List of Current Affairs

Source: Uttarakhand High Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Alok Mahra, in Shardul Negi v. State of Uttarakhand (2026), quashed criminal proceedings under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, (Section 108 of BNS) holding that a mere refusal to marry cannot, by itself, be treated as instigation to commit suicide within the meaning of Section 107 IPC. 

What was the Background of Shardul Negi v. State of Uttarakhand (2026) Case? 

• The case arose out of Sessions Trial No. 23 of 2020, in which the petitioner, Shardul Negi, was alleged to have been in a relationship with the deceased, a staff nurse. 
• The prosecution's case was that when the petitioner decided to end the relationship and declined to marry her, the deceased fell into depression and died by consuming an overdose of the medicine Midazolam. 
• An FIR was lodged by the deceased's father, following which a charge sheet under Section 306 IPC was filed against the petitioner. 
• The Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tehri Garhwal, framed charges against the petitioner, who then filed a revision petition before the High Court challenging the charge-framing order. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the ingredients missing from the prosecution's case: The petitioner argued that even taking the prosecution's version at face value, the essential ingredients of Section 306 IPC were absent, and that a refusal to marry could not be equated with instigation as defined under Section 107 IPC. 
• On the State's opposition: The State and the complainant contended that at the charge-framing stage, courts are not required to conduct a detailed appreciation of evidence, that a prima facie case was made out, and that setting aside the charge was inappropriate given the advanced stage of trial. 
• On the threshold for abetment under Section 306 IPC: Relying on the Supreme Court's rulings in Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal and Prakash v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held that before a person can be held liable under Section 306, the prosecution must establish direct or indirect acts of provocation or incitement that left the deceased with no option but to end their life. 
• On the misuse of Section 306 IPC: The Court expressed disapproval of the routine and mechanical invocation of Section 306 IPC by the police, observing that while genuine cases meeting the threshold should be dealt with firmly, the provision ought not to be used merely to placate the immediate sentiments of a grieving family. 
• On the standard for assessing conduct: The Court held that the conduct of the accused and the deceased must be evaluated from a practical, real-life perspective rather than in isolation, and that ordinary exchanges involving exaggerated or hyperbolic language cannot, without more, be elevated to the level of instigation to suicide. 
• On the duty of trial courts: The Court cautioned trial courts against adopting a "play it safe" approach by mechanically framing charges even where investigating agencies have disregarded the essential ingredients of Section 306 IPC, and held that trial courts must exercise due caution and circumspection at the stage of framing charges. 
• On the absence of instigation in the present case: The Court found no evidence of any overt act, active instigation, or intentional aid on the part of the petitioner that could have driven the deceased to take her own life. 
• On relief granted: The revision petition was allowed, the trial court's order framing charges was set aside, and the proceedings against the petitioner were quashed. 

What is the Legal Position on Abetment of Suicide under BNS? 

Section 108 of BNS – Abetment of Suicide: 

• Chapter: Chapter VI (Of Offences Affecting the Human Body) 
• Provision: Whoever abets the commission of suicide by any person shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term extending up to ten years, along with liability to fine. 
• Punishment: Imprisonment up to 10 years and fine. 
• Cognizability: Cognizable offence. 
• Bailability: Non-bailable offence. 
• Triable by: Court of Session. 

Comparison with Section 306, Indian Penal Code, 1860: 

• Textual continuity: Section 108 BNS reproduces Section 306 IPC verbatim in substance — the ingredients (abetment, suicide, punishment) and the punishment prescribed (up to 10 years' imprisonment and fine) remain unchanged. 
• Classification: Both provisions are cognizable, non-bailable, and triable exclusively by the Court of Session; there is no change in procedural classification. 
• Numbering shift: The only material change is the renumbering — from Section 306 under the IPC to Section 108 under the BNS — consistent with the broader renumbering exercise across the new criminal codes. 
• Chapter placement: Under the IPC, the provision fell within Chapter XVI (Offences Affecting the Human Body). Under the BNS, it is retained within the corresponding Chapter VI, which consolidates offences affecting the human body, preserving its original scheme of placement alongside homicide and hurt-related offences. 
• No change in judicial interpretation: Since the language of Section 108 BNS is identical to Section 306 IPC, existing Supreme Court and High Court precedents on abetment of suicide — including the requirement of a positive act of instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid under Section 107 IPC (now Section 45 BNS) — continue to apply without modification. 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice KV Viswanathan and Justice Alok Aradhe, in Jaspal Singh v. Ashwani Kumar (2026), held that a contractual clause providing for refund of earnest money in the event of default does not, by itself, prevent a court from granting specific performance of an agreement to sell. 

