1984. According to the prosecution, a group of five individuals conspired to steal a truck by hiring it under the pretext of transporting goods and subsequently murdering both the driver and the cleaner. 
• The prosecution's case largely rested on the testimony of one of the accused who was subsequently granted pardon and turned approver. The trial court convicted the appellant on the basis of the approver's testimony, corroborated by independent evidence. 
• Before the Supreme Court, the appellant challenged the conviction on the ground that the approver's testimony was exculpatory in nature and lacked adequate independent corroboration. The Court rejected these contentions and upheld the conviction, while modifying the sentence in light of the time already served.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the nature of an approver's testimony: The Court held that an approver's testimony must be inculpatory and not exculpatory. However, where the testimony is not entirely exculpatory and makes a full and complete disclosure of events relating to the commission of the crime in a manner that inspires confidence, such testimony cannot be discarded merely because the approver does not implicate himself to the same extent as he implicates the co-accused. 
• On the statutory framework: The Court clarified that Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Section 138 of BSA)  permits a conviction to rest on an uncorroborated accomplice testimony. However, Section 133 cannot be read in isolation — Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act adds a note of caution that an accomplice's testimony is unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars. As a matter of practice and prudence, therefore, corroboration from direct or circumstantial evidence in material particulars is desirable before recording a conviction on an approver's testimony. 
• On the legal principles summarised: The Court laid down the following principles governing corroboration of an approver's testimony: 
  • Corroboration of an approver's testimony in material particulars is not an inviolable rule of law; it is a rule of prudence. A court may convict on an uncorroborated approver's testimony if it records reasons for its satisfaction that reliance on such testimony is safe. 
  • Corroborating evidence, if required, may be direct, circumstantial, or both. 
  • Where corroboration is considered necessary, it must come from independent sources. Ordinarily, the testimony of one approver cannot be used to corroborate another approver. 
  • Corroboration, when required, must render the approver's testimony believable in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is not, however, required that every material circumstance against the accused be independently confirmed. 
• On the facts of the case: The Court found that the approver had not attempted to absolve himself completely. His testimony disclosed his own participation in events leading to the murders, including physically assisting in restraining one of the victims. The Court further found substantial corroboration from independent evidence — including recovery and identification of the stolen truck, forensic evidence, identification of the victims, and circumstances consistent with the approver's narration. 
• Accordingly, the appeal was partly allowed. The conviction was upheld; however, noting that the appellant had already served 18 years of imprisonment, the Court applied the principle in Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016) and modified the life sentence to the period already undergone, directing the appellant's release.

What is Section 138 of BSA? 

Section 138 of BSA: 

• An accomplice is a competent witness against an accused person. 
• A conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice.

Section 133 of IEA vs. Section 138 of BSA: 

Why was the Change Made? 

• The original Bharatiya Sakshya Bill retained the word "uncorroborated" from Section 133 IEA. 
• The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs (Report No. 248) flagged a contradiction between the original clause and Illustration (b) to Clause 119(1) of the Bill (equivalent to Illustration (b) to Section 114 IEA), which cautioned that an accomplice's testimony is unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars. 
• The Committee recommended suitable amendment to remove this contradiction. 
• Accordingly, "uncorroborated" was substituted with "corroborated" in the final enacted text of Section 138, BSA.

Impact of the Change: 

• Section 138, BSA is now consonant with Illustration (b) to Section 119(1), BSA — removing the internal contradiction that existed under the IEA regime. 
• The substitution amounts to statutory recognition of the settled judicial principle laid down by the Supreme Court on the combined effect of Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the IEA — that as a matter of prudence, corroboration is required before acting on an accomplice's testimony. 

Source: High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of Justice Sindhu Sharma and Justice Shahzad Azeem of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, in the case of Manzoor Ahmad Bhat v. Union of India & Ors. (2026), held that a contractual employee engaged under the Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS) cannot invoke the constitutional safeguards available to holders of civil posts under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI).  

• The Court dismissed a Letters Patent Appeal filed by Manzoor Ahmad Bhat challenging the judgment of the Single Judge, which had upheld the termination of his services as Laboratory Assistant under ECHS on grounds of unsatisfactory performance.

What was the Background of Manzoor Ahmad Bhat v. Union of India & Ors. (2026) Case? 

• The appellant was appointed as a Laboratory Assistant under the Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme. His engagement was initially for a fixed term and was subsequently extended through agreements executed in 2005 and 2006. 
• In May 2007, the appellant was served with a termination notice by the authorities citing deficiencies in laboratory functioning and repeated lapses in professional conduct. He submitted a reply to the notice, but the respondents proceeded to pass an order terminating his services. 
• Aggrieved, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court contending that the officer issuing the termination notice lacked competence and that the order was stigmatic in nature, necessitating a regular departmental enquiry in accordance with principles of natural justice. 
• The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, holding that the termination was in accordance with the contractual terms. The appellant then preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the nature of contractual employment and Article 311: The Court held that the appellant was neither holding a civil post nor was he a member of any civil service. His engagement was purely contractual and renewed from time to time under separate agreements. Consequently, the constitutional safeguards under Article 311 were not available to him. 
• On the contractual right to terminate: The Court noted that Clause (11) of the employment agreement specifically empowered the respondents to terminate the engagement by giving one month's notice or salary in lieu thereof, and contemplated termination on grounds including professional incompetence, misconduct, moral turpitude, and unsatisfactory performance of duties. Exercise of such a contractual right does not amount to punishment. 
• On the stigmatic nature of the order: The Court rejected the appellant's contention that the termination order was stigmatic. It held that the termination was not based upon any specific allegation of misconduct requiring a disciplinary enquiry, but stemmed from the appellant's overall unsatisfactory performance and lack of professional competence, as evidenced by repeated warnings and inspection reports on record. 
• On the distinguishability of Anoop Jaiswal: The Court distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, holding that in that case termination was founded upon specific allegations of misconduct concealed behind an innocuous order, whereas the present case involved termination for unsatisfactory performance under clear contractual terms. 
• On reliance upon precedent: The Court placed reliance on the Supreme Court's judgments in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36, and State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi (1976), reiterating that where an employer exercises a contractual or statutory right of termination and the order does not cast any stigma or impose penal consequences, Article 311 is not attracted. 
• Accordingly, the Division Bench found no infirmity in the Single Judge's judgment and dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal.

What is Article 311 of the COI? 

Article 311 – Dismissal, Removal or Reduction in Rank of Civil Servants 

• Clause (1): No member of a civil service (Union, All-India, or State) or holder of a civil post shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority. 
• Clause (2): No such person shall be dismissed, removed, or reduced in rank except after an inquiry where:  
  • He is informed of the charges against him, and 
  • Given a reasonable opportunity of being heard 
  • Once penalty is proposed after inquiry, no further opportunity for representation on the penalty is required. 

Exceptions (Clause 2 does not apply) when:  

• (a) Dismissal/removal is on grounds of conduct leading to conviction on a criminal charge 
• (b) The competent authority records in writing that holding an inquiry is not reasonably practicable 
• (c) The President or Governor is satisfied that inquiry is not expedient in the interest of State security 
• Clause (3): If a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, the decision of the authority empowered to dismiss/remove/reduce in rank shall be final.