What was the Background of Jaspal Singh v. Ashwani Kumar (2026) Case? 

• An Agreement to Sell dated June 22, 2003 was executed under which the plaintiff agreed to purchase the defendant's half share in 12 marlas of land for ₹12.50 lakh. 
• The appellant (plaintiff) paid ₹9 lakh as earnest money, and the parties subsequently extended the deadline for execution of the sale deed twice, with the respondent receiving an additional ₹60,000. 
• Alleging that the respondent failed to execute the sale deed despite his readiness and willingness to complete the transaction, the appellant filed a suit for specific performance in 2006. 
• The respondent denied the agreement, claiming that the documents had been signed as security for a separate financial arrangement connected with his proposed travel abroad. 
• The Trial Court granted only a refund of the earnest money. The First Appellate Court decreed specific performance. The High Court, in second appeal, restored the Trial Court's decree, prompting the plaintiff to approach the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the effect of a refund clause on the obligation to perform: The Court held that a clause merely providing for refund of earnest money in case the sale deed could not be executed does not amount to an election or a stipulation entitling the seller to discharge the bargain, at his option, by paying that sum in lieu of executing the sale deed. Such a clause records no more than the bare consequence flowing from non-execution, operating as a deterrent reinforcing the obligation to perform rather than as a substitute for it, and protects the purchaser's minimum entitlement without curtailing his right to insist on performance. 
• On the High Court's error in restoring the Trial Court's decree: The Court held that the High Court committed an error in interfering with the First Appellate Court's decision, having wrongly construed the refund clause as discharging the seller from the obligation of specific performance. 
• On the object of Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963: The Court held that accepting the High Court's interpretation would reward a defaulting vendor who had already received a substantial part of the sale consideration and had twice sought extensions for execution of the sale deed, and that such a construction would defeat rather than serve the object of Section 23. The Court further observed that the mere naming of a sum as damages or penalty in a contract does not by itself entitle the defaulting party to escape specific performance by paying that sum, and that a contrary reading would render Section 23 meaningless. 
• On the scope of second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC: The Court held that the High Court exceeded the limited scope of its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, reiterating that a High Court hearing a second appeal cannot reappreciate evidence or interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless such findings are perverse or unsupported by evidence. 
• On the respondent's defence of fabrication: The Court held that the respondent failed to establish his defence that the agreement was fabricated from signed blank papers, noting that he admitted his signatures on all three agreements and led no expert evidence to support the allegation of fraud. 
• On sale of an undivided share and consensual extensions: The Court held that sale of an undivided share in jointly owned property is legally permissible and cannot itself create suspicion about the genuineness of a transaction, and that the consensual extensions of time for execution of the sale deed did not indicate that the agreement was a sham. 
• On relief granted: The appeal was allowed, and the First Appellate Court's order decreeing specific performance was restored. 

What is the Legal Position on Refund Clauses and Specific Performance? 

Refund Clauses in Agreements to Sell: 

• A clause providing for refund of earnest money on non-execution of a sale deed does not, by itself, discharge the seller's obligation to perform the contract. 
• Such a clause must contain clear language of election or a stipulation permitting the seller to opt out of performance by payment, before it can be read as a substitute for specific performance. 
• Absent such language, the clause functions only as a deterrent and as a floor protecting the purchaser's minimum entitlement. 

Section 23, Specific Relief Act, 1963: 

• The provision governs the construction of clauses naming a sum as damages or penalty for breach of contract. 
• A contract remains specifically enforceable notwithstanding such a clause, unless the clause clearly shows an intention to allow performance to be substituted by payment. 
• Reading such clauses as automatic escape routes from performance would render Section 23 otiose. 

Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Second Appeal): 

• A second appeal lies only on a substantial question of law. 
• The High Court cannot reappreciate evidence or disturb concurrent findings of fact reached by the courts below. 
• Interference is permissible only where such findings are shown to be perverse or wholly unsupported by evidence.